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Remarks on the Origin of legis actio sacramento in rem 
 
 
Legis actio sacramento in rem has belonged to the most debated issues of literature on Roman 
Law up to the present day. The literature on the subject would fill a whole library, only its 
approximate treatment would require a separate monograph.1 When explaining the origins of 
legis actio sacramento in rem one can distinguish several, more or less clearly isolated trends. 
For the purposes of the present study the theory of oath and the theory of personal fight are 
the most important. The fundamentally sacred character of legis actio sacramento is 
emphasised by the theory of oath which sets forth that the principal aim of communal control 
could be the expiatio of the divinity retaliating the perjury, the sacramentum of the defeated 
party. This theory is also corroborated by the text of vindicatio that appears as a strictly 
formalised, religious-magical carmen.2 Although it is much older,3 the theory of personal 
fight is traced back to Jhering, and its essence is that in the beginning the parties actually 
fought against each other for the thing constituting the object of their controversy, but the 
community (the state) brought the fight under its own control in order to preserve internal 
peace. Therefore, the fight, in the form of legis actio sacramento in rem, as it is known today 
was enacted only symbolically, by employing the rod (festuca) instead of the spear (hasta).4 
The aim of the present study is merely to highlight a possibility – based mainly on the 
primary sources and partly on the findings of the literature on the subject – which will not 
consider the motifs of sacredness and private fight contradictory in the structure of legis actio 
sacramento in rem but will mingle them as organically complementing components. 
The present study wishes to highlight the following aspects of the description of Gaius.5 The 
sacred character of legis actio procedure is proved by the almost neurotic adherence to the 
words to be recited,6 and the same phenomenon is also exemplified by Pliny’s account of the 
dedicatio of Ops Opifera’s temple. (I.) Traces of private fight and arbitrary action are shown 
by the origins of the term vindicatio as well as by the rod used in the procedure instead of a 
spear. All the more so, as Gaius also explains this with the fact that what the Romans 
considered truly their own was the goods taken from the enemy; i.e., obtained by fight. 
Besides the connection between iudicium centumvirale and the hasta, the close relation 
between the spear and the cult of Mars also deserves special attention, as the hasta also 
carried a very important semantic load. (II.) The structure of ius fetiale, which regulated the 
law of war and of peace in the archaic age, a typical example of the intertwining of peaceful 
and martial elements, and rerum repetitio as well as clarigatio show remarkable parallel with 
legis sacramento in rem. (III.) In Plautus’s comedy, Casina, the right to dispose over the 
                                                 
1
 Cf. Zlinszky, J.: Gedanken zur legis actio sacramento in rem. Zeitschrift der Savigny-
Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung 106. 1989. 107 ff. 
2
 Wieacker, F.: Ius. Die Entstehung einer archaischen Rechtsordnung. In: Rechtswissenschaft 
und Rechtsentwicklung. Göttingen 1980. 33 ff.; Kaser, M.: Über „relatives Eigentum” im 
altrömischen Recht. ZSS 102. 1985. 1 ff.; Horvát, M.: Deux phases du procès romain. In: 
Mél. H. Lévy-Bruhl. Paris 1959. 163 ff.; Kaser, M.: Das römische Privatrecht, I–II. München 
1971–1975. I. 20. 22. 
3
 Staszków, M.: „Vim dicere” im altrömischen Prozeß. ZSS 80. 1963. 85 ff. 
4
 Jhering, R.: Der Geist des römischen Rechts. Leipzig 1880–1891. 114. 150. 163; Lévy-
Bruhl, H.: Le simulacre combat dans le „sacramentum in rem”. In: Studi in onore di P. 
Bonfante. Milano 1930. III. 83 ff.; Kaser 1971–1975. I. 20. 
5
 Gai. inst. 4, 16. 
6
 Köves-Zulauf, Th.: Bevezetés a római vallás és monda történetébe (Introduction to the 
history of Roman Religion and Myth). Budapest 1995. 249. 
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protagonist, a slave girl is decided by actual fight, followed by divine judgement. This 
procedure also shows remarkable similarities with the vindicatio mentioned by Gaius. (IV.) 
 
I. It is sufficiently well known that legis actio sacramento is strongly text-centred because – 
as Gaius himself emphasizes – the one who had mispronounced even one word of the text lost 
the case.1 In Roman thinking, the belief in the reality constituting character of the spoken 
word was of utmost importance.2 It is also very significant that for the Romans the concept of 
Fate, fatum, which determines human life, originally meant the (divine) word, the declared 
divine decision, thus fate came into being by expressing the decision of higher powers in 
words.3 “The reason is the firm belief of the Romans in the numinous power of the uttered 
word, their conviction that being was ultimately identical with uttered being, complete reality 
was only reality expressed in words.”4 Let us consider an example from the sphere of 
religious law (the dedicatio was part of ius publicum.) for the case when the validity of the 
sacred-judicial act did not depend only on the precise order of the words to be uttered but also 
on the exact pronunciation of each sound. 
Pliny Maior relates that Ops Opifera’s temple was consecrated by the pontifex maximus, 
Metellus, but because of his impediments of speech he had to struggle for several months 
until he was able to pronounce the words of the dedicatio.5 Succinctly, the historical 
background of the story is as follows: Sometime between 123 and 104 BC. a new, fourth 
temple was erected for the goddess Ops Opfiera (it cannot be excluded but it seems scarcely 
probable that her temple on the Capitolium was renovated); and this had to be consecrated by 
the pontifex maximus L. Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus, about whose career nothing else is 
known than he occupied the office of pontifex maximus in 114 BC.6 Pliny’s text mentions 
Metellus’s articulatory difficulties, which do not seem to bear much relevance from a 
historical point of view, yet its religious aspect highlights a cardinal point in Roman religio; 
namely, the requirement “that the words to be spoken should follow a pre-determined, 
precisely ordered, accurate pattern.”7 Perfect physical integrity was an essential condition for 
the fulfilment of clerical office in Roman religion,8 just as in several other religions as well,9 
which does not seem to be striking as this requirement was observed in the case of sacrificial 
animals10 as well as the official participants of the sacrifices.11 The question may arise how it 
was possible for Metellus to act as pontifex maximus, as he is the only pontifex whose 
                                                 
1
 Gai. inst. 4, 11. 30. 
2
 The importance of the sacral elements is pointed out by Kaser, M.: Das altrömische ius. 
Göttingen 1949. 309 ff. 
3
 See Pötscher, W.: Das römische fatum – Begriff und Verwendung. In: Hellas und Rom. 
Hildesheim 1988. 490 ff. 
4
 Köves-Zulauf, Th.: Reden und Schweigen. Römische Religion bei Plinius Maior. München 
1972. 312; Köves-Zulauf 1995. 207. 
5
 Plin. nat. 11, 174. 
6
 About the different presumtions of the year of the dedication see Wissowa, G.: Religion und 
Kultus der Römer. München 1912. 203; Latte, K.: Römische Religionsgeschichte. München 
1976. 73; Broughton, T. R. S.: The Magistrates of the Roman Republic. New York 
1951/1952. 1960. 532. 
7
 Köves-Zulauf 1995. 71. 
8
 Wissowa 1912. 491. 
9
 Plat. leg. 6, 759c; Lev. 21, 17 ff. 
10
 Sen. contr. 4, 2. 
11
 Plin. nat. 7, 105. 
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congenital disability is known.1 On the one hand, the increasing rationality of the age – as a 
result of which certain religious prescriptions were not taken so seriously, or were somehow 
evaded – might have played an important part in L. Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus’s 
becoming pontifex;2 on the other hand, the other important reason might have been the fact 
that the texts that had to be recited by the Roman priesthood were previously-determined, thus 
even a pontifex afflicted with severe articulatory problems could memorize them through long 
and troublesome rehearsal.3 Naturally, this would not have been possible in the case of a 
religion based on spontaneous religious discourse, free preaching, and prophetic prayer.4 
It is likely that the text of the dedicatio contained the name of the goddess Ops Opifera, which 
probably constituted double challenge for the pontifex’s cumbrous tongue (inexplanata 
lingua): the pronunciation of the alliterating name was most likely not an easy task for a 
person with speech impediments, who was possibly stuttering as well. In addition, the exact 
naming of the goddess was particularly important in the course of the dedicatio, given the fact 
that Ops Opifera was one of the deities of sowing.5 (The importance of the goddess Ops was 
never questionable for the Romans because – as her name also shows6 – she was related to 
richness, more precisely to the richness of the harvest; Ops was the incarnation of the rich 
yield of land, the helpful feature of Mother Earth.7 As a matter of fact, according to the 
minutious, hair splitting character of Roman religion, several different divine aspects of the 
earth were differentiated: it was generally venerated as Tellus, in its life augmenting aspect as 
Ceres, and in its harvest yielding effect as Ops.8 However, Roman religion distinguished even 
between the various aspects of Ops, as it was usual to connect different, so called 
Sondergottheiten to chronologically consecutive elements of various acts and events.9 On 
August 25 they celebrated Ops Consiva the goddess who performed the gathering of the 
harvest, two days earlier, on August 23 they celebrated Ops Opifera,10 from which it can be 
clearly inferred that by the name Ops Opifera – its second particle being related to the verb 
ferre – “the goddess bringing the richness of harvest” should be understood.11 The 
was also celebrated on August 23, and its logical connection with the celebration of Ops 
Opifera becomes clear if one considers that the grain not yet gathered in the granary is the 
most exposed to the danger of fire and thus it is the most in need of Ops Opifera’s help 
against Volcanus.12) Today it is impossible to clarify it in every detail why the Romans 
thought the naming of the deities of sowing to be particularly dangerous, but the importance 
of the goddess Ops becomes evident from the fact that during the research for Rome’s secret 
protective deities – the name was kept secret precisely to prevent the evocatio by the enemy – 
she was also a possible candidate to have fulfilled this function.13 
                                                 
1
 Cf. Köves-Zulauf 1972. 76. 
2
 Latte 1976. 276. 
3
 Latte 1976. 198. 392; Wissowa 1912. 397; Dumézil, G.: La religion romaine archaïque. 
Paris 1966. 53 ff. 
4
 Köves-Zulauf 1972. 77. 
5
 Köves-Zulauf 1972. 78. 
6
 Cf. Walde, A.–Hofmann, J. B.: Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch, I–II. Heidelberg 
1954. II. 205 f. 
7
 Radke, G.: Die Götter Altitaliens. Münster 1965. 238 ff. 
8
 Köves-Zulauf 1995. 76. 
9
 Latte 1976. 51 ff.; Radke 1965. 239 ff. 
10
 Radke 1965. 239. 
11
 Köves-Zulauf 1995. 77; Köves-Zulauf 1972. 79. 
12
 Latte 1976. 73. 129; Köves-Zulauf 1972. 79. 
13
 Macr. Sat. 3, 9, 3–4. 
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What conclusion can be drawn from all these regarding the present inquiry? The words of the 
vindicatio of legis actio sacramento in rem, developed for real estates, are referred to as 
carmen by Cicero as well.1 Inferring from the various meanings of the word carmen, the 
words of legis actio sacramento in rem qualified as magical, numinous, legal texts.2 
 
II. The in rem actiones are called vindicationes by Gaius,3 which harmonizes with the 
terminology of legis actio sacramento in rem, and in iure cessio, as well as adoptio, vindicare 
in libertatem and vindicare hereditatem.4 From the etymological attempts at defining the 
origin of the expressions “vindex”, “vindicatio”, “vindicta” the one proposed by Varro,5 
emphasizing the characteristic of force, “vim dicere” and relating the verb “dicere” to the 
core *deik (see also deiknyō, deiknymi) seems the most plausible, even if this cannot be 
undoubtedly demonstrated with modern linguistic evidence.6 The word dikē is traditionally 
derived from the root *deik of the verb deiknymi (to show, to point at, to explain, to testify); 
its basic meaning of direction, way, custom is supplemented with the meanings customary 
procedure, decision, resolution, trial, and law.7 (These two meanings, traditionally derived 
from each other are approached from a new aspect by Palmer who asserts that the meaning of 
signalling, custom, characteristic, particularity and the meaning decision, resolution, of the 
word dikē, originally the borderline drawn between two litigant parties derived from the root 
*deik, developed in parallel, independently from each other, and so neither of them can be 
considered secondary, derived from the other.8) When trying to understand the structure of 
vindicatio, Varro’s traditionally Roman etymology is of utmost importance, because it 
demonstrates the most clearly how the Romans themselves experienced and how they 
subsequently interpreted the most basic one of all the procedures termed as vindicatio, i.e., 
legis sacramento in rem.9 
It can be rightly assumed that in the beginning – and probably later on as well – the spear as 
weapon was nothing else than a long, sharp rod made of hard wood, and hardened in fire.10 If 
the hasta was the weapon with which in the course of the fights they could win loot, 
                                                 
1
 Cic. Mur. 26. Cf. Nótári, T.: Jog, vallás és retorika (Law, Religon and Rhetoric). Szeged 
2006. 52 ff. 
2
 Szádeczky-Kardoss S.–Tegyey I.: Szöveggyűjtemény a régi római irodalomból (Textbook of 
the Ancient Roman Literature). Debrecen 1998. 19 ff. (Quoted e.g. Ov. trist. 4, 1, 1–14; Tib. 
2, 6, 12–26; Porphyr. ad Hor. epist. 1, 1, 62; Hor. ars 417; Plaut. Trin. 349–352; Hor. epist. 2, 
1, 134–155; Macr. Sat. 5, 20, 17–18; Gell. 4, 9, 1–2; Varro ling. 6, 21; Plin. nat. 27, 12, 131; 
Quint. inst. 1, 6, 40; Varro ling. 7, 27; Fest. 325; Cic. div. 1, 1, 114–115; Fest. 325; Cic. div. 
1, 1, 114–115; Paul. Fest. 160; Cic. Brut. 19, 75; Liv. 1, 32, 5–14; 10, 38, 2–13.) 
3
 Gai. inst. 4, 5. 
4
 Gai. inst. 4, 16–17; 2, 24; 1, 134; Paul. D. 10, 4, 12 pr.; Gai. inst. 2, 120. Cf. Düll, R.: Vom 
vindex zum iudex. ZSS 54. 1934. 105. 
5
 Varro ling. 6, 60. 
6
 Cf. Walde–Hofmann 1954. II. 793 f. 
7
 Gonda, J.: ΔΕΙΚΝΥΜΙ: Semantische Studie over den Indo-Germanische Wortel DEIK. Paris 
1929. 224–232; Benveniste, E.: Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes. Paris 1969. 
II. 107–110; Gagarin, M.: „Dikē” in the „Works and Days”. Classical Philology 68. 1973. 
82. 
8
 Palmer, L. R.: The Indo-European Origins of Greek Justice. Oxford 1950. 157 ff. 
9
 Nótári, T.: Festuca autem utebantur quasi hastae loco. Acta Facultatis Politico-Iuridicae 
Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae 51. 2004. 133 ff. 
10
 Cic. Verr. 4, 125; Plin. nat. 16, 65; Tac. ann. 2, 14; Prop. 4, 1, 28; Amm. 31, 7, 12. 
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recognition, and hence power, it is no wonder that shortly it became the symbol of power.1 
This is also shown by Verrius Festus’s definition: “hasta summa armorum et imperii est”,2 
and the reference to imperium, especially in connection with the spear, reminds one of its 
magico-religious character, belonging to the sacred sphere.3 It is not by chance that the 
expression subhastatio means – and this is also mentioned by Gaius4 – the selling of loot, 
especially the selling of captives,5 obtained from the enemy through armed fight, and later 
meant any kind of auction in general.6 When presenting the institution of decemvri stlitibus 
iudicandis, Pomponius uses the term hastae praeesse7 which could not mean anything else 
but the leading of iudicium centumvirale. However, iudicium centumvirale came into being 
only one hundred years after the date assumed by Pomponius (242–227 BC.),8 thus the 
historical credibility of Pomponius’s report becomes doubtful, it can be safely stated that only 
a magistratus cum imperio was entitled to decide the question of legitimum dominium.9 The 
insignia of iudicium centumvirale,10 founded in the 2nd century BC. was the so-called hasta 
centumviralis. By the end of the republic the presidency of this court of law was fulfilled by a 
proquestor, due to the engagement of the praetores.11 Augustus appointed again a praetor as 
supervisor at the head of the iudicium centumvirale.12 Novellius Torquatus Atticus was the 
first praetor hastarius or praetor ad hastam known by name. With this disposition, Augustus 
probably did not introduce a new rule but revived an older one.13 If the court was sitting in 
different parts, the man, chosen by the praetor hastarius from among the decemvirii to 
preside the court ad hoc, was using his own spear in the iudicium,14 which fact is corroborated 
by Quintilian’s report of duae hastae in the case when the iudicium centumvirale was 
functioning divided into two parts.15 The iudicium centumvirale, judging cases of inheritance 
under the supervision of the praetor hastarius was usually sitting in four sections in the 
basilica Iulia.16 
In Servius’s commentary of Vergil’s Aeneid the description of the following ceremony can be 
found: “Is qui belli susceperat curam, sacrarium Martis ingressus primo ancilia 
commovebat, post hastam simulacri ipsius, dicens: ‘Mars vigila!’”17 The picture of the deity 
                                                 
1
 Waele, F. J. M. de: The Magic Staff or Rod in Graeco-Italian Antiquity. Gent 1927. 172. 
2
 Fest. 55, 3. 
3
 See Pötscher, W.: ’Numen’ und ’numen Augusti’. In: Hellas und Rom. Hildesheim 1988. 
462; Wagenvoort, H.: Wesenszüge altrömischer Religion. In: Aufstieg und Niedergang der 
römischen Welt, I/2. Berlin–New York 1972. 371 f. 
4
 Gai. inst. 4, 16. quod maxime sua esse credebant quae ex hostibus cepissent 
5
 Fest. 55, 9; 90, 19. 
6
 C. 10, 3, 1. 2. 5. 6; Liv. 2, 14, 1–4; Dion. Hal. 5, 34, 4; Val. Max. 3, 2, 2; Cic. off. 2, 27. 83; 
Phil. 2, 64. 103; Varro rust. 2, 10, 4; Sen. suas. 6, 3. Vö. Alföldi, A.: Hasta – Summa Imperii. 
The Spear as Embodiment of Sovereignty in Rome. American Journal of Acheology 63. 1959. 
3. 8; Waele 1927. 172. 
7
 Pomp. D. 1, 2, 2, 29. 
8
 Mommsen, Th.: Römisches Staatsrecht, I–III. Berlin 1887–1888. I. 275. 
9
 Alföldi 1959. 9. 
10
 Cf. Mommsen 1887–1888. II. 225. 
11
 Suet. Aug. 36, 1; Stat. 4, 4, 41. 
12
 Mommsen 1887–1888. II. 225; Alföldi 1959. 9. 
13
 CIL 6, 1365, 13; 8, 22721, 5; ILS 950; Mon. Ancyr. 8, 5. 
14
 Alföldi 1959. 10. 
15
 Quint. inst. 5, 2, 1; 11, 1, 78. 
16
 Plin. epist. 5, 9, 1–2. 5; 6, 33, 2–5; Quint. inst. 12, 5, 6. 
17
 Serv. in Verg. Aen. 8, 3. 
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could not be too old, because the Romans did not represent the image of their gods in the 
beginning,1 and Servius’s explanation goes back to Varro, just as Plutarch’s similar remark.2 
Seemingly, Varro gets into contradiction with the tradition, which has knowledge of several 
spears in Mars’s sacrarium. These must have been the spears of the salii, which were kept in 
the sacrarium Martis, together with the shields.3 The plural of shields is not surprising 
because – as it becomes evident from the aitologian myth explaining the institution of the salii 
– Numa Pompilius ordered the manufacturing of another eleven copies of the ancile 
descending from the sky, in order to prevent the stealing of the original one. During their 
processions the salii were carrying the ancile in their left and were beating it with a spear-like 
rod.4 The form of these spears was not identical with the form of those that were generally 
known and actually used for fighting in the Classical Age but they preserved – just like the 
shields of the salii – their archaic shape: They were so-called hasta pura, made exclusively of 
wood without any iron, and their prodigium was shown by their movement without any 
human agency in the sacrarium.5 
Nevertheless, the spears of the salii must be distinguished from Mars’s spear, which was – as 
they were venerating Mars’s presence in it6 – surrounded by a cult that was due to a deity,7 as 
the veneration of gods (e.g. Iuppiter, Lapis, Terminus) in some material form was usual for 
the Romans, which can be explained by the concept of the Person-Bereicheinheit.8 (The 
Person-Bereichdenken was a special way of experiencing the world for the man of antiquity, 
in the course of which he experienced physical reality, objects, processes, or states as such, 
and, at the same time, he experienced them as divinity as well. The thing and the divinity is 
often designated with the same word, and sometimes it is considerably difficult to decide, 
whether in a particular case themis or Themis, fortuna or Fortuna, terminus or Terminus 
should be written. Naturally, either solution is chosen, the other component is tacitly part of 
the concept and should be taken into account as well.9 Designation with the same word seems 
to suggest juxtaposition but in fact it means the unity of the person and his/her function, the 
sphere of authority represented by him/her, in which alternatively one or the other aspect 
comes to the fore.10) Iustinius in his Epitoma Historiarum Pompei Trogi mentions that, in the 
beginning, the spear was surrounded by a divine cult.11 Servius, based on Varro, reports that 
the beginning of war, after the moving of the ancilia, the celebrating priest also moved the 
hasta, as the image of the deity (simulacrum ipsius) and in the course of this he awoke Mars 
with the appeal “Mars vigila!” and by this, if we conceive Mars as a Person-Bereicheinheit, 
                                                 
1
 August. civ. 4, 31; Plut. Numa 8; Latte 1976. 150; Herter, H.: Zum bildlosen Kultus der 
Alten. Rheinisches Museum 74. 1925. 164 ff. 
2
 Norden, E.: Aus altrömischen Priesterbüchern. Leipzig 1939. 173 ff.; Plut. Rom. 29, 1. 
3
 Gell. 4, 6, 1–2; Wissowa 1912. 556. 
4
 Plut. Numa 13, 7; Dion. Hal. 2, 70. 
5
 Serv. in Verg. Aen. 6, 760; Liv. 40, 19, 2; Obseq. 6. (60); 19. (78); 36. (96); 44. (104); 50. 
(110) 
6
 Dumézil, G.: L’héritage indo-européen à Rome. Paris 1949. 60. 
7
 Arnob. 6, 11. (coluisse) pro Marte Romanos hastam, Varronis ut indicant Musae 
8
 Wissowa 1912. 144; Latte 1976. 114 ff.; Scholz, U. W.: Studien zum altitalischen und 
altrömischen Marskult und Marsmythos. Heidelberg 1970. 29; Pötscher 457 f. 
9
 Cf. Pötscher, W.: Ares. Gymnasium 66. 1959. 4 ff. 
10
 Pöscher, W.: Das Person-Bereichdenken in der frühgriechischen Periode. Wiener Studien 
72. 1959. 24. 
11
 Iustin. 43, 3, 3. Nam ab origine rerum pro diis immortalibus veteres hastas coluere. 
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he awoke War itself.1 There is no need of any further explication to see the manaistic, 
numinous aspect recognized by Wagenvoort in this religious act.2 The derivation of 
Quirinus’s name, meaning “spear” from the word of Sabin origin quiris-curis can be found in 
the works of several authors,3 and Iuno’s name, Quiritis is also explained this way.4 It is not 
by chance that Thormann appositely translates the name Quirites of the Roman citizens with 
the expression Speermänner.5 
Hence it becomes clear that Roman thinking connected somehow the concept of the force 
inherent in the spear, the numen both with Mars and with Quirinus, but the exact definition of 
this connection is encumbered by the fact that the existing sources expound on this numinous 
force only in the case of hasta Martis.6 The question arises why they were using a rod, the 
festuca instead of the spear meaning iustum dominium, in the course of the symbolic fight of 
legis actio sacramento in rem. According to Herman van den Brink the festuca and the hasta 
are parts of two completely different symbolic systems.7 He considers the spear to be an Indo-
European symbol of power,8 whereas he regards the rod as part of the Mediterranean culture.9 
At the same time, he disregards the point that at the time when these symbols were formed, 
the differences between the spear and the rod most probably had not occurred yet, as both 
were made of wood; the only minor differences could be the size or that the rod used as a 
weapon was hardened in fire.10 The fact that in the ceremony of the vindicatio the festuca 
stood for; i.e., represented the hasta can be explained by the disposition which from the 
beginning attempted to restrict the use of the spear within the pomerium and to confine it to 
the sphere of the most necessary rites.11 
 
III. Comparing ius fetiale and ius privatum several valuable parallels can be drawn with 
regard to the structure of clarigatio, rerum repetitio, and legis actio sacramento.12 The norms 
with a powerfully religious character of ius fetiale show close connection with several other 
Roman legal institutions; all the more so because for the man of the age it is difficult to 
imagine a bond with more binding power than the oath, including self malediction as well.13 
(According to Dahlheim, due to its strong superstitious-religious determination ius fetiale 
                                                 
1
 Serv. in Verg. Aen. 8, 3. Est autem sacrorum: nam is qui belli susceperat curam, sacrarium 
Martis ingressus primo ancilia commovebat, post hastam simulacri ipsius, dicens „Mars 
vigila”. 
2
 Wagenvoort 1972. 352 ff. 
3
 Ov. fast. 2, 475 ff.; Marc. Sat. 1, 9, 16; Dion. Hal. 2, 48, 2–4; Plut. Rom. 29, 1. 
4
 Fest. 43, 5. Curitim Iunonem appellabant, quia eandem ferre hastam putabant.; 55, 6. 
Iunonis Curitis ... quae ita appellabatur a ferenda hasta, quae lingua Sabinorum curis dicitur. 
5
 Thormann, K. F.: Der doppelte Ursprung der mancipatio, ein Beitrag zur Erforschung des 
frührömischen Rechtes unter Mitberücksichtigung des Nexum. München 1943. 32. 80 ff. 
6
 Alföldi 1959. 19. 
7
 Brink, H. v. d.: Staff laying. In: The Charm of Legal History. Amsterdam 1974. 68. 
8
 Cf. Neufeld, E.: The Hittite Laws. London 1951. 
9
 Brink 1974. 70 ff.; 77. 
10
 Waele 1927. 172. 
11
 Alföldi 1959. 4. 
12
 Donatuti, G.: La „clarigatio” o „rerum repetitio” e l’instituto paralello dell’ antica 
procedura civile romana. Iura 6. 1955. 31 ff.; Volterra, E.: L’instituto della „clarigatio” e 
l’antica procedura delle „legis actiones”. In: Scritti Carnelutti. Padova 1950. 251 ff. 
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lacks any kind of moral background.1 However, his view can be contested because legal 
formalism and legal ethics are not mutually exclusive components.2) In the archaic age, the 
interstate relationships of Rome were governed by a body of twenty priests, called the 
fetiales.3 Their tasks included the contracting of alliances, the foedus, the establishment of the 
conditions of armistices, and the declaration of war, given the fact that the war could only 
qualify as bellum pium ac iustum if it was declared and started in accordance with the rules of 
ius fetiale.4 (It is interesting that for the Romans the basic principle of the invulnerability of 
the envoys was indisputable. Whereas in the case of the Greeks the division of the institution 
of the kēryx, enjoying sacred protection and the presbeis, invulnerable as a result of a political 
agreement took place very early, in Rome the fetialis and later the other envoys – even if they 
did not belong to the fetiales5 – enjoyed sacred protection, even in time of war.6) 
The foedus – etymologically related to the expression fides7 –, the Roman state contract 
implemented by observing the required formalities,8 as opposed to the hospitium,9 the 
amicitia,10 the societas11 and the pax, does not signify the content of the contract but its form, 
and its most important element is the ceremonial oath made by the representative of the 
populus Romanus.12 The ceremony of the foedus is presented by Livy. According to him the 
priest (pater patratus), chosen from among the fetiales, consecrated by reciting the texts 
selected for the occasion and being touched with a bunch of sacred grass (sagmina), takes the 
oath after reading out the text of the contract.13 In the oath he calls Iuppiter, the pater patratus 
of the people making contract with him, and the people themselves to witness that the contract 
that has been read does not contain any falsity, and that the Roman people will not deviate 
from the former, and if they did – and here follows the self malediction – then he asks Iuppiter 
to come down on the Roman people the way he is just knocking down the sacrificial pig. 
Moreover, he should strike even more severely, as he is more powerful than the priest. Then 
he stabbed the sacrificial animal.14 Festus recounts a somewhat different formula, according 
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which the pater patratus, after knocking down the pig with a stone, asks Iuppiter to throw him 
out of his wealth as he is throwing away the stone if he proceeded falsely, but he entreats the 
god to spare his city.1 Polybios calls Rome’s first contract with Carthago an agreement per 
Iovem lapidem,2 Cicero ranks the per Iovem lapidem oath formula among ius civile.3 
When discussing ius fetiale it should be pointed out that the Romans were the first to interpret 
war as a legal fact and they created the concept of bellum iustum, influential up to the present 
day.4 Not all armed conflicts counted as war, bellum could only take place between peoples 
(populi), only the enemy possessing an organized state counted as hostis. In accordance with 
this, Cicero can state that only the oath given to the enemy obliges, the one given to robbers 
does not.5 We can depart from Livy’s description in the case of the declaration of war as well. 
On the border of that people’s land from which he demands satisfaction (rerum repetitio, or 
clarigatio6) the pater patratus declares that he presents his demands as an envoy of the 
Roman people, observing the divine law, and he calls Iuppiter, the borders (fines) and the 
divine law (fas) to witness that if he demanded the delivery of the mentioned people or things 
unrightfully, then Iuppiter should not allow him to return to his country. He recites this at the 
crossing of the border, and with slight alterations to the first person he encounters, and again, 
when he enters the town, and finally on the main square.7 If they do not deliver the things 
asked by him within thirty-three days – Dionysius Halicarnassensis mentions an interval of 
thirty days8 –, after calling Iuppiter, Ianus Quirinius, and all the gods witness, he declares that 
he did not receive what he demanded, and that on returning to Rome, he wishes to deliberate 
about how they could take revenge. This means that he declares the possibility of war 
(testatio, or denuntiatio belli).9 Arriving in Rome, the envoy presented the case to the Fathers 
and if the majority decided for purum piumque duellum, the pater patratus took an iron tipped 
or fire-hardened spear (hastam ferratam aut praeustam sanguineam) to the enemy’s border, 
and there, making reference to the unrightfulness of the refusal of his demand, he declared 
war and threw the spear onto the enemy’s territory.10 (Thus the direct causa of the war was 
enemy people’s unlawful behaviour, the fact that they did not deliver the things or people 
demanded by the Romans.11) 
As a matter of fact, there was no need of such declaration of war if the enemy invaded Roman 
territory. In this case they could immediately and unconditionally begin the counter attack, so 
the declaration of war implemented by the fetiales had any significance only in the case of 
offensive warfare, initiated by the Romans. The archaic age certainly knew the institution of 
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personal revenge, but the official declaration of war was only employed if the war was waged 
by the entire community, the populus, against another people, which was clearly distinguished 
from armed conflict between different groups of the aristocracy.1 In the course of its 
expansion Rome did not always have the opportunity to keep this ritual; therefore, the 
characteristically Roman formal conservatism chose the following fiction: The pater patratus 
threw the spear onto a plot of land declared enemy territory near Bellona’s temple and the 
entire ceremony was performed with respect to that plot of land, but the demands towards the 
enemy were presented by the legati of the senatus, and they were the ones to declare war.2 
(Sometimes they sent the spear to the people on whom they wanted to declare war.3) 
However, the fetiales’s ritual of the declaration of war considerably contributed to the 
observation of the requirement that the war had to possess some kind of iusta causa, and it is 
not by chance that Cicero, formulating the theory of just war under the influence of Stoic 
philosophy, connects aequitas belli with ius fetiale.4 
The hasta ferrata aut praeusta sanguinea, meaning iron tipped or fire hardened spear, 
mentioned by Livy,5 also deserves attention. At the same time, it is not known when the iron-
tipped spear was substituted for, or when it accompanied the wooden spear hardened in fire, 
as the Iron Age goes back to the turn of the 8th and 9th century BC. in Italy. It can be assumed 
though, that in ritual usage the iron-tipped spear could only take the place of the wooden one 
when it came to be exclusively used in everyday life.6 The expression sanguinea is 
particularly problematic: The word itself can be translated as consecrated in blood or 
coloured with blood. However, if it is taken for the denomination of the wooden material, it 
can mean the branch of the cornel tree, the sanguineae virgae, which, being hard wood, 
constituted a perfectly suitable raw material for the spear.7 Ammianus Marcellinus mentions 
in connection with the fetiales’s spear that besmearing it with blood played an important role 
in the course of its manufacturing.8 The spear made of cornel wood counted as arbor felix,9 
but the spear used for the declaration of war was hasta impura; i.e., arbor infelix, dedicated to 
the forces of the underworld.10 Thus, whether the fetiales’s spear was coloured with real 
or made of blood coloured cornel wood, the original hasta praeusta sanguinea was later 
changed for hasta ferrata sanguine infecta.11 The fetialis ritually predicts the outcome of war 
at its very beginning because by symbolically taking the enemy territory into possession with 
the hasta impura, dedicated to the gods of the underworld, he delivers the enemy, the hostis 
impius, bereft of the reason for its existence, to the forces of destruction.12 (In the light of this, 
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the role of evocatio, performed by the Romans before the attack, by which they intended to 
lure to Rome the gods of the enemy doomed to destruction becomes perfectly clear.1)  
The strongly text-centered nature of ius fetiale and legis actio sacramento is sufficiently well-
known; we know that whoever missed even one word of the text, lost the case.2 Although in 
the case of ius fetiale we have no expressis verbis knowledge of such consequences, it can be 
rightly assumed that the Romans did not tolerate even the slightest deviation from the text 
because this would have destroyed the effect of carmen, hence it would have endangered the 
result of the bellum iustum, fought with divine help.3 The oath is an indispensable part of ius 
fetiale. On the one hand, the self malediction of the pater patratus on the occasion that he 
presented unrightful demands in the name of the Roman people; on the other hand, the calling 
of the gods to witness the lawful procedure of the Romans and the unlawful procedure of the 
enemy. In the case of legis actio, a sacramentum corresponds to this oath.4 The oath-like 
character of sacramentum is clearly shown by the original meaning of the word itself.5 At the 
same time, it also incorporates the circumstance that the statement of the party taking the oath 
– e.g. the plaintiff – is true, and accordingly, the statement of his opponent is false. However, 
if in the end it were proved that the claim of the plaintiff does not stand, then it becomes 
evident that he committed perjury; i.e., he performed his own devotio.6 (Kaser also suspects 
that in the beginning the sacramentum was related to the divine judgement, but in his view 
this cannot be sufficiently documented for the period from which written sources exist.7 It is 
still a fact that the character of divine judgement can be traced – by analogy – also in this part 
of legis actio sacramento. References to the role played by the oath in the trial can be found 
not only in literary sources, but in traces, in later legal documents as well.8) It seems a further 
parallel that both rerum repetitio and legis actio sacramento are originally aimed at regaining 
the things unlawfully possessed by the opposing party in a peaceful manner, placing 
arbitrariness and fight under the control of the state, thus limiting their scope and intensity.9 
At the same time, it is a clear difference that whereas in the case of legis actio sacramento the 
parties accept the control and decision of a judge recognized by both of them, in the case of 
ius fetiale, this institution is absent. This is demonstrated by the fact that in the so-called 
international affairs they could not agree on the competence of legal court – this might be the 
cause of the absence of the apud iudicem stage of ius fetiale procedure – it can be rightly 
assumed though that the Romans found the umpire entitled to decide in the conflict of two 
nations exactly in the higher powers, who were so often called to witness.10 
Ius fetiale is a clearly religious system of norms and procedures, as this is shown by 
references made constantly to the persons and gods acting in it. Nevertheless, legis actio 
sacramento, considered to be an institution of ius privatum shows close connection with ius 
sacrum: In the beginning legis actio was performed in front of the rex, who was present, both 
in his person and his legitimacy, as a representative of the sphere of the sacred. Then the in 
iure stage of the trial took place in front of the magistratus; then, in concreto, it took place in 
front of the praetor, who was in terms of his jurisdictional responsibilities an inheritor of the 
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 The oath, strictly observing the words of the text, was also addressed to the gods, which 
substantiates the assumption that legis actio was closely related to ius sacrum.2 (Certain 
parallels can be detected between ius fetiale and the leges XII tabularum;3 for example the 
debtor had thirty days to satisfy the demand of the creditor if he admitted his indebtedness, or 
if the case was settled by legal decision. Similarly, the pater patratus had to wait with the 
denuntiatio belli for thirty days after he had announced his demands, according to Dionyssius 
Halicarnassesensis.4 The reason of both decrees was to help to find a peaceful solution of the 
conflict within this interval. In line with the relevant loci of the leges XII tabularum order on 
giving the person who causes damage into noxa,5 ius fetiale stipulates the extradition of the 
person who commits a deed injurious to Rome.6) The same intention, meant to restrict the 
uncontrollable arbitrary enforcement of private demands between the citizens of a state, or 
between different nations and states, trying to prevent the state of bellum omnium contra 
omnes by placing the act of solving the conflict under some kind of commonly accepted 
higher instance, might have stood at the origins of both ius fetiale and legis actio 
sacramento.7 
 
IV. It is sufficiently well known that in Homer’s Iliad Zeus decides certain armed conflicts 
with the help of his scales8 through the so-called psykhostasia, and kerostasia9 – this scene 
can be found with minor modifications in Virgil as well10 – and it is also known that in certain 
cases the combatants decide by lot who should start the fight, thus asking for the help of the 
gods.11 Naturally, the drawing of lots by oraculum was known by the Romans as well.12 Most 
often they practiced the version in which the wooden tickets of the persons taking part in the 
draw were placed in an urn, the sitella filled with water. It was bellied but had a narrow neck, 
and after reciting certain magic words and shaking the urn, they drew conclusions regarding 
the divine will from the sortes sinking or floating on the surface, of which only one could 
remain above due to the narrow neck of the urn.13 A similar procedure can be found in 
Plautus’s comedy, entitled Casina, which is all the more significant as Plautus, though often 
used Greek plots, had to adapt the scenes of his comedies to Roman thinking and everyday 
life, otherwise he could not have expected them to be successful. In Casina not merely a 
common oraculum is presented but the decision of a legal conflict by single combat – leading 
to the employment of actual violence – with the help of oraculum. This procedure shows a 
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special mixture of oraculum based on divine decision and archaic vindicatio, requiring the 
employment of vis, to the extent that it makes steps towards the repression of violence 
through oraculum, based on the decision of divine forces.1 
The situation in Casina is the following: The Athenian Cleostrata, wife of Lysidamus 
acquired and brought up the slave girl Casina out of her own fortune. Contradiction arises 
concerning the right to dispose over Casina. On the one hand, Lysidamus wants to acquire her 
for himself and his slave, Olympio; on the other hand, Cleostrata also claims the girl for 
herself and her slave, Chalinus. On behalf of the husband the vilicus, Olympio, on behalf of 
the wife Chalinus take part in the actual dispute.2 In the course of the dispute physical 
violence is used by the slaves representing the opposing husband and wife; at the same time, 
the oraculum preceding actual fight also begins. The two sortes are placed into the sitella and 
the actual fight takes place simultaneously with the ceremony. Chalinus is defeated in the 
oraculum, Olympio and his master are the winners, and the dispute is decided in favour of 
Cleostrata by the employment of a trick only in the second part of the play.3 
At the beginning of the procedure Cleostrata complains that her husband restricts her in her 
freedom to dispose over her slave, who constitutes her own property,4 and in reply her 
neighbour, Myrrhina reminds her of the rule of Roman matrimonial law that guarantees that 
the husband has the right to dispose over his wife’s entire property. In the dispute Lysidamus 
tries to convince his wife to yield to him, but Cleostrata sticks to her claim that she is entitled 
to provide for and dispose over her slave.5 The married couple agrees to entrust two slaves 
with the fight over Casina, however, both do this in the secret hope that they can force each 
other’s slaves to renounce Casina.6 The two slaves appear, and Lysidamus tells Chalinus that 
he promised Cassina to his slave, Olympio, to which Chalinus responds that Cleostrata 
promised the girl to him.7 Lysidamus offers to liberate Chalinus, if he renounces Casina, but 
the slave does not accept that.8 Lysidamus calls his wife and orders Chalinus to bring a sitella 
full of water and the sortes belonging to it, and announces that if the negotiations do not yield 
any result he will entrust the oraculum with the decision.9 Meanwhile Cleostrata tries to 
dissuade Olympio from clinging to Casina, but he says that he would not change his mind 
even at Iuppiter’s request.10 There is nothing left to do but turning to sortio, however, the 
oraculum, in which the will of the gods concerning the issue is manifested cannot dispense 
with vis, the actual fight.11 When Chalinus appears with the sitella and the sortes, Lysidamus 
announces that the fight must be fought observing the formal requirements of the procedure, 
and that he himself, wants to supervise it.12 However, he makes a final attempt at persuading 
Cleostrata, but she categorically refuses.13 So the ceremony begins, and the fact that 
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is performed strictly in adherence to the rules receives special emphasis.1 The sortes are 
marked with inscriptions and they check if there is any other sors in the urn, as well as the 
fact that the two balls are made of the same wood, as the winner of the oraculum will be the 
one whose sors will remain above in the urn.2 Then the urn is placed in front of Cleostrata, 
her task being to shake it and to draw out the sors.3 The two participants of the oraculum, 
Olympio and Chalinus pray to the gods to help their case and they accurse the adversary.4 
After the prayers Lysidamus calls on the parties to begin the actual combat, he wishes 
Olympio good luck, and so does his wife to Chalinus. Olympio asks Lysidamus whether he 
should hit Chalinus with his fist or with his open palm, to which his master replies that he 
should proceed the way he wants. Then Olympio, calling Iuppiter to help slaps Chalinus in 
the face, while Chalinus, calling Iuno to help, hits Olympio with his fist.5 After the outright 
violence, Cleostrata has to draw the sors that has remained above in the urn, and the parties 
are asked to cease fighting.6 Cleostrata draws out Olympio’s sors because that one is above, 
and announces that Chalinus is the loser, and Lysidamus announces that the gods have 
supported Olympio, fighting on his behalf. Olympio considers his victory to be a reward for 
his own, and for his ancestors’ pietas.7 So the case is settled with Casina having to marry 
Olympio, while Cleostrata has to make preparations for the ceremonial feast, which she 
begins, having accepted the decision of the oraculum.8 
As it becomes evident from the prologue of the play, Plautus modelled his comedy on 
Diphilus’s play, Klēroumenoi, and – as it is clearly shown by its title – the Greek play is also 
centred around a kind of sortio, a drawing or casting of lots, which is not in the least 
surprising taking into account that the oracula involving drawing of lots constituted an 
integral part of Greek religious thinking and religious practice.9 Plautus is a great master of 
intermingling Greek elements with Roman everyday life, customs, religion and law, and he 
explains in the prologue those elements of his play which could be strange to the Roman 
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audience. So he does with the motif of the slaves’ ‘marriage’,1 yet he does not consider it 
necessary to add any explanations to the settlement of the contradiction arising about the right 
to dispose over a slave by oraculum and fight; he is only content to mention the perfect 
righteousness and legality of the procedure.2 (The typically Roman character is corroborated 
by the reference to the decree of the leges XII tabularum, repudium.3) The fight of the Horatii 
and the Curiatii, described by Livy can be mentioned as a parallel to the single combat fought 
under ceremonial circumstances, as well as the form of the interstate contracts, in the course 
of which they call Iuppiter to help and also as witness, the actual fight being signified by the 
expression manum conserere.4 The act of manum conserere can also be encountered in 
Cicero’s and Gellius’s descriptions of the vindicatio of plots of land. From the comparison of 
these sources it becomes evident that the employment of vis, the actual – later symbolic – 
violence constituted a substantial part of legis actio sacramento.5  
The ritual described by Plautus must have constituted a certain intermediary stage between 
personal fight and vindicatio, as it is known today because in this case the parties agree on the 
rules of the settlement of the conflict, and they accept the control of a third person. The rules 
to be observed are mainly religious in character, and seem to be suitable to impede boundless 
and unrestricted violence. Nevertheless, vis is unquestionably part of the procedure, but the 
winner in the actual fight is decided by a higher, transcendental power; therefore, the fight 
receives the character of ordeal.6 The conditions of vindicatio in Casina are given: The right 
to dispose over the slave girl can be regarded as a kind of property issue, yet the opposing 
parties are substituted by their slaves in the procedure as taking into account the rules of 
comedy it would not be advisable to put on stage man and wife, Lysidamus and Cleostrata 
using violence against each other. However, the fight always concerns the rights and interests 
of their owners.7 First the husband announces his claim for the right to dispose over Casina, 
then, in response the wife does the same.8 Then – after trying in vain to persuade the 
opponent’s slave to give up their plans concerning Casina – the couple agrees that the 
decision in the dispute over the right of disposal should be reached in a procedure acceptable 
for both of them, and they agree to accept the decision as obligatory even if it happens to be 
unfavourable for them.9 
The accepted procedure is the oraculum, relying on sortio as well, which also included actual 
fight, as it is clearly shown by the expressions “necessumst vorsis gladiis”,10 “conlatis signis 
depugnarier”11 and “ire obviam”.12 To this extent the procedure is analogous with the 
vindicatio described by Gaius, as the employment of vis – in the beginning actual, later 
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symbolic – played an important role in this procedure as well.1 The command “age” calls for 
the beginning of the fight,2 which ends with the victory of one of the parties; the defeated one 
is regarded victus, or even mortuus.3 The actual fight – armed, as mentioned by the sources, 
but actually bare handed4 – is an essential part of the vindicatio; however, the dispute is not 
decided by the fight itself, but by the divine judgement, the oraculum, serving as the frame or 
background of the fight, somehow involving it into the mechanism of decision. Numerous 
parallels can be observed between the vindicatio in Plautus and the legis actio sacramento in 
rem known from Gaius’s Institutiones. The parties fight with the same weapons, and they 
recite the verba sollemnia which calls the divinity to help including an oath as well, together 
with the symbolic enactment of violence by using the festuca.5 
At the end of this brief study, not intended to be exhaustive, only wishing to highlight some 
aspects and associations, the following conclusions can be drawn: In our view, the opposing 
theories searching for the origin of legis actio sacramento in rem either in personal fight or in 
the religious sphere can be integrated into a single theory where they augment each other and 
produce the same result. The sacred element (by which not only the religious world view that 
names divinities is understood, but also the magic thinking that operates with numinous 
forces) can be clearly traced in the vindicatio procedure in the requirement of the verbatim 
recital of both the oath, the sacramentum and the carmen. The motif of the fight appears both 
in the etymology of the word vindicatio and in the employment of the spear. However, it is 
precisely the hasta that carries a religious extra semantic load in Roman imagination (this 
becomes evident from its role played both in Mars’s cult and in the declaration of war, which 
is a part of ius sacrum) which cannot be disregarded in the case of archaic civil law trial. 
Adapting to the rules of the genre, Plautus presents a quasi-property trial, the result of which 
is decided by restricted and controlled personal fight, employing the drawing of lots, thus 
calling for divine judgement. Based on all these, it can be rightly assumed that originally it 
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When scrutinizing the concept of authority, presenting the basic definition of auctoritas, the 
capacity of increase and augmentation, Hannah Arendt appositely quotes the relevant passage 
of Cicero which asserts that the task of founding the state, human community, as well as the 
preservation of what has already been founded, highly resembles the function of numen, i.e., 
divine operation;1 and in connection with this, she claims that in this respect the Romans 
regarded religious and political activity as being almost identical.2 The paper will examine 
various aspects of numen, one of the most important phenomena of Roman religion (I.), its 
etymology (II.), the institution of triumphus, a phenomenon that seems to be relevant from 
this point of view (III.), and the function of flamen Dialis, one of the most numinous 
phenomena of Roman religion (IV.), and finally the concept of numen Augusti, which 
incorporates these elements of the religious sphere into the legitimation of power. (V.)  
 
I. The concept of Augustus’s numen is of utmost importance from several points of view 
with respect to the subsequent cult of the emperor since it is not only the former Octavianus 
who, as a living person, is invested with numen exploitable in public life; his given name, 
Augustus, carries in itself the expression augus, which bears religious connotations.3 The 
leader who has imperium and auctoritas in the Roman conceptual sphere represents a 
certain archetype, because imperium originally meant nothing else than mana, the charisma 
of the leader; i.e., one’s capacity to implement, give birth to something in other persons.4 
The term numen, especially in ancient Roman sources, is mentioned in connection with 
gods, the senate, the Roman people as well as in relation to the mind on a more abstract, 
philosophical level as a superhuman force in itself which is nevertheless most frequently 
connected to a person of some kind. Rose defines the concept in perfect accordance with the 
meanings that occur in these sources: “Numen signifies a superhuman force, impersonal in 
itself but regularly belonging to a person (a god of some kind) or occasionally to an 
exceptionally important body of human beings, as the Roman senate or people.”5 This does 
not seem to be especially surprising as the senate fulfilled numerous religious functions. 
The religious identity and divine origin of the Quirites was widely accepted as well, and 
Cicero also drew a parallel between aminus and princeps deus in Somnium Scipionis.6 Thus, 
numen, especially according to the dynamistic trend associated with Wagenvoort’s name, 
signified—to use this Polynesian expression—a kind of mana, a mysterious force that 
dwells in a thing or in a person.7 
Numen Augusti, the concept of the charismatic leader, who represents deity in a special way, 
can be understood precisely by investigating the ambivalent relationship of Roman religion 
with epiphany, the numinous experience of the divine presence; at this point it becomes 
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apparent that the germs of certain later developed elements were present as far back as the 
stage of the most ancient Roman religion.1 Triumphus is the archetypal—numinous event of 
the embodiment of the deity, in concreto Iuppiter, surrounded by numerous preventive rites. 
It is not by chance that pondering over the role of numen in antique religion (antike, 
magische, faustische numina)2 Oswald Spengler mentions that the Roman cult of the 
emperor—which must be clearly separated from the oriental cult of the sovereign because 
of their different origins—is a natural consequence of Roman religion, and the role of the 
triumphator must be regarded as its precedent since Iuppiter’s numen was embodied in the 
consul who held the triumphus during the triumphal procession.3 It should be noted that the 
Iuppiter-like role of the presence of the triumphator’s embodying the divine numen was, 
among other things, a numinous, awe-inspiring experience for the Romans, because Roman 
religion—unlike Greek religion—tried to avoid divine presence, epiphany; e.g., this was the 
reason for the complete turning around, the circumactio corporis after finishing the prayer 
as well as the well-known fas sit vidisse4 formula, which means: “I should not be blamed 
for seeing it.”5 
 
II. The first occurrence of the word numen can be found—in concreto in a genitive and an 
attributive construction belonging to a god’s name—in the fragments of Accius,6 later near 
the genitives of the words deus and divus,7 referring to a particular god, e.g., Ceres8 or 
Iuppiter,9 as well as in an attributive construction with the adjective divinum.10 It 
characteristically occurs in verbal constructions near the verbs denoting ritual activities,11 
whereas in attributive constructions it appears near adjectives denoting piety, anger, 
reconcilability, or, on the contrary, implacability.12 In Augustus’s time numen can also mean 
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the deity himself, although previously it meant only one of his properties or functions1—a 
typical example of this can be found in the prooemium of the Aeneis,2 and Servius3 also 
defines it in accordance with this thought when recounting Iuno’s functions in his 
commentary.4 The antique grammarians also tried to explain this expression; e.g., Festus 
defines it as a divine nodding, and divine power,5 Varro defines it as imperium.6 These 
interpretations lead to the basic meaning of the word; i.e., (assenting divine) nodding.7 
Various authors—like Pfister,8 Wagenvoort9 and Rose10—identify the expression with the 
verbum ’to move’. Interpreting a pregnant locus by Catullus,11 Pfister also takes position vis-
a-vis the orendistic, will-expressing meaning of the word numen,12 which seems to be 
strongly corroborated not only by the expression adnuit in the text of Catullus, but also by 
other constructions with the verb *nuo,13 which reinforce the (personal) expression of the 
will with the help of the emotionally charged gesture of nodding.14 
Opinions also differ concerning the age of the term numen itself. Pfister ranks it among the 
most ancient layers of religious terms,15 Rose prefers not to take sides in this question.16 
Latte’s opinion deserves special attention. On the one hand, he claims that the term numen 
can be encountered neither in ancient religious texts nor in the works of Plautus, Ennius or 
Cato; its first occurrence in the works of Accius and Lucilius can be dated to the second half 
of the 2nd century BC., so he thinks it is possible that it became part of the Latin language 
only because of the influence of Stoic philosophy, as a translation of the Greek dynamis;17 
the other hand, he notes that it is impossible to explain why this particular word was used to 
translate the concept of dynamis theou.18 Concerning the first part of Latte’s idea, it cannot 
be disregarded that both Ennius’s and Cato’s texts are considerably incomplete, so the lack 
of the word numen does not provide sufficient reason for drawing conclusions. Plautus’s 
comedies cannot contain the expression because of their very nature, while in religious texts 
the term numen signifies a concept that refers to the sphere of religious experience rather 
than to ritual.19 In connection with Cicero’s relevant locus,20 Latte seems to forget about the 
important sacred functions of the senatus, such as the ordering of the triumphus, the 
consecration of a certain plot of land to gods and later the initiation of the emperor to the 
divine status. Walter Pötscher also states that through these functions the senatus assumed 
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certain competencies that belonged to the divine sphere.1 When Lucretius connects the 
concept of numen to the human mind,2 he presumably speaks only about the familiar 
mechanism through which religious concepts mutatis mutandis gain philosophical 
significance. 
The question concerning the main operational principle of numen, which at the same time 
means the manifestation of the divine will, is of utmost importance. Pötscher considers 
*nuere, the manifestation of the divine will, an ancient component of Roman religion, 
which avoided epiphany, carefully guarded pax deorum, and interpreted the slightest 
deviation from the order of daily routine as a sign (more precisely as a symptom, according 
to Thomas Köves-Zulauf3) without attempting to draw any conclusion with regard to the age 
of the expression numen.4 Similarities between this expression and Greek terms are striking: 
the word numen can be connected with neyma, whereas the meaning of nutus can be 
connected with neysis. The common characteristic feature of these latter two is the 
dynamism inherent in them,5 but the closest parallel can be drawn between neyo6 and *nuo, 
known in its constructions.7 The concept of divine warning, consent or disapproval 
appearing in the form of natural phenomena can be encountered in the works of both in 
Greek and Roman authors.8 However, the different omina cannot be strictly paralelled with 
the divinity expressing his will with a nod (nutus) because in most cases only the Romans’ 
conviction about a certain event being proper or not can be inferred without the possibility 
of establishing whether or not the given warning was connected to the will of a personal 
god.9 
In numerous cases it is not possible to separate the personal energy-component and the one 
that is manifested only in the course of operation; neither is it possible to define their 
precise amount and proportion since they are phenomena outside the sphere of logic. At the 
same time, certain omina—e.g., the augurium connected to the founding of Rome—were 
traditionally related to particular gods.10 Presumably they included both the local, less 
important divinities manifesting themselves mainly in the form of natural phenomena, 
conceived as operating natural forces and the more important ones invested with a certain 
cult and precisely defined personal characteristics, almost a personality—this coincides with 
the concept of Person-Bereicheinheit, the notion of the unity of person and sphere of 
authority which for the antique man meant the unity and the simultaneity of the material 
component and the divinity of the given phenomenon.11 As Kerényi also notes: “Apollo—
and every other Greek god—is a primordial type that was recognised by the Greeks as the 
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metaphysical form of experienced spiritual and plastically contemplated natural realities.”1 
According to the conviction of ancient Romans, the lack of a precise denomination does not 
mean that the augurium would have been the work of chance and not the manifestation of a 
particular (personal) will. The concept of divinities invested with a concretely defined 
personality is not excluded by the fact that they are not called by a precise name; it is 
enough to think of the text and the ritual of evocatio,2 belonging to the sphere of the ius 
sacrum, known from Macrobius,3 which appeals, without mentioning names, to personal 
gods and not impersonal forces.4 The image of Zeus, shaking the skies and the earth with a 
little movement of his head, as well as the image of Iuppiter can be frequently encountered.5 
It seems to be worth returning to the two oldest occurrences of the term in the constructions 
nomen et numen Iovis and nomen vestrum numenque in the fragments of Accius. In both 
cases the expression numen is connected with the word nomen. Two widely differing 
opinions collide here. Wagenvoort thinks that this construction might help to grasp the 
historic moment when the concept of the personal God comes to existence as a development 
of the impersonal, magical force, just as the primary expression of numen is later associated 
with the secondary term nomen as the result of a kind of evolution.6 Conversely, Pötscher 
argues that the expressions numen and nomen are two different aspects of the same 
phenomenon without either of them being secondary to the other with regard to both their 
meaning and their chronology.7 This view is corroborated by the analogy taken from the 
functions of the Roman military leader; i.e., ductus, imperium and auspicium are concepts 
that appear together, in juxtaposition, overlap but do not constitute synonymous at all.8 
These concepts express different aspects of the same office, and it is highly unlikely that 
they would be only synonyms heaped together—imperium primarily signifies the effective 
power of the commander but is also related to the religious sphere; in auspicium the sacred 
element is dominant, at the same time it implies the executive competence needed for its 
fulfillment.9 According to Wagenvoort, in Roman thinking, certain persons disposed of a 
special mana of their own: e.g., the imperator—if the origin of the word is considered—has 
a creative fertilising power,10 and when, as a general, he ordered his soldiers to occupy a 
camp of the enemy, he conjured up the force necessary to carry out the order with the help 
of his magic words; hence it can be inferred that imperium is nothing else than a form of 
transmitting a mysterious force.11 It cannot be disregarded that according to antique views, 
the name is never arbitrary but it always, regarding gods as well, constitutes an integral part 
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of personality; it was not by chance that they proceeded with such caution when precisely 
naming gods or keeping their names in secret if it was necessary.1 
 
III. Payne believes that it is not possible to understand Roman thinking without 
understanding triumphus.2 Although tradition knows about a very early instance of 
triumphus held by Romulus, the ceremony of triumphus is connected to the introduction of 
the cult of Iuppiter Capitolinus in the year 509 BC.3 The last triumphi corresponding with all 
religious requirements were held at the end of the 3rd century AD.;4 the triumphus organised 
later—the custom long survived the fall of the empire—cannot be considered to be the 
continuation of the religious tradition.5 Although the political importance of triumphus can 
hardly be overestimated, and countless examples can be found for its abusus for profane 
purposes in Roman history, it must be kept in mind that triumphus is originally a religious 
act6 both in the magic and the sacred sense of the word7 because, as it has been mentioned in 
the introduction, in the course of it the numen of the Iuppiter Capitolinus is incarnated in the 
triumphator.8 In ancient times, the archaic triumphus, presumably taken over from the 
Etruscans, started from the mountains of Alba, and in line with the classic rite formed 
through historical development it proceeded according to the following itinerary: The 
procession started from the Campus Martius, entered the city through the Porta Triumphalis, 
there they presented the prescribed sacrifice, then headed towards the Porta Carmentalis—
after the building of Circus Flaminius had been finished, the procession naturally touched it 
as well—originally they went across the Velabrum towards the Capitolium; later they went 
round the Palatinus along the Via Sacra to reach the same place.9 In the procession, the 
looted treasures, the weapons seized from the enemy, the sacrificial gifts, the group of 
captives, including captive generals, rulers and their royal household, were followed by the 
triumphator himself escorted by his officers and the soldiers of his army.10 The triumphator 
was standing on a two-wheeled, horse-drawn quadriga, holding an ivory scepter with 
Iuppiter’s bird, the eagle in one hand and a laurel twig in the other; a slave standing behind 
him on the quadriga was holding a golden wreath above his head. He was wearing a laurel 
wreath on his head and festive clothes on his body, which he put down when he reached the 
Capitolium11 and he sacrificed a white bull to Iuppiter there.12 
The characteristics that make the general similar to Iuppiter, more precisely incarnate 
Iuppiter in him were the following: the triumphator’s face was painted vermilion,13 the 
colour of the face of the Iuppiter Capitolinus’s clay statue. This red painting on the face did 
not only serve his identification with Iuppiter, it also symbolised blood investing the general 
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with the magic power dwelling in blood;1 his clothes did not merely resemble the clothes of 
Iuppiter’s statue but they were identical with them, as they took off the statue’s clothes (this 
meant the toga palmata, on the one hand; and the toga picta decorated with golden stars that 
was worn over it, on the other) to dress the triumphator in them.2 The triumphator was 
driving a quadriga like the one standing on the top of the temple of the Capitolium, where 
the above-mentioned statue of Iuppiter was standing too.3 Many scholars, like Fowler4 and 
Deubner5 attempted to deny that the triumphator represented Iuppiter and he was regarded as 
being Iuppiter for that period, but they could not shake the view that holds them identical 
regarded as communis opinio in the literature on the subject.6 It is true that it is hard to 
interpret the duplicity that the triumphator in the procession, who, by virtue of the above 
identification, is none other than Iuppiter during this period, is heading towards Iuppiter’s 
Temple on his quadriga in order to present sacrifice to the god there, so Iuppiter’s 
presence is somehow redoubled for this period. However, it must be taken into account that 
the contradiction that is rationally percieved in the triumphus but does not disturb the 
experience on religious level cannot be reconciled according to the rules of linear logic.7 It 
must also be observed that the divine character of the triumphator was gradually waning in 
the course of the ceremony until it completely ceased when he put down his wreath and his 
clothes at the statue.8 (The sacrifice presented on the Capitolium was followed by the ludi 
magni, which probably constituted an integral part of the triumphus; this seems to be 
corroborated by the fact that though the independent ludi magni separated from the 
triumphus itself appeared only later, the magistratus who organised the games still appeared 
in clothes resembling those of the triumphator. The date of the games were connected to the 
founding ceremony of the Capitolian Temple celebrated on the 13 September.9) 
At the same time, the special position acquired by the triumphator through his temporary 
deification was carrying numerous dangers. The rational core of these dangers was the envy 
manifested towards the triumphator, which was expressed in malocchio in terms of magic, 
and in the ire of Nemesis and Fortuna in a religious interpretation. Against this envy they 
tried to defend the triumphator with the help of various preventive means well-known from 
antique magic; e.g., amulets put round his neck, bells fastened onto the quadriga, which 
were meant to keep demons away, obscene accessories10 as well as by singing satirical 
songs in order to belittle the glory of the triumphant general, so diminishing the danger of 
divine envy.11  
However, more important than all these is the rite according to which the slave holding a 
golden wreath above the triumphator’s head was shouting into his ears to remind him that 
he was a human being, as it is described in a locus of Naturalis Historia by Plinius Maior.12 
Köves-Zulauf thoroughly examined both the Plinian and the parallel loci13—with special 
attention to the phrase hoti antrōpoi eisin in Arrianos’s text and hominem te memento in 
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Tertullianus’s and Hieronymus’s works. Therefore, we took over the recipere version in the 
Plinian text recommended by him instead of the respicere version proposed by Ernout.1 A 
particular mixture can be identified in Fortuna’s character: the Romans regarded Fortuna as 
an aspect of Nemesis.2 Accordingly, she entered the Roman pantheon as the enemy of 
human intemperance and conceit. In this function the appositio of carnifex gloriae is rightly 
conferred on her—meaning that she is not only the enemy but the executioner of glory—
which mutatis mutandis should be taken to refer to both Fortuna and the servus publicus; 
that is, it also contained some kind of concealed threat for the triumphator in order to 
defend him from hybris and diminish his glory the way the satirical songs were meant to. 
The goddess’s place in Plinius’s text is exactly where the other sources locate the servus 
publicus, which again alludes to their symbolic identificability, to Envy lying in wait and 
ready to pounce on him.3 It is a question whether Fortuna and Nemesis had any concrete 
function in the rites of the triumphus, or the Plinian locus was entered in the text as an 
element of the author’s personal style of composition and message. Although there is no 
knowledge of any cultic prayer or ritual act addressed to Fortuna in the course of the 
triumphus, the fear of the power of Fortuna and Nemesis probably occurred in the 
triumphator’s thoughts,4 as certain references seem to prove that. Plinius’s wording verifies 
that perceiving Fortuna’s power both in terms of reality and religious belief was not at all 
alien to the atmosphere of the triumphus.5 The restraining, moderative character of the 
recipere could be taken stricto sensu for the speed of the quadriga; i.e., the triumphator had 
to proceed more slowly in his carriage (which was probably not driven by himself taking the 
ceremonial clothes, the scepter and the laurel stick into account), otherwise he would have 
got too much ahead of his soldiers, making them rightly feel offended, as the triumphus was 
meant to recognise both the triumphator’s and their merits.6 On the other hand, considering 
the magical-religious atmosphere of the triumphus, it could carry a more abstract, spiritual 
meaning, fitting into the line of the rites of prevention. It can be righteously asked what the 
substantial difference between the textual variant recipe and that of respice is. It is perhaps 
not necessary to go into a more detailed discussion of the literary history and textual 
arguments proposed by Köves-Zulauf which make his version more plausible. It seems 
more important to give an overview of his conclusions drawn from the immanent structure 
of the triumphus.7  
The inadequacy of looking back is substantiated by other sources as well8 by emphasizing the 
rigid, statue-like posture of the triumphator modelling Iuppiter Capitolinus meant to evoke 
the feeling of tremendum maiestatis, which completely harmonizes with the description of the 
Persian ruler’s posture that probably influenced the formation of the rite of the triumphus 
relatively early.9 It is possible to ponder on the fact that the prohibition of looking back is 
well-known from mythology in cases when a given person is standing at the limit, the meeting 
point of two spheres, one negative, harmful, demonic,10 arising from the past, the other 
positive, fulfilling, pointing to the future. The story of Deucalion who throws stones behind 
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his back,1 or the ceremony of the magic digging out of the plant example of the threat of the 
demonic sphere.2 Looking back appears as the threat of losing the mission-fulfilling, positive 
future in numerous texts from both the Old and New Testaments.3 The equally strong 
presence of the two spheres is exemplified by the story of Orpheus looking back4 and by the 
story of Lot’s wife.5 Several circumstances that prohibit looking back meet in the ceremony of 
the triumphus: The triumphator is preparing to perform a religious act, the sacrifice dedicated 
to Iuppiter Capitolinus, in the most important moment of his life; he is returning from the scene 
of his triumph to the most sacred place of his motherland; in his back the power of Nemesis, the 
harmful force of malocchio is watching.6 On the other hand, the prohibition of looking back 
seems to be corroborated by the circumstance that the triumphator, who will take off the 
divine insignia when reaching the sanctuary of Iuppiter Capitolinus to end his temporary 
identification with the deity, would hinder his own rehumanisation aimed at actually by the 
entire ceremony, and would provoke Nemesis even more. 
 
IV. The flamen Dialis, Iuppiter’s priest is a specifically numinous phenomenon of Roman 
religion. Among the ancient grammarians, Varro derives the expression flamen from the word 
filum,7 but there is no universally accepted communis opinio doctorum concerning the 
etymology of the word even in the modern literature of the subject.8 Similarly, the latest 
attempts at interpretation did not yield any solid and satisfying results. (As later it will 
become evident—not so much from linguistic but rather from structural considerations—the 
hypothesis connecting flamen to brahman, proposed by Dumézil,9 seems to be the most 
plausible. Fortunately, the attribute Dialis does not present so much difficulty; undoubtedly, it 
derives from Diespiter, i.e., the archaic nominative of Iuppiter.10 A descriptive treatment of 
more general source material concerning the three flamines maiores (Dialis, Martialis, 
Quirinalis) was carried out by Samter,11 and Dumézil called attention to the importance of the 
ancient Iuppiter–Mars–Quirinus triad, on the basis of which the importance of the three 
flamines can be explained, and to the results of this in Roman history besides various other 
aspects.12 Our most important antique source that treats the flamen Dialis, the prescriptions 
bestowing certain responsabilities on him, forbidding him various activities, constituting 
certain taboos is Noctes Atticae by Gellius. In what follows, this locus will be the main object 
of scrutiny. 
Before the detailed analysis of particular rules, it is perhaps useful to recapitulate Latte’s 
statement, according to which most rules, taboos and prohibitions meant to defend the 
magical, numinous power possessed by the flamen Dialis.13 The flamen Dialis was not 
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to ride a horse, to mount a horse.1 At first glance it would seem evident to consider this 
prohibition as placing the horse, the animal associated with death under taboo2 as it was also 
forbidden for this animal to enter Diana’s Nemorensis grove; and it is well-known that this 
cult preserved many archaic elements for later historical periods as well.3 However, this 
interpretation would have excluded the possibility for the flamen Dialis, strictly obliged to 
refrain from the chtonic sphere, to travel on a horse-drawn coach in Rome,4 as the flamen 
Dialis was forbidden both to touch and see the things declared taboo for him. Though there is 
considerable difference between riding a horse and travelling in a coach, the presence of the 
horse is essential in both cases.5 It cannot be excluded that the prohibition of riding a horse 
may be interpreted on the basis of Meyer’s finding that although riding a horse was a widely 
spread form of transport in ancient Rome, it was not held in very high esteem.6 On the 
contrary, travelling on a coach carried in itself a certain sacred element that transcended the 
human sphere.7 
The flamen Dialis is furthermore forbidden to see a mobilised army or to make an oath.8 The 
first requirement is easily understandable as a fighting army is in constant mortal danger, it is 
potentially in the power of Death, so its sight is a contangio enervans for the flamen Dialis, a 
contact that diminishes his mana.9 Whereas in archaic law the oath contains certain elements 
of self-malediction,10 and so carries the possibility of decreasing mana, the numinous force, 
which must be definitely avoided by the flamen Dialis.11 Being tied or manacled is in some 
way characteristic of the slave, who is deprived of the right to dispose over his own life; 
consequently, it is also a mana-diminishing factor. Therefore, the flamen Dialis is forbidden 
to wear any kind of knot or ring,12 if a manacled person seeks refuge in his house, he should 
untied,13 and if someone is being taken to be flogged and he imploringly puts his arms around 
the flamen’s knees, then it is forbidden to punish him on that day.14 In this last case the 
convict’s physical contact with the flamen Dialis presumably played some part too.15 
The life of the flamen Dialis is pervaded by numerous other taboos too, which, although in a 
less concretely definable manner, are also meant to stop the diminishing of mana, the 
numinous force. So, for example, he may not touch a goat, raw meat, ivy, or beans and he 
may not even utter these words, nor is he allowed to touch flour or batter made with leaven.16 
The goat, the beans, and the ivy is related to the cult of the dead and as such,17 and they must 
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be avoided by the flamen Dialis as he cannot step on a place where somebody was buried, nor 
can he touch a deceased person.1 This does not contradict the fact that he is allowed to take 
part in funerals,2 as he does not get into contact with the deceased, thus he does not enter the 
chtonic sphere; on the contrary, he facilitates eternal departure from the world of the living. 
His refraining from raw meat, which is too closely related to the butchered animal is also 
understandable. The increasing, swelling action of the leaven in the batter permits association 
with the reluctance towards a new, unknown force and probably tries to keep the flamen 
Dialis within the circumstances of the epoch in which only unleavened bread was known.3 
The hair of the flamen Dialis can be cut only by a free person, his cut hair and nails can only 
be interred under a certain, fruit-yielding tree.4 According to antique views hair was the main 
container of life-force and if it is touched or cut by an unworthy person, then a substantial 
energy decrease ensues through contagio enervans.5 The concept of arbor felix, the tree 
yielding edible fruit, and that of arbor infelix, the barren tree or the tree yielding inedible fruit 
is also known from archaic law. A citizen found guilty of perduellio was hanged on the latter 
as they did not want to diminish or injure the life force or numen of a fertile tree by bringing it 
into direct or indirect contact with a dead criminal.6 It is not by chance that the cut hair and 
nails of the flamen Dialis, which even in this state were carrying mana, had to be buried in the 
ground under an arbor felix thus enhancing its fertility.7 The hair had to be cut with a bronze 
instrument instead of one made of iron.8 This harmonizes with the prohibition to ride, clearly 
showing the formal conservatism of the Romans. It can thus be assumed that this prohibition 
originates from very ancient times, when tools made of iron—due to their modernity—were 
considered taboo in religious rituals.9 Taking out fire from the house of the flamen Dialis was 
only allowed for sacral purposes,10 which was meant to defend the fire pervaded by numen 
was burning in the house of the flamen Dialis against abuse. The privileged position of the 
flamen Dialis was emphasized by the provision according to which in a company he could be 
preceded in the seating arrangement only by the rex sacrorum.11 It is difficult to interpret the 
provision that he must not walk under the vine-shoots hanging down.12 According to 
Pötscher’s explanation, this might be due to the fact that the flamen Dialis always had to wear 
an apex on his head13 and the shoots hanging too low could brush it down from his head.14 
Conversely, in his interpretation Kerényi refers to the Dionysian characteristic present in 
grapes which would have decreased the numinous force of the flamen Dialis.15 This 
explanation would be satisfactory if there had been knowledge of a rule that prohibited the 
flamen Dialis to drink wine.16  
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The prescriptions discussed so far were all meant to defend the flamen Dialis from the 
diminishing of mana, the numinous force. The following rules can be organised around a 
completely different point of consideration, namely in view of the fact that flamen Dialis 
cotidie feriatus est,1 i.e., the flamen Dialis fulfils his cultic service every day. In Karl 
Kerényi’s wording: “Der zeitliche Ablauf seines Lebens war der Kultakt.”2 According to 
Georges Dumézil “le flamen historique se présente comme une victime qui n’est jamais 
immoléé”.3 Walter Pötscher defines the role of the flamen Dialis even more trenchantly. It is a 
definition which served also as a starting point for the present analysis. It asserts that: “Der 
Flamen Dialis darf Priester im engeren Sinne des Wortes genannt werden, nicht so, wie man 
gelegentlich auch die Pontifices Priester zu nennen pflegt. Er repräsentiert den Gott, er 
macht den Gott in einer Form präsent.”4 One must bear this in mind when interpreting the 
rule that the flamen Dialis is not allowed to stay outdoors without wearing the apex.5 
Originally he even had to wear it in the house,6 which presumably refers back to the age when 
he was not allowed to stay in a house, or under any roof at all. The constant wearing of the 
apex appears in Roman legal thinking as a result of the fiction that the flamen Dialis 
permanently lives outdoors.7 It is possibly the remnant of this stage when the ritual was not 
performed in the temple but in the open air in the sacred grove, that the legs of his bed had to 
be smeared with clay in order to assure direct contact with the earth.8 The significance of this 
prescription becomes evident when analysed together with two further rules concerning the 
bed of the flamen Dialis: It is prohibited for the flamen Dialis to sleep in a bed that is not his 
own for three consecutive days; no other person may sleep in his bed; and beside the clay leg 
of the table there should be a pot with sacrificial milk loaf and sacrificial honey grist scones.9 
Based on these, it can be conjectured that the bed of the flamen Dialis is of certain cultic 
importance, constituting an integral element of his sacral function. 
Although Latte did not fail to observe the parallel that can be drawn between this 
phenomenon and the Dodonian cult of Zeus,10 further-reaching conclusions can be found 
in Pötscher.11 The basis of the Dodonian cult is the hieros gamos taking place between Zeus 
Naios and Dione, the sacred communion of the Sky and the Earth which is meant to ensure 
the fertility of the area surrounding Dodona, in this case interpreted as the Person–
Bereicheinheit of Dione, with the help of rain falling on it, in this case interpreted as the 
Person–Bereicheinheit of Zeus, who fulfils here the function of the god of rain, or generally 
the god of weather.12 The priests in the service of this cult, the hypophētai were not allowed to 
wash their feet, and they were not allowed to sleep in bed all their life so that their direct 
contact with the earth should never be broken.13 Thus several parallels can be pointed out 
between the elements of the two cults: For the Greeks the hypophētai are the priests of Zeus 
Naios, whereas the flamen Dialis is the priest of Iuppiter; i.e., the priest of the Roman 
equivalent of the same god. The hypophētai may not wash their feet and they have to sleep on 
the ground all their life, while the flamen Dialis sleeps in a bed whose legs are covered with 
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clay so that the direct contact with the earth should be assured. The priests of Zeus Naios 
continually stay in the sacred grove,1 while the flamen Dialis fulfils unceasing divine service 
all his life, always wears the apex, so he is de iure always in the open air, and he cannot leave 
his bed which ensures constant contact with the earth for more than three consecutive nights. 
In the Dodonian cult woman-priests (promanties) also take part,2 and the wife of the flamen 
Dialis, the flaminica Dialis plays such an important role in his life that if she dies, the flamen 
Dialis must also resign from his office.3 Whereas the promanties serve as priestesses of 
Dione, the flaminica is present only as the feminine component of the same priestly function.4 
Taking all these into account it can be safely stated that the fact that the flamen Dialis sleeps 
nearly every night of his life in his bed with clay-covered legs, which makes its connection 
with the earth tighter, and near to it there should be sacrificial milk-loaf—as if enhancing its 
sanctity—can be regarded as a cultic event. The obligation of the flamen Dialis, who is 
present in his office essentially as a husband since he has to resign from the flamonium if the 
flaminica dies, to sleep on the ground night after night should be interpreted as a hierogamic 
act with the Earth.5 The hierogamic view6 need not necessarily be connected with a concrete 
myth—this would indeed be surprising in the case of Roman religion which is so short of 
mythical stories and so prone to historicizing the common Indo-European mythic thesaurus.7 
It suffices to transpose the image of the earth’s fertilisation with rain to the level of the cult.8 
Much less is known about the prescriptions concerning the flaminica Dialis. Roughly the 
same rules applied to her as to the flamen Dialis.9 The colour red predominated in her 
clothing, which again cannot be accidental. Much rather it seems emphatic because it 
corresponds to the Roman wedding dress, which also accentuates the hierogamic concept. 
And so does the fact that the flamen Dialis had important ritual duties in the most ancient and 
solemn form of the Roman marriage ceremony, the confarreatio.10 Naturally, the flamen and 
flaminica also had to live in a marriage,11 bound according to this sacral ceremony of the 
highest order as their marriage constituted an integral part of the flamen’s office.12 
The tabooistic prescriptions and prohibitions governing the flamen’s life destined to stop the 
diminishing of mana, the numinous force, become intelligible in their structure if 
approached from this aspect of the priesthood of the flamen Dialis; i.e., his cultic 
connection with the Earth, symbolizing the Earth’s fertilisation by the Sky, and in terms of 
other acts of his life meant to represent Iuppiter. His participation in the confarreatio 
marriage ceremony, which brings the ceremony closer to its purpose merely by his 
praesentia Iovialis, clearly fits into the line of these prescriptions. 
 
V. First let us take a brief overview—following mainly Taeger13 and Pötscher14—of the 
literature of the numen Augusti problem. Somewhat simplifying the question, Toutain 
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regards Augustus’s numen and person as being basically the same, and substantiates his 
views by stating that the conceptual separation, especially for provincial usage, is too 
minute, almost hair-splitting.1 In his opinion he seems to forget the characteristic Roman 
religious tendency prone to atomizing and separation, which instead of synthesizing, 
connected clearly separable divine forces, so-called Sondergottheiten with numerous 
phenomena of everyday life, like the different phases of the life of corn.2 Pippidi identifies 
the concepts of numen Augusti and genius Augusti with each other.3 His view is challenged 
by Taeger who, highlighting the fundamental differences between the cult of numen and that 
of the genius, categorically rejects the attempt at identifying numen Augusti and genius 
Augusti.4 In his opinion this cult was dedicated to Augustus’s numen; i.e., the numinous 
force present in the emperor as Augustus, to obtain a general cultic figure, and not one 
related to some particular function.5 Since numen is a concept less strictly cultic than genius, 
it is much rather connected with experiencing a given phenomenon as a religious 
experience.6 With regard to the problem of genius and numen Fishwick states that the phrase 
numen Augusti was frequently used instead of the construction genius Augusti but this does 
not mean at all that the term numen would have meant the same as the term genius.7 
According to Latte, genius is the life-giving, personal creative power that dwells in man, 
which never becomes abstract.8 This, as a matter of fact, does not mean that a given god, a 
human being, or a corporation could not have possessed numen, on the one hand, and 
genius, on the other, in Roman thinking.9 Numen is much rather a given momentary 
operation, a (divine) manifestation, involving a kind of extra energy.10 The divinity 
genius, though it is not itself a genius; at the same time, it possesses numen and—
especially according to the Augustan and the subsequent terminology—is itself numen. 
This, however, does not solve the numen Augusti–genius Augusti problem because the 
term numen genii would be possible de iure, but it does not de facto appear in textual 
tradition. On the contrary, the construction genius numinis is somewhat problematic, 
especially with respect to the living princeps, considering the fact that emperors—at least 
those of the Augustan age—were not regarded stricto sensu; i.e., religiously revered gods in 
their lifetime.11  
Consequently, the emperor possessing numinousity remained human throughout his life, 
even on the highest level of his exaltation, although, as it will be demonstrated, a human 
being representing divine substance.12 In Roman thinking, the entry to the pantheon of 
certain abstract notions (e.g., Concordia, Pax, Salus) might have served as an analogy with 
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the consecratio following the emperor’s death.1 The veneration of the living and the 
deceased emperor are two more or less clearly separable mechanisms because the deceased 
emperor became de iure god by the act of consecratio.2 Hence he was entitled to the 
attribute divus—which contained a kind of distinction between the eternally venerated gods 
and the people who became, or were declared divine after their death, as it is pointed out by 
Servius,3 but this distinction was bearing grammatical rather than cultic relevance.4 Since it 
is an independent concept, the numen attributed to the ruler cannot be considered identical 
with the ruler’s genius although, considering its origins, it incorporates some of its aspects.5 
At the same time, to a certain extent, it can be related to the Hellenistic, eyergetēs image of 
the ruler, which can be regarded as one of the sources of the Roman cult of the emperor. 
Nevertheless, the most important point remains that by the numen of the ruler they 
invariably meant a special supernatural force and reality and if—as Cicero refers to it as 
well6—the unified, consenting Senate can possess numen, than the living princeps can 
possess numen as well. The fact that it possesses numen, a numinous force—as a result of 
the unconscious associations evoked by the rites surrounding his person rather than by 
virtue of the consecratio does not necessarily mean that he would become a numen; i.e., a 
divinity. The fact that the numen Augusti was cultically venerated as early as during the life 
of the princeps reveals that it was not primarily Augustus’s person that partook of religious 
hommage but the numinous, manaistic force, the numen praesens, manifested for his 
subjects through his person.7 On the other hand, it is quite difficult to establish a precise 
borderline because although it is true that Augustus did not become divus in his lifetime, he 
accepted the title Divi filius after Caesar, who became Divus Iulius in the year 42 BC.8 It is 
in perfect accordance with the above that Augustus was first given the right to wear the 
wreath of the triumphator during all his public appearances,9 then, in the year 19 BC. he 
obtained the privilege to wear the vestments of the triumphator in addition to the wreath on 
the first day of each year,10 so he could appear among his subjects as the image of Iuppiter 
Optimus Maximus. According to Suetonius, the future greatness of the later Augustus was 
predicted to his father by a Dionysian augury in a dream when he saw his son invested with 
the ornaments of Iuppiter Optimus Maximus.11 (It is worth noting that representing 
as Iuppiter was part of the private cult, but Servius knows of a statue of Augustus which 
represented the ruler in complete Appollonian vestments.12) 
Therefore, it can be righteously inferred that religious and dynamistic ideas played a role in 
Octavianus’s becoming Augustus in the year 27 BC. because before him this epitheton had 
not been used for persons but only for sanctified things and cultic accessories. The word 
augus13 originally meant nothing else than the one that has been augmented.14 The 
construction augustum augurium first occurs in the Annales by Ennius.15 On the textile 
by Athene, described in Ovidius’s Metamorphoses, twelve Olympian gods can be seen who 
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are sitting on their thrones with augusta gravitate; i.e., in human form but with an authority 
in their personality that exceeds human measure.1 This expression can be encountered 
twice in connection with Hercules, who is recognized by Euander in Livius from his 
supernatural character, his emanation, habitum formanque,2 and who appears in a 
corresponding shape when rising to heaven in Ovidius as well.3 The poet explains the 
expression in accordance with the dynamistic connotations: “Sancta vocant augusta 
patres, augusta vocantur templa sacerdotum rite dicata manu. Huius et augurium dependet 
origine verbi et quodcumque sua Iuppiter auget ope.”4 This denomination thus immanently 
carries within itself the substance that stands beyond the human sphere, grows into the 
divine sphere, and though this is not defined each time the word is uttered.5 It exerts its 
influence going deeper and originating deeper than any definition by means of unconscious 
associations. It is not by chance that in order to illustrate this, Altheim quotes Vitruvius’s 
address to Augustus: divina tua mens et numen, imperator Caesar.6 A reference to the same 
creative act can be found in Suetonius when he says that the glory of permanent fame, the 
gift of immortal gods will be received by those who increased the power of the Roman 
people from the smallest to the greatest measure.7 So the word augustus derives from the 
verb augere, and is cognate with the term augurium, synonymous with sanctus, and even 
more with the expression sacer,8 which receives its character from the sanctification 
performed by the sacerdos (cf. sacer-dare).9 However, the sanctification could be carried 
out only by a person, the augur, who had the numinous ability, the auctoritas to increase 
mana.10 
Considering the Roman concept of religio one must lay great emphasis on the experience of 
numinousity that reflects its special relationships, as Carl Gustav Jung (based on Otto 
Rudolf’s views11) defines religion as a dynamic (i.e., full of dynamos—see also the 
identifiability of the concept of numen with the Greek term dynamos) existence or influence 
that affects the human subject from the outside getting control over it.12 The main 
characteristic of the archetype can be found precisely in its numinousity because the 
archetypal situations and images generate an emotional and temperamental overcharge, 
and so elicit the feeling of tremendum maiestatis from the conscience. Jung defines the 
origin and gist of mana as the archetype being present in the collective unconscious, which 
appears as a person possessing power and authority; e.g., the hero and the godman: “Die 
Mana Persönlichkeit ist aber eine Dominante des kollektiven Unbewußten, der bekannte 
Archetypus des mächtigen Mannes in Form des Helden, des Häuptlings, des Zauberers, 
Medizimannes und Heiligen, des Herrn über Menschen und Geister, des Freundes Gottes.” 
“...Beide Figuren entsprechen dem Begriff des ‘außergewönlich Wirkungsvollen’, welchen 
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Ausdruck Lehmann in seiner bekannten Monographie1 erklärend für Mana setzt. Ich nenne 
daher eine solche Persönlichkeit einfach Mana-Persönlichkeit. Sie enspricht einer 
Dominante des kollektiven Unbewußten, einem Archetypus, der sich in der menschlichen 
Psyche seit unvordenklichen Zeiten durch entsprechende Erfahrung ausgebildet hat. Der 
Primitive analysiert nicht und gibt sich keine Rechenschaft darüber, warum ein andere ihm 
überlegen ist. Ist er klüger und stärker als er, so hat er eben Mana, das heißt er hat eben 
eine größere Kraft; er kann diese Kraft auch verlieren, vielleicht, weil im Schlaf jemand 
über ihn entwickelt sich historisch zur Heldenfigur un zum Gottmenschen, dessen irdische 
Figur der Priester ist.”2 It is in complete harmony with this that the operation of 
numinosum seizes and dominates the human subject, the subject being the victim of this 
operation rather than its originator, independently of the subject’s will.3 
It is worth taking a quick glance at how the concept of imperium is related to the concept of 
numen and to the concept of auctoritas that augments and expresses the capacity of 
numinousity by its creative function even on the level of historical reality. We have seen 
that the religious and military leader (both functions were fulfilled in the beginning by the 
rex in Rome) possesses mana since he activates the archetype of the divine leader and 
that of the hero on the level of the collective unconscious.4 His mana enables him to 
increase the fertility of the land as it can be seen from ethnological examples. According to 
this, in Wagenvoort’s interpretation imperare originally not meant nothing else but ‘to call 
to life’, ‘to fertilize’, as the general, who ordered (imperabat) his soldiers to attack an alien 
camp, conjured up, created the force necessary to carry out the mission with the help of his 
magic words; therefore, he draws the conclusion that imperium is nothing else than the 
ability of creating and transmitting a mysterious power.5 Köves-Zulauf mentions it as a 
specificity of this that: “the particular interest of the issue, not to be discussed in great 
detail here, is that parere (to give birth) is a typically feminine word, whereas imperium 
was exclusively possessed by men.”6  
Without endeavouring to thoroughy explain this phenomenon, let us proceed again from C. 
G. Jung’s definition of the Mana-Persönlichkeit, according to which it is nothing else than 
the archetype of the power-possessing man figure that dwells in the collective unconscious 
which dominates the conscious personality and takes over the autonomous power and value 
of the anima; and later the identification with this figure creates the idea of possessing the 
mana of the anima.7 By this, although the conscious did not prevail over the unconscious, it 
integrated the power of its representative, the anima to such an extent that the possibility 
of a more direct connection between the ego and the unconscious was created, through 
which the ego acquired the identification with its ideal which exercises higher power, the 
one possessing the power of mana, the außergewöhnlich Wirkungsvolles, and so it 
becomes a mana-personality.8 That is, it is through the harmonization of the relation 
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maintained with the anima that one becomes a leader capable of evoking the archetype of 
the possessor of power, who has the ability in the strictest sense of the word to create, to 
bear certain ideas of power in others that is designated by a typically feminine word 
imperium. (The leader who lives in disharmony with the anima also evokes the archetype of 
the manaistic personality in his subjects but precisely due to this disharmony, by which the 
power of the anima prevails over him, he becomes destructive, cannot appropriate the 
imperium that is creative, basically due to the word’s etymology.) 
Augustus achieved the stability of his legitimacy by the superior handling of all these 
associated points connected to auctoritas, imperium and numen through transferring the 
formation called—to use Max Weber’s formula—charismatic legitimization into the 
construction called traditional legitimization. The concept of numen Augusti organically fits 
into the Roman religious system as, on the one hand, it evokes in the subjects the concept of 
numen, the divine presence and dynamistic operational mode; on the other hand, it evokes 
augus, the numinous experience of the charismatic leader who possesses the augmenting, 
creative ability, mana. Köves-Zulauf’s characterisation constitutes a convenient parallel, it 
gives a synthesis of the relationship of Roman religion with language: “Therefore, Roman 
religion is the religion of discipline, of repression, of anxiety, not of eliberated relief, as the 
Greek... From here ensues the neurotic relationship of Roman religion with speech.”1 As 
we have seen it is not only the Romans’ relationship with speech that is relatively neurotic, 
but also their general relationship with the numinous experiences of religion as their 
relationship with the above analyzed archetypal phenomena is basically negative, refusing. 
This should not necessarily be the case as “the archetype itself is neither positive nor 
negative but a morally neutral numen that becomes good or bad only as a result of its 
collision with the conscience.”2 It is precisely this neurosis inherent in Roman religion, 
constituting its most basic part that is used by the reigning power—so as to ensure its 
unquestionability—by elevating the concept of authority to numinous regions, generating 
the feeling of tremendum maiestatis. 
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Verbality in Archaic Roman Law 
 
 
Beginning with the well-known fact that one lost a lawsuit if he made even a single verbal 
mistake in his speech during the process of the legis action sacramento, we have to examine 
through some examples the power of verbality in ius sacrum. (I.) We study the development 
of the concept of fatum (II.), a narration of Plinius maior concerning the dedicatio of the 
templum of Ops Opifera (III.), another narration based on a source of Plinius related to a 
special interpretation of prodigium (IV.), as well as parallels that can be discovered between 
“fruges excantare” and the ceremony of the evocatio (V.). From these one could gain a 
picture of connection between Roman religion and jurisprudence of the Archaic Age and the 
spoken word. 
 
I. The description of the ritual of legis actio sacramento im rem is provided by Gaius.1 This is 
the locus that should be brought into harmony with the explanation of the meaning of manum 
conserere given by Gellius, and with the above presented text. Aulus Gellius in Noctes 
Atticae2 wants to get an explanation for the origin and meaning of “ex iure manum 
consertum”, an expression coming from the old legis actio claims, from a renowned 
grammaticus, who first refuses to answer the question since he deals with grammatica, 
Vergilius, Plautus and Ennius. In reply, Gellius remarks that it was exactly chapter eight of 
Ennius’s Annales where he found the phrase; in turn the grammaticus asserts that Ennius 
drew this expression not from legal but poetic language. The actual explanation follows after 
that.3 Consequently, according to Gellius, manum conserere means grasping the object of 
dispute manually (manu prendere), which corresponds to Gaius’s phrase rem apprehendere; 
however, in view of its purpose it has definitely separated from that in the course of time.4 
According to Gaius’s locus, the assertion of “property” or “stronger right to possess”5 by 
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both parties through uttering the sentence “HUNC EGO HOMINEM EX IURE QUIRITIUM 
MEUM ESSE AIO” refers to things present in iure and grasped manually. Thus, initially 
vindicatio—just as mancipatio1–was created for transactions involving chattels of greater 
value (i.e., slaves and draught animals) since the thought that rule over a single land can be 
exercised merely by placing a rod or hands on it would suppose considerable abstraction of 
generally accepted formalism, hardly reconciled with the way of thinking of the archaic age.2 
Therefore, the obligation that the object of dispute should be present before the magistratus 
applied to any and all things; and regarding the things that could be brought there without any 
difficulty this requirement continued to be in force without any changes.3 In the event of lands 
and things, or totality of things that could not be taken to comitium—according to Gellius, in 
order for the proceedings to comply with the provisions of the Twelve Table Law,4 which 
stipulated that the act of manum conserere had to be implemented in iure, i.e., before the 
law—both the magistratus and the parties to the dispute went to the land in order to 
implement vindicatio there by which the given land became ius, i.e., venue of jurisdiction. As 
the power of Rome was extended, the burden on the magistratus increased, and so it was no 
longer possible to apply the above procedure; therefore, a new solution was looked for. 
Contrary to the provision of the Twelve Table Law, through tacitus consensus the act of 
manum conserere was no longer implemented in iure; instead, to this end the parties called 
each other from before the law.5 The party claiming the thing (the latter plaintiff) called the 
owner of the thing (the later defendant) from the comitium to the place where the object of 
dispute lay; the parties went there together, and took a piece of the thing, then brought it to 
Rome before the magistratus where vindicatio described by Gaius was carried out as if the 
entire land had stood before the law. (Gaius is silent about the procedure of manum conserere 
since the narration of legis actio lawsuits provides a historical outlook for those who study 
iurisprudentia, and not an antiquarian who carries out research like Gellius.)6 So the ritual of 
manum conserere was applied only in the case of certain objects of dispute as it were to 
prepare vindicatio. The reference made to praetor in Gellius’s text with respect to the time of 
the Twelve Table Law is, of course, anachronism.7 The territory of the State of Rome, the 
ager Romanus antiquus did not go beyond a five-six mile strip of land surrounding the 
pomerium on the left bank of the Tiberis;8 this strip was extended to ten miles only through 
the occupation of Fidenae in 426;9 it is probable that merely this increase in territory made it 




The development described by Gellius perfectly corresponds to the changes in the procedure 
described in Pro Murena, implemented in iure; likewise they can be brought into harmony 
with the ritual of vindicatio presented by Gaius, if the sentences bequeathed by Cicero are 
interpreted as the preparatory procedure of the actual vindicatio.11 Accordingly, for picking up 
a lump of earth, that is, to implement manum conserere the assistance of the magistratus was 
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no longer required since he could set out from the assumption that the witnesses present when 
the act was carried out1 would report during the proceedings any irregularity that might have 
occurred. By that the land no longer represented ius, venue of jurisdiction.2 Now manum 
conserere was used in the meaning of vindicias sumere; in the sense of vindicatio,3 i.e., 
grasping the object of dispute by the parties in the form of manum conserere and bringing it 
before the law. Just as the magistratus made his job easier, the parties did the same provided 
that an agreement was reached between them regarding the issue; if they wanted to bring an 
action regarding a definite land, they brought a lump of earth from the land needed later for 
vindicatio, and at the instruction of the magistratus they only pretended to leave from before 
the law.4 
 
II. The overt insistence on text of legis actio sacramento is widely known since—as Gaius 
himself stressed it—one who misquoted a single word of the text lost the lawsuit.5 In Roman 
thinking faith in the impact of spoken words constituting reality bore high significance.6 “The 
reason for that was the Romans’ unshakeable faith in the numinous force of uttered words; it 
is our firm belief that all things considered existence is identical with the existence uttered, 
complete reality is no other than reality cast into words.”7 
Regarding the origin of the word fatum several Roman authors can be quoted. Varro believes 
the term fatum comes from the fact that the Parcae determine the lifespan of infants by stating 
their decision;8 which is confirmed by Fronto who asserts that destiny is called fatum after the 
spoken word. This recognition of Antique people that fatum derives from the verb for, fari, 
fatus sum has been confirmed by modern linguistics.9 The commentary written by Servius on 
Vergilius’s Aeneis helps to go into deeper analysis by asserting that fatum is participium, and 
denotes what the gods have said;10 consequently, the term itself means divine word, divine 
decision (Götterspruch).11 On the other hand, there is a goddess called Fata: on the territory of 
Lavinium three altar inscriptions from the 4th-3rd c. B.C. were found which prove the cult of 
the Goddess Fata; her name is Neuna (Nona), which is known from several literary sources. 
Here, Gellius quotes Varro and Caesellius Vindex, who describes the name of the Parcae, and, 
on the grounds of Livius Andronicus’s quotation from the Odysseia, the coming of a day 
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foretold by Morta.1 The Parca Morta/Maurtia named by Caesellius Vindex is also known from 
the inscription from Lavinium;2 the question arises if the goddess Fata can be called Parca; 
more specifically: if we are talking abut the same goddess when referring Fata and Parca?3 
Nona is named Fata on the inscriptions, and Parca by literary sources; Morta is referred to as 
Parca both on inscriptions and in literary sources. On the other hand, the fragment from 
Livius Andronicus talks about Maurtia with Fata being as it were her interpreter; that is, her 
scope of activity is fari. Through Gellius it is known from Varro that the name of Parca comes 
from the word “partus” by changing one sound thereof,4 so her name was originally Parica; 
that is, she was adored as the goddess of delivery, birth. Parca, however, can be also 
Morta/Maurtia; consequently, she is in close relation with death, which is highly stressed for a 
goddess of delivery and birth when a child is born dead; but the sources reveal that 
Morta/Maurtia can stand beside goddess Fata as an interpreter, which is not much surprising 
when considering Fata’s relation to fatum, whose meanings include: death, destruction, 
perishing. 
In Greek faith the Moirai measured out mortals’ moira, portion of life; and since they 
followed up human life, they were active at birth too. Roman thinking split this function into 
two; goddesses carried out tasks related to birth as Parcae, they made decisions over human 
fate as Fatae; while the Greek Moirai united both aspects in themselves, Roman religion—
using the methodology known from the creation of the image of Sondergötter5—expressed 
these two functions through two goddesses (Parca and Fata); the difference between them is 
based only on shift of emphasis since, as the comparison of the three inscriptions and the 
literary sources has revealed, the Parca is at the same time Fata, and the Fata is at the same 
time Parca,6 depending on which numen of which aspect comes to the front.7 
It is a fact that both the word fatum, the divine word and Fata, the goddess who has spoken 
come from the verb fari; their form with their suffix is participium perfectum. In classic Latin 
this form usually denotes passive voice, except for deponens verbs; on the other hand, for 
certain verbs with form and denotation in the active voice grammar books define participium 
perfectum as denoting active voice (although this form, as shown above, is primarily passive). 
Even without exploring the roots of the problem in the history of language it is 
unambiguously clear that participium perfectum in ancient Indo-German language was 
exempt from diathesis,8 it could be used either in active, or passive voice, or in intransitive 
meaning. For deponens verbs, which include fari, active is the primary meaning but passive is 
also allowed.9 The relation between fatum and Fata does not seem to be an accident; what is 
more, it is quite probable that what they manifest is the active and passive aspects of the same 
uniform experience;10 fatum is the divine word, Fata is the result of the activity of the 
who utters this word. The act of fari is possessed by each god who utters a given divine 
decision;11 in line with this interpretation, Isidorus Hispalensis also calls everything that the 
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gods tell and Iuppiter says fatum.1 Therefore, fatum is the giving of the divine decision 
uttered; fari was not limited to Fataere, or to Parcaere; fatum can be given, for example, by 
Iuppiter,2 Iuno,3 Apollo4 and gods in general.5 
It was not by accident that the concepts of the Romans formed of destiny, fate were so 
strongly attached to the uttered divine word’s force to create reality; they identified human 
existence with the formulation of existence, casting existence into words; this fundamental 
experience may bring closer to understanding the Roman thinking ex asse. 
 
III. In his account Plinius maior describes that Ops Opifera’s Temple was consecrated by 
pontifex maximus Metellus, but due to his difficulties in speaking fluently he was compelled 
to suffer for months until he was able to utter the words of the dedicatio.6 Sometime between 
123 B.C. and 104 B.C. another, the fourth temple was raised for goddess Ops in Rome—it 
cannot be excluded but seems not much probable that her temple on the Capitolium was 
restored—and it was pontifex maximus L. Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus who had to 
consecrate this temple, of whose career no more is known for sure than that he fulfilled the 
office of the high priest in 114 B.C.7 Plinius’s text gives an account of Metellus’s difficulties 
in using language, which does not seem to have any historical significance, but in terms of 
religion it turns the attention to a cardinal point of Roman religio; specifically, the 
requirement of ”the pre-determined, accurate form, exact order of the utterance of the words 
to be spoken”.8 Complete physical health was in Rome—as in several other religions—a 
prerequisite for fulfilling priestly functions,9 which seems all the less surprising since this 
requirement held both with respect to sacrificial animals,10 and the official participants of 
sacrifices.11 
The question may arise how come that Metellus acted as pontifex maximus; all the more, as he 
was the only pontifex who had some physical disability from birth as sources reveal. (Albeit, 
tradition maintains the memory of another pontifex maximus L. Caecilius Metellus, who 
fulfilled this office between 243 B.C. and 221 B.C., and who got blind after having been 
elected, as he saved the Palladium guaranteeing the existence of Rome from Vesta’ temple 
during a fire, which was not allowed to be seen by anybody, including the pontifex maximus.12 
After he had got blind, being scrupulously precise in complying with religious requirements, 
and elected dictator seventeen years after he had been alleged to have got blind, this high 
priest13 did not resign; because—as rhetoric controversiae reveal14—a man with physical 
handicaps was not permitted to become pontifex, but in case of accidents that occurred when 
he had already fulfilled the office he was not obliged to resign.15 It is, however, highly 
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probable that the narrative on pontifex maximus L. Caecilius Metellus’s blindness is nothing 
else but rendering the myth of Caeculus, the ancestor of the gens Caecilia, coming from 
Vulcanus and found next to the public hearth dedicated to Vesta as a historical fact.1) L. 
Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus becoming pontifex maximus might have been made possible 
partly by the growing rationality of the age, on the one hand; as a result of this rationality 
certain religious requirements were no longer seriously observed, or they tried to evade them 
in some form or other;2 and by the fact that most of the texts to be spoken by Roman priests 
were pre-determined, and so could be learned by heart even by the pontifex afflicted with 
inherent speech difficulty through lengthy and tiring exercise;3 as a matter of fact, this would 
not have been possible in a religion based on spontaneous sacred speech, free preaching and 
prophetic prayer.4  
The text of the dedicatio most probably contained the name of goddess Ops Opifera, which 
must have posed a double challenge to pontifex maximus with his difficulties in speaking 
fluently (inexplanata lingua): to utter an alliterating name was certainly not an easy task for a 
man with speech difficulties and perhaps stuttering; furthermore, it was exactly during the 
dedicatio that the accurate naming of the goddess was highly important since Ops Opifera 
belonged to the deities of sowing.5 The significance of the goddess Ops was never doubtful to 
the Romans for—as her name shows6—it was attached to richness; more exactly, to the 
richness of the produce; in other words, Ops incorporated the rich yield of the arable land, 
manifested the helping aspect of the mother earth;7 as a matter of fact, in line with the 
inclination to go into details inherent in Roman religion various forms of manifestation of the 
soil were distinguished, so the soil was adored in general as Tellus, in its aspect enhancing life 
as Ceres, and in its capacity to produce crop as Ops.8 
Roman religion, however, divided the aspects of Ops into further parts, as it was customary 
for it to assign so-called Sondergottheiten to the chronologically succeeding elements of 
various events and actions.9 On 25 August, they held the festivity of Ops Consiva, i.e., of the 
goddess who “has carried out gathering of the crop”; and two days earlier, on 23 August, the 
festivity of Ops Opifera was celebrated,10 from which it can be unambiguously deduced that 
the name Ops Opifera—its second part is connected with the verb ”ferre”—should be 
interpreted as the goddess11 ”bringing abundance of heavy crop”.12 On that same day, 23 
August, they celebrated Volcanalia, and its logical connection with the festivity of Ops 
Opifera becomes clear when considering that it is wheat not collected yet in pitfalls that is the 
most exposed to fire, and is in need of Ops Opifera’s resolute protection against Vulcanus.13 
Today it is no longer possible to explore in every detail why the Romans thought it was 
especially dangerous to call the deities of sowing by their names; however, it indicates the 
importance of the goddess Ops that in the course of searching for the secret guardian deity of 
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Rome—this name was not known by the public just to prevent evocatio by the enemy—Ops 
has also arisen as a deity who might have fulfilled this function.1 
The findings summed here clearly show that the validity of dedicatio as an integral institution 
of ius sacrum was inseparably attached to the exact utterance and proper order of the words to 
be spoken; as a parallel this phenomenon makes it more definite that legis actio sacramento in 
rem was strongly focused on the text. 
 
IV. A peculiar interpretation of prodigium provides an interesting parallel with the reality 
creating function of the spoken word. First, a brief examination of the significance of 
prodigium will be given. The Romans called the accustomed order, peaceful state of the world 
pax de(or)um, which meant the gods’ peaceful relation to humans; and if this order was upset, 
it was always deducible to the gods’ stepping out of this peaceful state.2 The breakdown of the 
cosmic order, that is, any extraordinary, new event was considered prodigium.3 The 
etymology of the word is dubious—in Walde–Hofmann’s interpretation prodigium derives 
from the compound ”prod-aio”; consequently, prodigium means foretelling, or pointing 
ahead. This interpretation does not seem satisfying because prodigium was a term that always 
had to be interpreted, and that is why in Rome they always used the help of pontifices, libri 
Sibyllini or haruspices to carry out this task, since prodigium itself does not state anything; 
apparently another interpretation is more proper that asserts that the word derives from the 
compound “prod-agere”, so prodigium means the process of moving ahead; accordingly, 
prodigium is nothing else than the act when “breaking through this shell, transcendental 
forces hiding behind the surface come forth and become manifest”.4 
Among the forms of interpretation of prodigium Plinius maior discusses the following case at 
a highlighted point: when laying the foundations of the Capitolium the Romans found a 
human head on the Tarpeius Hill; they sent delegates to the most famous oracle of Etruria, 
Olenus Calenus, who tried to transpose the prodigium with fortunate significance to his own 
people. In front his feet he drew the image of the temple with his cane and said: ”So you say 
so, Romans? This is where Iuppiter Optimus Maximus’s temple will be, we found the head 
here?” The oracle’s son warned the delegates about his father’s trick—if they had given 
improper answer, the prediction would have passed on Etruria: ”We do not say that the head 
was found exactly here but in Rome”, replied the delegates.5 In his account Plinius refers to 
the concordant evidence in the Annales, and research has established that he took the 
description from Valerius Antias, who used Piso and Fabius Pictor as sources;6 accordingly, 
this legend had existed as early as the 3rd c. B.C.7 The author does not intend to analyse the 
symbolism of the head in detail, just notes that the durability of buildings (the Capitolium was 
the symbol the city of Rome and so the empire itself) was meant to be ensured by people 
living in Europe since the Neolithic age through the ritual of walling up live persons. As 
certain versions of the text report not only on a human head but a healthy human body, it can 
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be made probable that the story intended to refer to such a ritual.1 The oracle wanted to rob 
fatum from Rome, and pointed at the outlined layout, and tried to convince the Romans to say 
that the head had been found at the oracle’s feet, on the land of Etruria. If the Romans had 
made such a statement, the impacts of the prodigium would have been produced on the 
Etruscans; the head would have stayed in Rome but not the fatum related to it. 
So human word in Roman thinking had magical impact creating and changing reality; in this 
respect it is enough to think of the statements made on fatum.2 In our present way of thinking, 
we would of course interpret the oracle’ words interpreting the prodigium in terms of sense 
and not word for word; the people of the age of the legend, however, did not do so. “The 
reason for that was the Romans’ unshakeable faith in the numinous force of uttered words; it 
is our firm belief that all things considered existence is identical with the existence uttered, 
complete reality is no other than reality cast into words.”3 
 
V. Among the norms of table eight of the Twelve Table Law containing criminal law rules 
several original provisions can be found that are in close connection with verbality: ”QUI 
MALUM CARMEN INCANTASSIT…”,4 and related to it there is a norm that imposes capital 
punishment on those who conjure up carmen reviling others.5 The law also provides for those 
who enchant and allure others’ crop to come to them: ”QUI FRUGES EXCANTASSIT”6, 
”NEVE ALIENAM SEGETEM PELLEXERIS”7 With this latter source it is possible to connect 
the remark of Servius’s commentary on Vergilius,8 and with the loci 1/a. and 8/a. Plinius 
maior’s thought.9 It was not by accident that the author of this paper quoted the relevant 
paragraph in Naturalis historia, because Plinius compares the relevant provisions of the 
Twelve Table Law with the ritual regarding which his source, Verrius Flaccus names several 
authors: in the siege of a town the Roman priests first of all ”evoked” the god (this is the so-
called evocatio) under whose patronage the given town stood, since in Rome they promised 
the same or greater cult to the god; furthermore, this ceremony had survived in the pontifices’ 
science, and that is why they kept the name of the god in secret under whose patronage Rome 
stood to avoid that the enemy should act the same way.10 To have better understanding of 
these provisions of the Twelve Table Law, it is worth making some remarks concerning the 
locus regarding evocatio. 
With respect to evocatio the text contains two unambiguous statements: on the one hand, the 
ceremony of evocatio; on the other hand, its practice that had existed—in theory—until his 
own age, i.e., the 1st c. This latter statement on the survival of the custom might be the 
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author’s own thought and does not go back to the auctores referred to above by him;1 at the 
same time, it cannot be excluded that Plinius simply took over Verrius’s statement without 
any critical note or comment.2 Even if presuming that the comment on the survival of the 
ritual was indeed Plinius’s own assertion, it does not necessarily mean that he himself were 
allowed to inspect pontifical writings, much rather he might have supposed—relying on what 
he read in Verrius—that it had not changed until his age.3 Plinius did not disclose the text of 
the ceremony, but it can be found in Macrobius, who described in concreto carmen 
evocationis applied to Carthago.4 Concerning evocatio Plinius speaks about oppidum—the 
ceremony of evocatio could be used against a town, i.e., urbs, founded by complying with 
sacred rituals similarly to Rome,5 but as sources reveal it could be used against oppida too; 
the term ”solitum” seems to imply that evocatio occurred much more often in the course of 
Roman history than the specific cases supported by documentary evidence imply.6 
Furthermore, the author clearly states that the ceremony of evocatio was performed by 
sacerdotes, contrary to the ritual of devotio urbis which fell in the competence of the dictator, 
or the imperator.7 
While in Roman beliefs evocatio—being carmen addressed to a deity having a specifically 
determined personality—prepared the destruction of the enemy’s town as a religious act, 
devotio urbis did that as consecratio addressed to magical, that is, impersonal forces of the 
underworld;8 most frequently aimed against the town already deprived of its guardian deities.9 
The carmen of devotio urbis is also known from Macrobius.10 At the same time, it is not 
possible to set up unambiguously a nulla devotio sine evocatione11 thesis since devotio was 
frequently applied without evocatio—as the latter could be carried out only regarding urbes—
here Macrobius intended to set a logical sequence only, rather than determine a cogens norm 
of ius sacrum. The source cited also states that to avoid evocatio carried out by the enemy 
they kept the identity of the deity who protected Rome in secret. It is in line with Plinius’s 
statements, which can be read in Macrobius12 and Servius,13 albeit, regarding the issue if their 
content corresponds to the facts contradictory views are entertained in the literature because 
the name of the guardian deity is unknown; some experts brand the ideas about it pure fiction 
or relatively late borrowing from the East;14 however, others dismissing this standpoint of 
supercriticism suppose that it was not to support the ritual of evocatio that the sources created 
a secret deity for Rome but it was the thinking of people of the age—which accepted the 
notion that enemies’ towns could be destructed though evocatio—that deemed it necessary to 
keep Rome’s guardian deity’s name in secret in order to protect it against possible evocatio 
carried out by enemies.15 
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Rome’s other (secret) name—nomen alterum—is referred to by Plinius maior also at other 
points;1 the ”nisi” inserted by Mommsen, held quite uncertain in inherited texts, affects the 
core of the content of the source,2 which might make it probable that the secret name of the 
city of Rome was permitted to be uttered solely in secret ceremonies. This assumption, i.e., 
Mommsen’s addition, is basically in conflict with and made unnecessary by the image of the 
goddess since she was portrayed both with covered eyes and sealed mouth to indicate 
complete silence that referred to her name, and with/by the sources that confirm that this 
secret name was not permitted to be uttered even in religious ceremonies.3 On the grounds of 
the above it seems logical to ignore the insertion ”nisi” when reviewing the text. The source 
contains three data: first, the existence of the secret name of the city of Rome; secondly, that it 
was betrayed by Valerius Soranus and the betrayer was punished—Plinius traces this 
information back to Varro—thirdly, the cult of goddess Angerona; the latter is taken by the 
author from Verrius; the second and third fact will be touched on only to the extent that they 
are related to the controversial issue of nomen alterum.4 The existence of the secret name of 
the city of Rome can be supported from several points of view: dismissing the standpoint of 
hypercrticism, as in the case of evocatio, until the contrary has been proved, the ritual of 
devotio urbis can be accepted as an element actually used and constituting an integral part of 
Roman religion. Regarding secret names, research has explored several parallels between the 
names of persons, tribes and towns, whose secrecy in each case was rooted in the belief in the 
possibility of abusing the name through magical means, and it was meant to protect the bearer 
of the name against such abuse.5 
(The phrase ”dicere arcanis caeremoniarum nefas habetur” raises the question which 
nominativus the expression arcanis caeremoniarum can be deduced to: to the peculiar 
genitivus partitivus arcanae caeremoniarum, or to arcana caeremoniarum, where the 
genitivus allows interpretation either as explicativus, or possessivus or partitivus. That is, 
does Plinius mean totally secret ceremonies by it, or only rituals that had parts including 
secret elements but their entirety was performed in public. Whichever interpretation is 
accepted, it seems certain that the ceremony, or ceremonies mentioned by Plinius was/were 
somehow connected with the secret name of Rome and the prohibition to utter it.) Although 
Plinius does not specify here what ceremony he meant, there is only one ritual known 
considered indeed strictly secret that was so closely related to the secret name of the city as 
evocatio to the secret guardian deities of the city, and that is devotio urbis. In a similar spirit 
Macrobius comments upon the issue.6 Just as Macrobius somewhat mingles the ceremonies of 
evocatio and devotio urbis, Plinius does not clearly separate the two rituals from one another 
either; it must have been the essential secrecy of both cases that made the author to draw 
parallel with the portrayal of goddess Angerona, which is involved in the text definitely as the 
symbol of silent secrecy without making it possible to determine clearly whose secret the 
goddess preserves. 
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Returning to the quoted loci of the Twelve Table Law, it does not seem unnecessary to recall 
what meanings the term carmen carries when occurring in the sources. The term carmen can 
have very different meanings: work song,1 children’ song, game rhyme,2 love song,3 satirical 
poem, funny song,4 legend, sentence,5 magical rhyme, healing song,6 cultic song, prayer,7 
prophecy,8 song on the deceased, ancestors,9 ancient law,10 entering into an alliance, 
declaration of war and military oath.11 On the grounds of this ranking it is possible to accept 
the interpretation that the relevant provision of the Twelve Table12 imposed capital 
punishment on those using abusive songs;13 in other cases14 the law uses the term carmen in 
the sense of magical rhyme. The facts of the case ”fruges excantassit” and ”segetem 
pellexerit” are properly highlighted by another locus in Plinius;15 this source adduces to the 
three goddesses of harvesting grain without naming two of them (Seia, Segesta), and refers to 
the third one asserting that it is prohibited to utter her name in a house, or in any roofed place 
(sub tecto). It is known from other parallel loci that the third goddess bore the name 
Tutilina.16 Most probably what we have here is a permanent triad of goddesses. The function 
of the first two goddesses is quite clear: Seia protects the seed sown and resting in the soil, 
and Segesta protects grain ripening, still standing, which seems to be confirmed by the 
etymology of the two names.17 In the examination of Tutilina’s name and role it is most 
fortunate to set out from the analytical approach quite typical of Roman religion by which it 
splits certain processes of life into the minutest units, and assigns each phase of these actions 
or events to the powers of a particular Sondergott18 by naming a Usener, individual deity 
specially allocated to them.19 
This triad undoubtedly belongs to the phases of the ripening of grain, and it logically comes 
from that that having knowledge of the roles of the first and second Sondergöttin the role of 
the third one can be determined; specifically, it is the task of harvesting grain, and bringing it 
to the barn, and guarding it there. This is in harmony with Augustinus’s statement taken over 
from Varro,20 which asserts that naming Tutilina in a closed space—just as naming the other 
two goddess presumably elsewhere, on the meadow which ripens grain—could be connected 
with the fact that uttering the name was identical with evoking the given numen. Naming the 
deity—which was in a certain aspect identical with the material reality represented by it 
according to the peculiarly Greek-Roman Person-Bereichdenken21—might make it possible to 
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commit abuse with the grain protected by it; so, for example, enchanting sowing to come to 
someone else’s land, or charming the already harvested grain to come to someone else’s 
building. The independent existence of deities assigned to each phase of the life cycle of the 
grain shows that their names were not absolutely taboo, instead they were tabooed only under 
certain circumstances and at certain places since only then and there did they produce their 
impact. As a matter of fact, it is not possible to separate strictly and systematically the 
religious and the magical approaches regarding these phenomenon of Antique beliefs for 
naming the deity implies religious, and the excantatio performed by it magical motifs, 
presumably the co-existence of the two approaches should be reckoned with here too just as in 
the case of evocatio and devotio urbis. 
What consequences can be drawn with regard to the subject of the investigation of this paper? 
The words of the vindicatio of legis actio sacramento in rem developed for real estate 
properties were called carmen also by Cicero.1 Setting out from the numerous meanings of the 
the word carmen the words of legis actio sacramento in rem were qualified as a text with 
legal content of sacred—magical, numinous—nature.2 The relation of the Romans to sacred 
texts, or spoken words is determined by Köves-Zulauf as follows: ”Roman religion is the 
religion of …discipline, anxiety, suppression, and not of relieved relaxation as the Greek. … 
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Ius vitae necisque et exponendi 
 
 
A Roman pater familias was entitled to the following positive rights: ius vitae ac necis, ius 
exponendi, ius vendendi and ius noxae dedendi. What follows is an in-depth analysis of the 
changes in ius vitae ac necis and ius exponendi. Ius vitae ac necis denotes right of disposal 
over the life and death of a filius/filia familias, while ius exponendi the right to expose 
newborn infants. Exposing a child often contained its death or wilful murder; e.g., in case of a 
deformed child when the aim was to get the family or the community rid of prodigium 
representing ill luck. Therefore, it seems to be more proper to discuss the rights a father had 
against newborn infants—no matter if they applied to killing or only exposing the child—as 
part of ius exponendi since killing or exposing children was several times limited and 
sanctioned in a single imperial decree. Originally, ius vitae ac necis was sacral and punitive 
law power. Its sacral character came to the front when killing a deformed child since this right 
is the component of the father’s power over his newborn infant, and this will be discussed 
under the heading ius exponendi; its punitive law aspect will become obvious when it is used 
against an adult child. This paper, first, intends to describe changes in ius vitae ac necis, and 
dwell on the restrictions and rules of procedure of exercising it (I.). After that, changes in ius 
exponendi will be followed up, with special regard to the regulation of the legal status of the 
exposed child (II.). 
In Roman law potestas always denotes some power; plena in re potestas is full power of the 
owner of the thing over the thing, by which ”in his own property everybody can do everything 
that does not disturb others”.1 Pater familias was entitled to patria potestas over his children 
and dominica potestas over his slaves.2 Patria potestas, just as power over one’s wife, manus, 
comes from the same full-scope power of the head of the family. This power is total: on the 
one hand, because free family members, slaves and lifeless things are all subjected to it; on 
the other hand, because it contains the right to destroy things and kill the above mentioned 
persons.3 Consequently, the power over persons and things the head of the family was entitled 
to (potestas, manus, mancipium, dominium) developed from the same ancient power, none of 
the formations of power served as an example for the other4, which clearly refutes 
Mommsen’s view that the father had ownership over his children.5 According to Ulpian, pater 
familias is the one who is entitled to dominion in his house.6 (Domus is also a sacral concept, 
which had its own household gods (dii penates).7  
It is well known that according to Roman law certain persons have rights of their own, such as 
the pater familias, others are under power, such as the wife (uxor in manu), the person in 
mancipium and the family child under patria potestas.8 Several descriptions of patria potestas 
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can be found in the sources of Roman law, e.g. in Institutiones of Gaius1 and Iustian.2 Almost 
surprised, Gaius notes that such an extended father’s power does not exist anywhere else, 
perhaps only among the Galatas. (He is presumably wrong on this point since we have 
information on similar extensive potestas in the Antiquity among the Celts in Gaul3, as it is 
described by Caesar.4) Although several presentations of patria potestas can be found in the 
sources, it was not defined uniformly. Presumably, they considered it unnecessary to 
determine it exhaustively since patria potestas was clearly the product of the Roman spirit, 
and it owed its existence not to the State’s lawmaking as it went back to times long before the 
State.5 Only sui iuris citizens with full right could be patres familias6, all the persons were 
under patria potestas over whom the pater familias exercised his rights not due to dominica 
potestas or manus: children begotten in lawful marriage7, adopted children8, legitimated 
children, wives of blood children and adopted children (in case of manus marriage), if their 
father was under patria potestas, grandchildren, great-grandchildren etc. and their wives (in 
case of manus marriage).9 In Watson’s definition, patria potestas meant the power that in 
Roman society the male head of the family was entitled to over the free family members 
subordinated to him (apart from the wife, who was under manus).10  
Pater familias was entitled to the following rights: ius vitae ac necis, ius exponendi, ius 
vendendi and ius noxae dedendi.11 What follows is an in-depth analysis of the changes in ius 
vitae ac necis and ius exponendi.  
 
I. In Antique sources several references can be found to ius vitae ac necis that constituted an 
essential element of the potestas of the pater familias.12 One of the royal laws left to us by 
Dionysius of Halicarnass under the name of Romulus regulates the father’s punitive power 
over his adult child. According to it, the father was entitled to full-scope power over his son 
during the son’s whole lifetime, he was allowed to restrict his personal freedom, beat him, 
exile him in handcuffs to do rural work, and kill him; thus, the source, listing the canon of 
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punishments that could be imposed, refers to the possibility of exercising ius vitae ac necis 
almost as ultima ratio.1 Although the law does not say anything on either the scope of 
application of these punishments or the procedure necessary for imposing them, it can be 
made probable that the family child was not at the mercy of the father, if we consider the strict 
control that the gens exercised initially over the internal life of the family and which was later 
assumed by the censor.2 We know from Dionysius that censores controlled how the pater 
familias brought up their children and if they deemed upbringing too strict or too mild, they 
took firm measures; they acted similarly with regard to disciplining slaves.3 Presumably, 
censores also took care to ensure that the religious cult of the house community was properly 
fulfilled.4 By clear irony, Plutarch notes that censores did not leave either marriage or 
upbringing of children or feasts without control, instead they exercised supervision over 
everybody’s conduct of life and political thinking.5 
The first proof of the restrictions of exercising ius vitae ac necis, which constituted the 
content of patria potestas, is provided by the stipulation of the Twelve Table Law that can be 
more or less safely reconstructed from the Gaius text of Codex Veronensis and from 
Fragmentum Augustoduniense: ”Ergo tum praetor corpus te dedere dom …………… 
parentem putes …… iure uti t……………<do> mino vel parenti etiam occidere eum et 
mortuum dedere in no<xam> ………… ………… patria potestas potest. n ………… cum patris 
potestas talis est ut habeat vitae et necis po<testatem>. De filio hoc tractari crudele est, 
sed… non est. … n post r…. <occi>dere sine iusta causa, ut constituit lex XII tabularum, sed 
deferre iu<dici> debet propter calumniam.6  Fragmentum Augustoduniense discusses the 
power of pater familias that gives him the right to kill the slave or family child who has 
caused damage to a third party delictually, and to fulfil the obligation of noxae deditio by 
handing over the corpse or a part thereof. Directly after that, it clearly states that patria 
potestas contains ius vitae ac necis, and that in accordance with the provisions of the Twelve 
Table Law the pater familias was not allowed to kill his son sine iusta causa. Krüger’s 
reading of the text is not completely certain, however, in spite of these changes it is possible 
to read the phrase without any doubt <occi>dere sine iusta causa, ut constituit lex XII 
tabularum, i.e., that in accordance with the provisions of the Twelve Table Law the pater 
familias was not allowed to kill his son without iusta causa. The authenticity of the quotation 
would be doubtful if it should or could be presumed that this is only an independent insertion 
of the jurist who compiled Fragmentum Augustoduniense from Gaius’s texts. However, in the 
present case rather fragmentary text of Codex Veronensis contains the ”…tabul…” fragment7, 
which can mean nothing else than leges XII tabularum, which makes it highly probable that 
this provision from the Twelve Table Law was contained in the original Gaius text too.8 
Kunkel claims that originally iusta causa meant that it was mandatory to prove that the son 
had committed a crime which made it lawful to apply death penalty.9 Presumably, 
demonstration had a determined order where, after the case had been accurately described and 
investigated, the family child charged with committing the crime was given the opportunity to 
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defend himself. This is also implied by the phrases found in the cases to be discussed later 
cognita domi causa1, inspecta diligentissime causa2, audita causa and quae adulescens pro se 
dixerat3. 
The fragment deferre iu<……..> debet propter calumniam was read by its first publisher, 
Chatelain as hoc, which was borrowed from him by Krüger too. First, Ferrini and Scialoja 
read and supplemented it to iu<dici>, which version was soon shared by Krüger too. 
However, as it has been proved by Kunkel4, the iu<dici> reading is not acceptable either in 
terms of content or textual criticism. Namely, if the translation of deferre iudici is “beim 
Richter Anklage erheben” or “dem Richter anzeigen”, then, by interpreting iudex as a body of 
administration of justice (öffentliche Justiz), two opportunities are offered. Either the pater 
familias shall bring a charge against his son before the law to avoid calumnia; but this 
interpretation would fundamentally question the existence or exercisability of ius vitae ac 
necis, which constitutes a cardinal point of patria potestas. Or the pater familias had to report 
to the iudex the killing carried out by him owing to the ius vitae ac necis he was entitled to, 
and in this case it is difficult to harmonise a mere obligation to report with the prohibition of 
killing of the filius familias sine iusta causa. If we accept the reading iu<……> as proper, the 
addition iu<dici> cannot satisfy us because it does not fill up the lacuna present in the text. 
Namely, the edge of the page was cut off in equal width in order to use it again, so, at least 
seven-eight—and not four—letters are missing from each line; consequently, the addition 
iu<dicibus> instead of iu<dici> seems to be more acceptable. This reading will give sense if 
we interpret iudices not as judges of administration of justice but members of the consilium, 
the relatives and friends. At the same time, it is also possible that the reading iu<……> not 
having been confirmed can be replaced by nec<essariis> or pro<pinquis>. As the reading of 
the text raises serious problems, it should not be considered a proof beyond any doubt of the 
absolute necessity of consilium necessariorum, yet, from the above it is absolutely clear that 
in order to exercise ius vitae ac necis the crime of the filius had to be proved (iusta causa), if 
the father wanted to avoid the charge of murder. At the same time, other sources provide 
convincing proofs that to exercise ius vitae ac necis it was necessary to hold iudicium 
domesticum and to convene the consilium necessariorum: ”Maiores nostri dominum patrem 
familias appellaverunt, honores in domo gerere, ius dicere, permiserunt et domum pusillam 
rem publicam esse iudicaverunt.”5 Seneca, in his letter to Lucilius, mentions that the ancestors 
made it possible for the dominus, i.e., the pater familias to fulfil offices in the house 
community and exercise iurisdictio, thus, they considered the home or house community a 
reduced-sized copy of the State. The dominus, exercising punitive power, acted in compliance 
with exemplum maiorum6 and priscum institutum according to Tacitus;7 in compliance with 
mos maiorum according to Sueton;8 and in compliance with consuetudo according to Cicero9. 
The iudicium took place, within certain formalities, usually in the atrium of the home of the 
pater familias.10 
                                                 
1
 Liv. 2, 41, 10. 
2
 Val. Max. 9, 5, 1. 
3
 Sen. clem. 1, 15, 3. 
4
 Kunkel 1966. 244. 
5
 Sen. epist. 47, 14. 
6
 Tac. ann. 2, 50. Adulterii graviorem poenam deprecatus, ut exemplo maiorum propinquis suis ultra 
ducentesimum lapidem removeretur suasit. 
7
 Tac. ann. 13, 32. Isque prisco instituto propinquis coram de capite famaque coniugis cognovit et insontem 
nuntiavit. 
8
 Sue. Tib. 35. ut propinqui more maiorum de communi sententia coercerent 
9
 Cic. Rosc. Am. 15, 44. Quod consuetudine patres faciunt, id quasi novum reprehendis… 
10
 Val. Max 5, 8, 3. Succurrebant effigies maiorum cum titulis suis ut eorum virtutes posteri non solum legerent, 
sed etiam immittarentur. 
 53
With regard to the question whether iudicium domesticum was real jurisdiction, the literature 
is rather divided. The view that does not acknowledge iudicium domesticum as real 
jurisdiction can be traced back to Mommsen.1 He refuses the concept of iudicium domesticum 
for being an oxymoron, and speaks about Hauszucht only, which can be called coercitio or 
disciplina too; so, iudicium domesticum, that is, according to him Hauszucht is nothing else 
than a sort of a Gewissensgericht.2 Following Mommsen, Volterra claims that the judgment of 
the iudicium domesticum did not exempt the person under power from the State’s court 
proceedings and the punishment imposed by it3, and that the existence of State’s court set up 
for judging the crime excludes the existence of iudicium domesticum as a legal institution.4 
Guided by a similar thought, Mommsen also misses the accurate description of the scope of 
crimes to be judged by iudicium domesticum.5 According to Kunkel’s opinion, this way of 
thinking was not typical of the Romans as scopes of authority overlapped in the order of the 
state administration of justice too, which also proves that the competence of the courts of 
justices ordered to judge determined crimes had never become exclusive, between domestic 
jurisdiction and the State’s administration of justice, and while they existed side by side a 
mutual competition of competencies prevailed between them.6 (A similar situation evolved 
between the tresviri capitales and the quaestiones perpetuae7, and due to certain crimes it was 
possible to bring a charge before the quaestio repetundarum, the quaestio maiestatis or the 
quaestio de vi too.8) Kaser—although he does not resolutely refuse to give any significance to 
iudicium domesticum as Mommsen and Volterra—emphasises that it did not belong to the 
scope of ius.9 Iudicium domesticum is considered real jurisdiction by those who more or less 
share Geib’s opinion, as Geib claims that the pater familias was entitled to the right of 
punitive jurisdiction over the members of his family.10 Romans considered the family a 
reduced-sized copy of the State, in which pater familias can be made equal to magistratus 
having imperium, and similarly their iudisdicto can be made parallel too11, as Bonfante has 
already called the attention resolutely to this point.12 This opinion was shared by Düll, 
although in his view in iudicium domesticum the pater familias was not necessarily bound by 
the opinion of the consilium.13 Kunkel ties the wife’s and children’s capital culpability by all 
means to consilium, and believes that the pater familias could not make himself independent 
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of the majority judgement of the consilium with regard to guilt or innocence of the accused.1 
Below we provide a few examples which reveal that if the father wanted to exercise the ius 
vitae ac necis he was entitled to and wanted to be exempted from the charge of murder, he 
had to deal with the case in consilium necessariorum. 
Livy discloses two traditions on the conviction and death of Cassius.2 According to one of 
them, his father executed the death sentence on him; after he had held the necessary trial at his 
home, he had his son whipped and executed. He offered the son’s property to Ceres, he had a 
statue made of that and had it written on it that it had been made by Cassius’s family. 
According to the other tradition, quaestores Caeso Fabius and L. Valerius brought a charge 
against Cassisus due to perduellio and convicted him in the proceedings conducted before the 
comitium in 486/5 B.C. Livius tends to give credit to the second tradition, however, the 
impossibility of this version has already been demonstrated by Mommsen too.3 Therefore, in 
the tradition that can be considered authentic, an example of iudicium domesticum is 
presented to us. Killing on the father’s order is not arbitrary because the cases have been 
investigated and negotiated. Livy does not expressly refer to consilium necessariorum, 
however, as the other cases published by him reveal this was natural to the writer of the age of 
Augustus, his intention by giving this account was primarily to highlight the severitas and 
gravitas of heads of family of ancient times.4 According to Voci, the fact that it is the word 
familia and not the word pater that can be read on the statue erected for Ceres refers to a 
giudizio commune.5 In the present case it seems to be proper to translate the word familia as 
family and not as property because also Livius mentions the consecratio of the son’s peculium 
only, and familia (pecuniaque)6 was not used as a synonym of peculium. The phrase 
damnatus, for that matter, does not prove that the father had adopted the judgment 
independently, sine consilio because the words condemnare and damnare in classical quaestio 
lawsuits denote the activity of the accuser too.7  
According to Valerius Maximus L. Gellius (cos. 72 B.C.; censor 70 B.C.), who charged his 
son with the intention to kill him and having committed adultery with his stepmother, invited 
almost the entire senatus to the trial to judge his son’s crime.8 He disclosed his suspicion to 
the accused and allowed him to defend himself; then, after very careful deliberation of the 
case he acquitted him on the grounds of the judgement of the consilium and of his own. The 
judgment was adopted de consilii sententia, so it was based on the votes of the consilium; sua 
sententia refers merely to the fact that the father found his son innocent too.9 Volterra asserts 
that the father, being convinced of his son’s innocence from the outset, convened the 
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consilium to clarify his own honesty and to save his son from the popular action proceedings 
of parricidium.1 Kunkel, however, calls the attention to the point that the source does not 
contain any reference to that, what is more, it speaks about a highly careful investigation of 
the charge, and that the state of facts of parricidium had never been extended to merely 
attempted or planned crime and that the assassination attempt was to be punished in certain 
cases only, even after lex Cornelia de sicariis.2 
According to Seneca L. Tarius Rufus (cos. suff. 16 B.C.) punished his son, who tried to kill 
him, by exile only, and continued to pay him the previously set annuity.3 If Seneca praised the 
bonus pater familias only, then the description of the case would serve as a proof of the 
unlimited punitive power of pater familias. The philosopher, however, commemorates 
Augustus too as bonus princeps. The praise of the emperor and description of his behaviour 
clearly reveals that the filius’s crime was judged by a consilium, and Augustus was its most 
respected member, however, a member only, because, taking care that the father should 
conduct the cognitio, he did not ask the consilium and its members to appear before him, 
instead, he went to see them at the home of the head of the family. After the cognitio had been 
conducted, in which his son was allowed to defend himself, in accordance with usual order of 
procedure the persons present cast their vote orally on the issue of the son’s guilt, however, 
Augustus, preventing his own vote cast first as the ballot of the most highly ranked person 
from influencing the others, proposed voting in writing. After the boards, on which the 
sententias were written, had been collected but had not been opened yet, he made an oath that 
he would not accept Tarius’s inheritance. So, in this case the issue of guilt was decided in 
writing, and he did not want to influence them. In imposing the punishment, however, he 
wanted to urge the consilium to adopt a lenient judgment, which was carried out orally. Tarius 
had to decide on the basis of the majority of the votes cast, because if he had considered the 
sententias advice only, then Augustus’s efforts not to influence anybody by his vote and to 
count his ballot as equal to the other votes would have been unnecessary. 
In the case referred by Marcian, emperor Hadrian sent a father to exile who killed his son 
while they were hunting because he had an adulterous affair with his stepmother.4 According 
to the emperor, the act of assassination is a deed worthy of a rogue and not a father, as the 
essence of patria potestas is pietas and not cruelty. The father should not have killed his son 
even if he had caught him in the act of adultery with his stepmother as he was not entitled to 
do that by lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis.5 Whereas, if the above mentioned law would 
have entitled the pater familias to kill his son or wife caught in the act of adultery, here he 
should not have exercised his such right because this was not a case of being caught in the act 
but a permanent adulterous affair ( the phrase adulterabat is used here as durativum). In this 
case in iudicium domesticum a consilium should have been convened to judge over the 
offenders. The father did not do that, instead, he assassinated his son. It is more probable that 
                                                 
1
 Volterra 1948. 133. 
2
 Kunkel 1966. 224. 
3
 Sen. clem. 1, 15, 2–6. Cogniturus de filio Tarius advocavit in consilium Carsarem Augustum; venit in privatos 
penates, adsedit pars alieni consilii fuit, non dixit: ’Immo in domum meam veniat’, quod si factum esset, 
Caesaris futura erat cognitio, non patris. Audita causa excussisque omnibus ex his quae adulescens pro se 
dixerat, et his, quibus arguebatur, petit, ut sententiam suam auisque scriberet, ne ea omium fieret, quae Caesaris 
fuisset. Deinde priusquam aperientur codicilli, iuravit se Tarii, hominis locupletis, hereditatem non aditurum. 
Tarius quidem eodem die et alterum heredem perdidit, sed Caesar libertatem sententiae suae redemit; et 
postquam adprobavit gratuitam esse severitatem suam, quod principi semper curandum est, dixit relegandum, 
quo patri videretur. 
4
 Marc. D. 48, 9, 5. Divus Hadrianus fertur, cum in venatione filium suum quidam necaverat, qui novercam 
adulterabat, in insulam eum deportasse, quod latronis magis quam patris iure eum interfecit: nam patria 
potestas in pietate debet, non atrocitate consistere. 
5
 D. 48, 5. 
 56
here Hadrian punishes the father due to lack of proper punitive proceedings, iudicium 
domesticum and not just schimpliche Gesinnung, as Kaser presumes.1 
Special attention should be paid to the fragment of Ulpian that states that the father shall not 
kill his son without hearing him; instead, he shall bring a charge against him before the 
principals of the province.2 The first part of the text (indauditum filium pater occidere non 
potest) is perhaps the only trace of the existence of iudicium domesticum in Iustinian’s Digest. 
The originality of the second part of the text (sed accusare eum apud praefectum praesidemve 
provinciae debet) has been questioned by Mommsen already3, and Bonfante clearly 
considered it interpolated.4 Perozzi believed that the description was possibly original because 
in his view in the times of Severus the rights the father was entitled to had not lost their effect 
yet, they were subordinated to the obligation to report to the magistratus only.5 Kunkel adds 
the following explanation to this locus: The first part forbids the father to kill his son without 
hearing him; the second part, however, clearly refuses to give him the right of killing and 
thereby entirely and generally orders him to bring a charge before the State’s court of justice. 
Therefore, it is probable that the original text applied to the case of holding the iudicium 
domesticum, and if under it the filius was allowed to defend himself, it permitted the killing of 
the son. Furthermore, in his opinion, the part on praeses and praefectus is not necessarily 
interpolated because the father could also waive exercising his punitive power and bring the 
son’s crime before public court of justice, and so, perhaps, the compilers deleted the reference 
to iudicium domesticum only, which might have run as follows: ”sed cognoscere de eo cum 
amicis vel accusare eum apud praefectum praesidemve provinciae debet.”6 
In the Digest, apart from the above-mentioned case, all traces of iudicium domesticum and 
consilium necessariorum had been carefully deleted by the compilers as patria potestas had 
been reduced to a merely instructive, disciplinary power already before Iustinianus, and so the 
ius vitae ac necis exercised in iudicium domesticum had completely lost its significance. 
Consequently, the lack of iudicium domesticum and consilium cannot be proved by the 
argumentum e silentio that we cannot find any reference to them in Iustinian’s codification.7  
The fact that iudicium domesticum was required in order to exercise ius vitae ac necis is 
apparent from the above. In certain exceptional cases the law allowed killing sine iudicio too. 
Among these cases the regulations of lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis had highly great 
significance. This law provides the father with the right to kill both his daughter caught in the 
act of adultery and the man committing adultery, with impunity; however, it confines this 
right to certain terms and limits.8 The daughter had to be under the father’s9 potestas10, the 
adulterium had to be committed at his own or his son-in-law’s house11, the father had to kill 
his daughter too, along with the man. If he killed the correus only, it was considered 
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homicida, and his deed was to be judged in accordance with lex Cornelia de sicariis.1 The 
father who killed the correus only was not punishable in the event that his daughter stayed 
alive because she fled and not because the father saved her life.2 The rescripta of emperors 
Marcus Aurelius and Commodus provided the father with acquittal from the charge of 
homicidium in the case where the father had killed the correus but his daughter stayed alive, if 
the father had seriously wounded the daughter—which reveals that he wanted to kill her—but 
his daughter recovered owing to pure luck.3 The father had to catch the offenders in ipsis 
rebus Veneris.4 He had to kill both offenders at the same time, without any delay (uno ictu et 
uno impetu et aequali ira).5 If the father killed his daughter only after a certain amount of 
time has elapsed, it was deemed homicida, if, however, the daughter escaped, and the father 
reached and killed her—as he acted continuatione animi—he was acquitted from the charge of 
homicidium.6 What is the connection between ius vitae ac necis arising from patria potestas 
and ius occidendi provided by lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis?7 Papinian, to the question 
why it was necessary to set forth in law that the father had the power to kill his daughter too 
although the relevant lex regia granted him vitae necisque potestas over his children, responds 
that the law does not vest the father with new power, instead, it obliges him to kill his 
daughter too together with the man committing adultery because thereby—i.e., if he does not 
pardon his daughter either—he acts with greater equity. The question might arise why it is 
necessary to discuss this legal institution in details in the Digest and the Collatio. As it has 
become apparent from the above, the father’s ius vitae ac necis terminated in the 4th c. already 
and careful compilers deleted almost all references to iudicium domesticum necessarily related 
to it. Thus, it became indispensable to maintain lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis, which 
continued to operate now without ius vitae ac necis arising from patria potestas. 
Ius occidendi that may be exercised over the daughter caught in the act of adultery is an 
organic part of patria potestas. Probably, here they applied the criminal law principle that 
punishment—in the present case: killing—of offenders caught in the act (manifesti) was 
permitted without proceedings too.8 This right would continue to hold against a married 
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daughter too, even if his father had given her in mariti manum, which is probably connected 
with the provisions of lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis that restricted manus. Namely, 
according to leges regiae, the husband judged, in the consilium domesticum together with 
relatives, over his wife’s acts to be punished by death such as adultery and drinking wine.1 If, 
however, he had caught her wife in the act of adultery (in adulterio uxorem tuam si 
prehendisses), according to Cato, he could kill her with impunity (impune) and without any 
special proceedings (sine iudicio).2 The lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis, however, deprived 
the husband from this right, even in the case where his wife was under manus; thereby 
Augustus weakened manus and adjusted it to the current conditions of the age.3 He argued 
that whereas father’s love encouraged him to give pardon, a husband’s rage urged him to take 
hasty revenge.4 If the husband nevertheless killed his wife caught in the act of adultery, he 
had to account for his act under lex Cornelia de sicariis.5 
The father’s ius vitae ac necis remained untouched until the 4th c. A.D. in spite of minor or 
greater legal or out-of-law restrictions. Constantine speaks about ius vitae ac necis still as a 
living legal institution.6 In 365, this right of the pater familias weakened to pure punitive 
power; the emperor’s decree determined the father’s duty that he should reprimand young 
people for their blunders, and should prevent them from committing further faults.7 With a 
few changes, Iustinianus borrowed Constantine’s text from Codex Theodosianus. However, 
he made such changes specifically with regard to ius vitae ac necis as he mentioned it merely 
as the power that the pater familias used to be entitled to.8 This clearly reveals that by the age 
of Iustinianus ius vitae ac necis as a legal institution had long become extinct, and application 
of the provisions set forth therein was subject to criminal law regulation.  
 
II. Ius exponendi and ius vitae ac necis exercised over newborn infants had been contained 
from the outset by patria potestas. A lex regia left to later ages under the name Romulus 
obliged the pater familias to bring up every male child and firstborn female child, and forbade 
him to kill children younger than three years, except for deformed children immediately after 
their birth. It did not forbid exposition of the latter either, however, it set the condition that 
they had to be shown to five neighbours. On those who might not comply with this law, it 
imposed the punishment of confiscating half of their property.9 This norm, which belonged to 
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the system of sacral law, had at one time actually restricted patria potestas, yet, later on we 
can find no reference to its application—especially with regard to applying forfeiture of 
property as sanction in such cases. 
After that, we learn from Cicero of a provision of the Twelve Table Law, which probably not 
only allowed but ordered the expositio of deformed children: ”Cito necatus tamquam ex XII 
tabulis insignis ad deformitatem puer.”1 Just as Romulus’s lex regia did not forbid exposition 
of deformed children, the norm from the Twelve Table Law left to us from Cicero’s De 
legibus also permits, what is more, perhaps orders their destruction. Leges regiae provides for 
exposition of children, the Twelve Table Law for killing children, however, presumably these 
phrases in these sources—even if they are not used as synonyms—denote acts with identical 
outcome in terms of the child’s fate. For, in the case of deformed children nobody thought of 
adopting and bringing them up, which can be attributed to practical and religious causes. In 
Roman thinking, a deformed child was considered prodigium, which the community had to be 
get rid of during procuratio prodigii. Romans called the usual order, repose of the world pax 
deum, which meant gods’ peaceful relation to men, and if this order was upset, it could be 
always attributed to gods stepping out of this repose.2 Breaking down of the cosmic order, so 
every extraordinary, new event was considered prodigium.3 The etymology of the word is 
dubious; in Walde–Hofmann’s interpretation prodigium comes from prod-aio,4 accordingly 
prodigium means foretelling or forecastring. This approach does not seem to be acceptable 
because “prodigium itself does not declare anything”5, actually, needs to be interpreted, that is 
why they used the assistance of pontifexes, the Sibylla books or haruspexes.6 There is a more 
proper interpretation claiming that the word comes from the compound prod-agere, so 
prodigium is nothing else than ”breaking through this shell, supernatural forces hiding 
behind the surface come forth, become manifest”.7 Whenever prodigium appeared, be it of a 
private or state kind, after its meaning had been found out, that is, interpreted, procuratio had 
to be carried out, upon the proposal made again by the interpreters; if the same prodigium 
recurred more frequently, the pontifices always ordered the same conciliation.8 (For example, 
if stone rain was falling, novemdiale sacrum had to be held.9) Deformed children had to be 
destroyed10, and children born on an ominous day were considered prodigium too.11 Sueton 
describes that on the day of Britannicus’s death stones were thrown at the temples, altars were 
turned over, the Lares were driven to the street, and children were exposed. The procuratio of 
deformed children considered prodigium was usually carried out by killing or exposition; 
however, it should be added that in these cases exposition always meant that the child was 
destined to die, the outcome of the two acts was eventually identical. The procuratio had to be 
always bloodless, therefore they performed it by drowning.12 
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Data on newer regulation of ius exponendi are available from a much later period, the 4th c. 
A.D. only, so it is possible that this element of patria potestas had not been considerably 
limited until then. Exposition of children could be attributed, as a matter of fact, not only to 
religious causes, in this period either. Likewise, the father could expose the child that it was 
not willing to acknowledge as his own due to the mother’s alleged or real infidelity or that he 
did not want to bring up because of his poverty or other economic reasons. In these cases the 
child was not meant to perish; they exposed it at a place where others could easily find it.1 As 
a matter of fact, we know of cases where a child, having been admitted, was meant and 
instructed to be a prostitute or gladiator (ad servitutem aut ad lupanar).2 It occurred that the 
father met and got familiar with his formerly exposed daughter now as a prostitute.3 Several 
of them were afflicted and forced to beg.4 
Sources from the age before Constantinus do not provide a uniform picture on the legal status 
of exposed children. In Plautus’s and Terence’s plays exposed and then admitted children 
keep their free status.5 In Plautus’s comedy Casina, the exposed female child was admitted by 
the libertina Cleostrata, who gave her the name Casina. Casina, having grown up, became the 
wife of Eutyrichus also having free status. In Cistellaria by Plautus, the procuress Melaenis 
admitted and brought up the exposed Selenium born as a free person, who later married the 
free Alcesimarchus. In Terence’s Heautontimorumenos, Antiphila, who was exposed by his 
mother, Sostrata, kept his free status, and married the also free Clinia. At the same time it is 
beyond doubt that several exposed children were forced to live as a slave.6 Sueton provides 
information first on M. Antonius Gnipho, who was born free in Gaul (ingenuus), however, 
was exposed as a child, and was then liberated and educated by the person who brought him 
up. After that he mentions that Gnipho was a highly talented man with outstanding power of 
memory, who acquired erudition in both Latin and Greek.7 The second source is about C. 
Melissus born also free (ingenuus) in Spoletium, who was exposed in his childhood due to 
conflicts between the parents.8 Thanks to the person who brought him up and admitted him, 
he was given training in higher sciences, and was recommended to Maecenas as a 
grammarian. Maecenas made friends with him, and although his mother supported his son’s 
freedom too—using the claim called adsertio libertatis—Melissus nevertheless remained in 
statu servitutis because he deemed it more than his original descent. Weiss interpreted the 
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phrases ingenuus natus and manumissus as opposites, and derived Gnipho’s slave status 
therefrom.1 According to Coril, in this text in servitute denotes merely a de facto status and 
not that the child had been made servus also de iure.2  Watson believes that Suetonius does 
not use the phrases status servitutis or manumissus as terminus technicus, so it would have 
been unnecessary to pay special attention to them.3 Manumissus not necessarily refers to 
status servitutis since they used remancipatio or manumissio also in the case of filius in 
mancipium.4 The father could reclaim his exposed child from the nutritor after having 
reimbursed the costs of alimentatio.5 
On the legal status of children born free and then exposed, Pliny the Younger, propraetor of 
Bithynia and emperor Traianus exchanged letters. The letters were presumably dated in 
Plinius’s second year in office, in 111.6 In his letter, Plinius presents the issue of the status 
and alimentatio of children born free and then exposed, called threptos, as a problem affecting 
the entire province to emperor Traianus, as he has not found a rule that applies either 
expressly to Bithynia or the whole empire and believes that he could not be satisfied with 
other examples in a matter that can be decided solely by the emperor’s authority. Although he 
knows about certain epistulae and edicta, such as for example those issued by emperors 
Augustus, Vespasianus and Titus for Andania, Sparta and Achaia, they all contain particular 
rules only, and therefore cannot be applied to Pliny’s province. Otherwise, he does not send 
Traianus the copies of the documents referred to because they are probably available in the 
emperor’s archives, which much better text.7 In his response letter, Traianus precisely 
formulates the question raised by Pliny: so, the issue addressed concerns children born free 
who have been exposed by their parents and then have been admitted and brought up as slaves 
by others. Traianus mentions that his predecessors have indeed settled this issue with general 
effect extending to each province, and refers to Domitianus’s two epistulae written to 
proconsules Avidius Negrinus and Armenius Brocchus, which are perhaps not to be fully 
ignored, however, as they do not have a general scope, cannot be applied to Bithynia. 
Traianus grants the opportunity of adsertio in libertatem, and refuses to give the nutritor the 
right to claim reimbursement of the costs of alimentatio and ius retentionis that serves to 
ensure that. The question arises who may enforce plea for freedom. As it was vindicatio in 
libertatem and not vindicatio in patriam potestatem that Traianus permitted, according to 
Cornil, it was not the parents but the child itself that was entitled to the right of vindicatio.8 
Yet, because a child living as a slave was not allowed to initiate a lawsuit, action taken by the 
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adsertor was needed to represent the child in the lawsuit.1 Consequently, Traianus sets out 
from the child’s status libertatis that, accordingly, cannot be lost.2 The costs of alimentatio 
are not be reimbursed because in the present case regaining freedom is not ransoming from 
status sevitutis but liberation from slavery.3 
According to Scaevola’s fragment, which also bears decisive significance in determining the 
legal status of exposed children, a Roman citizen divorced his wife and married again.4 The 
cast off wife exposed the child, who was brought up by a third party. In his last will and 
testament the father, as he did not know if his son was alive or not, did not name him as his 
inheritor and did not disinherit him either. Following his father’s death, the son, once he had 
been recognised by his mother and father’s mother, took possession of the estate as legitimus 
heres. In Scaevola’s view, the last will was invalid because the son was under patria potestas, 
even if his father did not know about it.5 According to Paulus, the exposed child will retain its 
status libertatis, even if it might not be aware of it and might consider itself a slave.6 
In the rescriptum of emperors Diocletianus and Maximianus, dated 295, addressed to 
Rhodonus, the following can be read:7 Rhodonus admitted and brought up a girl born free and 
exposed, and after she had grown up, he meant her to marry his son. Before entering into the 
marriage, the natural father took action and claimed to release his daughter. The father 
retained his potestas over the child, and he could have enforced it through praeiudicium de 
patria potestate.8 The question, however, concerned only the issue whether the father should 
reimburse the costs of alimentatio. In the rescriptum, the rulers decided that if the natural 
father should be against conclusion of marriage between his daughter and the foster father’s 
son, then he should reimburse the costs of alimentatio, if, however, he agreed to it, then he 
would be exempted from reimbursing the costs. 
An exposed slave child also retains its innate status servitutis. The issue of ownership over the 
child was regulated by emperor Alexander Serverus in his rescriptum written to A. Claudius 
in 224:9 if the child was exposed without the dominus being aware of it or against his will, he 
was entitled to the right of  vindicatio, however, he had to reimburse the nutritor for his costs. 
On the other hand, if the dominus himself had the slave woman’s child exposed, then he 
would not be granted the right of repetitio. In accordance with the principle of derelictio, the 
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slave child so exposed will retain its status, yet, will become a child having no dominus, and 
the collector will obtain ownership over him through occupatio.1 
Reference to the exposed child’s slave status can be found also among the contracts of the 
waxed boards of Dacia:2 on 17 March 139, in Kartum, purchase of a slave was entered into 
between Maximus Batonis and Dasius Versonis, its subject was an approximately six-year-old 
slave girl called Passia. The seller was obliged to name the origin of the slave in negotiating 
the purchase and sale3 as it highly influenced what occupation she was suitable for; for this 
reason, the aedilisi edictum also obliged those who sold slaves on the market to name their 
natio.4 Mommsen claims that the phrase empta sportellaria implies that the owner had 
purchased the girl’s mother, and was given the slave girl, Passia as a present since sportella 
means present.5 Weiss’s interpretation seems to be more probable, he asserts that the seller 
himself had purchased the girl as an exposed child, and he proves it by the following:6 the 
papyruses reveal that the phrase sportellarius is identical with koptriaireios7, which always 
denotes the exposed child. Undoubtedly, sportella means a small basket, as in Hieronymus’s 
Vulgata regarding the exposition of Moses can be read.8 Fiscella, which is the deminutivum of 
fiscus that originally meant basket, is the synonym of sportella, and refers to the custom that a 
basket was often used when exposing a child. Therefore, sportellaria means a female child 
exposed in a basket; it is possible to get closer to this interpretation by certain Greek sources, 
which assert that a child was exposed also in some kind of vessel (ostrakon, enkhystria). 
Constantine’s law dated 17 April 331 brought significant change in the legal status of exposed 
children, for it extended the regulation pertaining to the fate of slave women’s children, 
adopted by Alexandrus Severus, to free children.9 Thus, the father who has exposed his child, 
will lose his potestas over the child, and thereby the right to reclaim the child. The nutritor 
freely decides the status of the admitted child, irrespective if the child was born as a free 
person or a slave. The phrase retineat sub eodem statu, quem apud se collectum voluerit 
agitare shows that the father was not given the opportunity of vindicatio in libertatem or 
adsertio libertatis.10 It is quite clear that this law provided highly effective protection for the 
person who brought up the exposed child. 
Restriction or prohibition of ius exponendi was implemented on the level of law rather late. In 
February 374, emperors Valentinianus, Valens and Gratianus ordered to impose death penalty 
for killing children.11 A month later Valentinianus declared that exposition of children was to 
be punished.12 As Valentinianus referred to an earlier punishment, it cannot be ruled out that 
he renewed a prohibition of exposition that had existed for a long time. On the contrary, it is 
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also possible—if we interpret expositio as a form of necatio, which was not alien from post-
classical thinking at all—that Valentinianus referred to the prohibition of killing children 
dated February of the same year and the item of penalty imposed thereon.1 The latter 
standpoint can be supported by the argument that the addressee of both constitutiones was the 
same Probus praefectus praetorio. The item of punishment cannot be known from the latter 
contitutio. According to Memmer, the fact that in 442 a person who exposed his child was 
certainly not sentenced to death yet is confirmed by the proof that the tenth canon of the 
Concilium Vasense held in the same year dealt with ecclesiastical punishment of those who 
exposed their children.2 Namely, if a regulation imposing death penalty on exposition had 
existed, then the discussion of ecclesiastical punishment would have become completely 
unnecessary.3 The prohibition of exposition of children of 374 presumably applied to the 
pater familias’s own children only because this law also regulated the dominus’s rights over 
the exposed colonus and slave child.4 Based thereon the dominus or the patronus who meant 
the child to die and for this reason exposed it was not entitled to the right of reclaiming it. In 
412, emperors Honorius and Theodosius entered a similar regulation into force.5 Compared to 
the previous regulation, it appears as a new element that the regulation makes admitting the 
child subject to meeting two conditions: it had to take place before the bishop and a document 
had to be made thereon. According to Memmer, this makes it probable that the collector had 
the right in accordance with the norm of 331 to decide the status of the child.6 
In accordance with Iustinianus’s regulation of 529 covering the entire empire, it was 
prohibited to sink the exposed child to the fate of colonus or slave, no matter what status he 
was from.7 So, it ensured freedom to all exposed children, even to slave children who were 
caused to be exposed by the dominus. It forbids the collector to gain advantage from bringing 
up the child; his act is deemed officium pietatis.8 He confirmed the provisions set forth in this 
regulation in the same year.9 In 541, he expressis verbis guaranteed the freedom of exposed 
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children too1, and he allowed the dominus to prove his ownership over the child only in the 
event that the child had been exposed without him being aware of it or in spite of his will. 
Coming to the end of this analysis, it is necessary to add a few remarks in summary on the 
two legal institutions of patria potestas, discussed in this paper. Ius vitae ac necis, that is, the 
punitive power of pater familias against an adult child meant a right that actually existed until 
the 4th c. A.D., based on which the father himself could kill his children. The exercise of this 
right, however, was confined to meeting certain rules of procedure and limits. Consequently, 
he had to conduct the proceedings within the frameworks of iudicium domesticum, in which 
the consilium necessariorum investigated the charge and heard the defence of the accused, 
and, then, in the event that the offence seemed to be a crime that deserved death penalty 
indeed, it decided guilt by majority of the votes cast, which decision had absolutely binding 
force upon the pater familias. By lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis, Augustus further 
narrowed the scope of application of ius vitae ac necis. Ius exponendi, that is, the right of the 
pater familias over the newborn infant was a living legal institution also in practice until 374 
A.D. Two sides of its exercise are distinguished. One of them is basically ecclesiastical, in 
this case the exposition of the child as procuratio prodigii was aimed at the child’s death and 
was not separated from killing the newborn infant. In the other case the reason was merely 
that the family or the pater familias did not want to bring up the child; yet, they could reckon 
that somebody would find and bring up the child. If the latter opportunity occurred, then the 
issue of the status of the brought up child arose as a question. During the centuries this 
showed rather variable picture until the law of the age of Iustinian reached the stage where it 
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Remarks on Marriage and Divorce in Roman Law 
 
 
Roman law acknowledged two kinds of civil law marriage: marriage generating manus, that 
is, husband’s power, and marriage without manus. In this paper we shall confine our 
investigation to marriage with manus, and as part of that we intend to expound the following 
issues in detail: the forms of the conclusion of engagement (I.), of marriage, and of obtaining 
manus, specifically confarreatio, coemptio and usus (II.), the relation of uxor in manu to 
agnatio (III.), the husband’s punitive power over the wife under iudicium domesticum and on 
the grounds of lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis (IV.), and the forms of divorce and the 
termination of manus, paying special regard to remancipatio uxoris (V.). 
 
I. In the archaic age the engagement was concluded through sponsio,1 as Varro’s De lingua 
Latina reveals,2 where the term sponsus denotes commitment of one of the parties,3 and 
sponsio arises after the sponsus has been carried out by both of the parties.4 Festus asserts the 
sacred character of the engagement, sponsalia, and states that the terms sponsus and sponsa 
just as the word sponsio itself come from the Greek terms spondē (drink sacrifice), and 
spondō (to offer drink sacrifice), and denote this ceremony and the implementors thereof:5 
“Deinde oblitus inferiore capite sponsum et sponsam ex Graeco dicta ait, quod ii spondas 
interpositis rebus divinis faciant.”6 Consequently, sponsio was initially the act of making a 
promise 7 confirmed by an oath,8 and was customarily performed as part of certain rituals, 
e.g., in requesting auspicium that served to manifest gods’ will9 and calling the same gods to 
witness10 that the oath was true.11 The person taking the oath (iusiurandum,12 sacramentum) 
as it were delivered him/herself to the said higher powers, and by breaking the oath incurred 
their punishment,13 i.e., became a sacer and had to suffer all of its social consequences, 
namely, full expulsion from the community, and the option of being killed by anybody, what 
is more, the act of killing this person was considered a kind of expiatory sacrifice, piaculum 
offered to the deity.14 
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In the inter-state relations of the early period sponsio was an agreement made before the 
contract to be concluded at a later point of time, aimed at entering into the foedus in the 
future, that is, a kind of bond for title, which was, however, binding not the populus Romanus 
itself but only the sponsores taking part in it, who were threatened by noxae deditio in case 
the foedus failed, or more precisely, if the senatus dismissed its conclusion.1 Livy describes 
the relevant formula in connection with the case when the consul Postumius and his 
consponsores promised the Samnites in 321 B.C. at Caudium to enter into a peace treaty, but 
the motion for the contract was dismissed by the senatus, and Postumius was handed over 
under noxae deditio by the fetiales to the Samnits.2 Later in Gaius’s Institutiones it was the 
princeps who promised the leader of the foreign people to enter into a peace treaty under 
sponsio;3 in this case it was presumably compelling public interest that justified that the aliens 
were exceptionally allowed to use the verb spondere which could be used solely by Roman 
citizens specifically due to its sacred nature.4 The specification noxae deditio implies that this 
procedure of the sponsores was considered delictum, and the fact that they believed their 
commitment was supposed to be fulfilled towards the deity rather than to the other party can 
be inferred from Livy calling their procedure impium scelus, an act of violating the divine 
order; so noxae deditio was most probably meant to be addressed both to the other people and 
the higher powers—and if the enemy had the persons handed over executed, then in the 
interpretation of the generally accepted ideas of the period the deity obtained redress he was 
entitled to because of the oath broken.5 
Initially the persons subjected to the patria potestas to be engaged were most probably not 
allowed to play an active part in entering into the sponsalia since their transaction capacity 
was limited6 as it can be unambiguously inferred from the sources with respect to the fiancée.7 
To the question whether the fiancé himself was merely the subject of the transaction entered 
into by the person exercising power in the conclusion of the engagement, or an active 
participant, Kupiszewski tries to give an answer on the basis of a relevant locus in Varro: 
“Qui dicit a sua sponte ’spondeo’, spondet est sponsor; qui idem faciat obligatur sponsu, 
consponsus; hoc Naevius significat cum ait ’consponsi’.”8 First, it was presumably the 
finacée’s father, or the person exercising power over her who made a promise to conclude the 
marriage, so it is him the source calls sponsor; then a promise was made by the other party 
too regarding the same subject (idem)—this other party is called consponsus by Varro, which 
might make it probable that this term was meant to denote the fiancé, who is referred to as 
sponsus in another context, and that the denomination consponsus came from sponsus. The 
term sponsor, however, is beyond any doubt in active voice, and it would be hard to explain 
why Varro would have used within the same sentence now the word sponsor (the fiancée’s 
father pledging himself to hand her over) and then consponsus (the fiancé making a promise) 
to denote the implementors of the same act. Now if we consider the term consponsus the 
participium perfectum of the verb spondeo, it becomes clear that the fiancé did not play an 
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active part in the conclusion of the engagement, it was not he himself who made the promise, 
instead it was him who was promised to the other party, that is, to the fiancée’s father—
Kupiszewski holds the view that consponsus is simply a synonym of sponsor.1 (This 
explanation is supported by the fact that in the period when it was now the fiancé himself who 
concluded the engagement2 neither the word sponsor, nor the word consponsus occur in this 
context.3) Based on a different interpretation, i.e., if the term consponsus simply came from 
sponsus, Varro could not have referred to the point that Naevius called both of the parties 
exercising power who made a promise regarding the same subject, namely, the marriage of 
their children, consponsi.4  
One of the most important sources for specifying further changes in the institution of 
sponsalia is the following locus of Aulus Gellius’s work entitled Noctes Atticae quoting 
Servius Sulpicius Rufus’s De dotibus.5 The parties taking part in the conclusion of the 
engagement are the fiancée’s father, or guardian, that is, the person who exercises power over 
her, and the fiancé—although this source does not reveal if the engagement was allowed to be 
concluded independently only by the sponsus having rights of his own or by the person 
subjected to the patria potestas too. In Plautus’s comedies we find plenty of examples for the 
engagement being entered into both by the fiancé himself6 and by the fiancé’s father;7 in 
Terentius’s Andria the parents conclude the sponsalia for the benefit of their children,8 and 
Cicero writes concerning Galba that he had Crassus’s daughter engaged to his son Crassus.9 
The differences can be most probably deduced from the different status familiae of the given 
fiancé: a sui iuris fiancé acted by himself, and even his father could not force him to conclude 
a marriage unacceptable for him;10 on behalf of the filius familias subjected to the patria 
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potestas his father entered into the transaction,1 and the pater familias was not only allowed to 
have his say on his conclusion of marriage but the act of disregarding his command and the 
lack of his permit involved infamia.2 It follows from all the above that the sponsus referred to 
by Servius Sulpicius was a person having his own rights, i.e., was allowed to conclude the 
engagement by himself.3 
Similarly to earlier periods, the fiancée did not play an active part in entering into the 
sponsalia, she continued to be the one who was promised to the fiancé, a sponsa. (In certain 
sources she is named pacta, dicta, or sperata,4 from which terms it might be concluded—
especially setting out from the definition given by Arnobius,5 where the denominations 
sperata and pacta are opposed to the denomination sponsa—that in these cases the 
engagement was entered into not through sponsio, or stipulatio.6 Whereas, Servius considers 
the word pacta in the relevant line of the Aeneis 7 a synonym of sponsa.8 It cannot be ruled 
out that this uncertainty in terminology can be traced back to the fact that in the age of Servius 
Arnobius sponsio and stipulatio, and the conclusion of the engagement through them were no 
longer applied;9 however, in the age of Plautus engagements were made through sponsio-
stipulatio, or pactum confirmed by them, and in Trinummus, after describing the completion 
of the act,10 the author calls the fiancée11 pacta.12) The mutual promise set forth in the 
engagement sponsio contained the following acts:13 the fiancée’s father made a promise to 
marry off his daughter (in matrimonium dare), and the fiancé made a promise to marry the 
girl (in matrimonium ducturum esse),14 as it is clear from the references made in the 
explanations of Florentin and Ulpian.15 
 
II. As specified by Gaius, manus arises in three forms: usus, confarreatio and coempio;16 by 
using the term olim he unambiguously implies that these institutions were applied not in his 
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own age but in ancient times, and, contrary to other sources,1 he clearly formulates that they 
are the forms of obtaining manus and not the forms of concluding the marriage itself.2 The 
order of the development is disputed, in the literature no communis opinio doctorum on the 
subject has been established until now that can be regarded reassuring. Concerning 
confarreatio we can infer Etruscan origin from its highly sacred character, on the one hand; 
and from the more liberal status possessed by women among the Etruscans, on the other,3 
which is confirmed by the celebration of the conclusion of marriage under confarreatio, as we 
shall see, to the extent that in this procedure the woman is an equal acting party who actively 
takes part in the rite, while in coemptio she is only the subject of the procedure.4 Although not 
taking a firm position confirming the Etruscan origin, Kaser5 regards confarreatio an alien 
body in the system of Roman ius sacrum, since in the procedure it is the religious act itself 
that leads to legal consequences affecting ius privatum without being produced by the joint 
impact of ius sacrum and ius privatum usual in other legal institutions, since it does not 
require the assistance of either persons who might exercise power, or the meeting of the 
people.6 
From Gaius’s description of confarreatio it becomes clear that this ritual comprised a sacrifice 
offered to Iuppiter Farreus, including farreum libum,7 that is, the joint consumption of panis 
farreus, and offering a part of it to Iuppiter (the term confarreatio comes from this), in the 
first place, and reciting certain ceremonial, sacred texts in the compulsory presence of ten 
witnesses; Gaius describes this ritual as one generally used in his age, since both the rex 
sacrorum and the flamines maiores (flamen Dialis, flamen Martialis, flamen Quirinalis) had 
to come from a marriage under confarreatio, and in order to fulfill their priestly office they 
had to live in marriage of such kind.8 The comments made on the ritual itself in Ulpian’s 
Liber singularis regularum corresponds to Gaius’s description.9 From the explanation given 
by Servius on the relevant locus in Vergil’s Georgics it can be ascertained that in the ritual 
certain fruits and the aforesaid sacrificial fan made of ground spelt with salt (mola salsa) were 
used, and that the marriage was concluded in the presence of the pontifex maximus and the 
flamen Dialis.10 Also in Servius’s commentaries on Vergil’s Aeneid two additional points are 
made concerning the confarreatio: dextrarum iunctio11 and in manum conventio to be 
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interpreted in the literal sense of the phrase,1 the act of linking the right hands of the couple to 
be married was carried out over the fire burning on the altar; during the celebration a sacred 
torch was burning, and there was water in a pitcher to symbolize the two most important 
elements and their joint presence; that is how the marriage was concluded between the flamen 
and his wife, the flaminica.2 During the ritual the couple to be married were sitting with 
covered head on two chairs covered with the skin of sacrificial lamb placed close to each 
other,3 which was meant to confirm the relation to be established between them.4 The priestly 
functions enumerated in the sources, the offices of the rex sacrorum, the flamen (and the 
flaminica) Dialis, the flamen Martialis and the flamen Quirinalis were allowed to be fulfilled 
only by patricians; and as the so-called communicatio sacrorum, that is, offering sacrifice 
under the supervision of the pontifex maximus and with the assistance of the flamen Dialis, 
was not permitted between patricians and plebeians, it is highly probable that plebeians were 
ab ovo barred from the ritual of confarreatio, and it was reserved for the conclusion of 
marriage of patricians having sacred consequences that cannot be disregarded.5 
The question arises how long the institution of confarreatio can be considered a living 
practice. Towards the end of the age of the Roman republic patricians took it rather 
burdensome to assume the office of the flamen Dialis heavily delimited by taboos6 and 
consequently preventing them from making a political career, and that is how this priestly 
function was left vacant for a longer period from 87 B.C.; although both the dignity of the 
flamines and confarreatio were reinstated by a senatus consultum attached to the name of 
Augustus dating from 12 B.C.,7 this measure could not bring long lasting results since 
Tiberius had to deal with the problem again in 23.8 What happened was that they wanted to 
elect a new flamen Dialis to replace the deceased Servius Malugiensis, but the required 
conditions—stipulating that the proper person was to be selected from three persons coming 
from marriages concluded under confarreatio—were missing because the patricians willingly 
refrained from concluding such a marriage as in the procedure the wife would have been 
removed from the subjection to the patria potestas, and would have been forced under to 
husband’s manus. Eventually, Servius Malugiensis’s son became his successor, 
simultaneously a resolution was adopted on the subject that the flaminica Dialis would be 
subjected to her hasbund’s power only with respect to the sacra, otherwise she was entitled to 
rights equal to rights other women had.9 
The conclusion of marriage had a web of rituals around it belonging to the scope of fas but 
adopted by ius too. For example, certain days and periods were regarded absolutely ineligible 
for concluding a marriage: such as Kalendae and Idus (dies feriati) every month, since on 
these days it was forbidden to use force against anybody, and the conclusion of marriage 
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involved a kind of violence to be committed against the virgo;1 likewise, no marriage was 
concluded on the days following Kalendae, Nonae and Idus, which were deemed dies atri, 
such as the first half of February and the second half of March and the whole month of May; 
on the contrary, in this respect the second half of June and the whole of July were held 
fortunate periods.2 Marriage rites were designed to serve two key purposes: they were to 
protect marriage from infertility, on the one hand; and to make the fiancée’s passage from one 
house community cult to another secure, on the other.3 The fiancée was seated in Mutinus 
Titinus’s fascinus, whom she offered sacrifice while being covered with a veil and wearing a 
toga praetextata,4 then she offered her toys from childhood and the toga praetextata that she 
had to take off once and for all on the day of her marriage to the lar familiaris5 (in other 
tradition to Venus,6 or Fortuna virginalis7). The fiancée’s hair was arranged with the tip of a 
spear a man had been killed with so that its vital force should increase that of the fiancée.8 
The marriage celebration commenced with auspicium, then sacrifice was offered (at a later 
point of the ritual having arrived at the fiancé’s house the bride would grease the gatepost of 
her husband-to-be with the fat or suet of the sacrificial animal, initially a pig, then a lamb); the 
wedding dinner (coena nuptialis) following the offering of sacrifices lasted until the evening 
star rose.9 
The coena nuptialis was followed by the most important part of the ritual, deductio in domum 
mariti, the act of being introduced to the husband’s house,10 whose starting act was the 
symbolical kidnapping of the fiancée from her mother’s lap,11 which custom is traced back by 
Plutarch to the abduction of Sabine women,12 and which was undoubtedly backed by the 
memory of the one-time custom of abduction of women as a form of generating marriage.13 
The procession was opened by a boy holding a torch, two other lads were leading the 
fiancée,14 who was followed by people carrying a spinning wheel, a reel, a basket and pots, 
which referred to her later household duties (the fiancée brought three asses from her parents’ 
house, she gave one of them to her husband, put the other one on the altar of the lar 
familiaris, and placed the third one in the sanctuary of the lares protecting the abode of her 
husband-to-be); the members of the procession were carrying torches made of hawthorn,15 
they were singing wedding songs, and were throwing money and nuts16 among the spectators; 
all these and the fescennina iocatio17 were meant to keep misfortune away.18 In the course of 
this the ritualistic shout talassa or talassio with a meaning having obscured by the time of the 
historical age was sounded.19 
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Having arrived in their would-be home the bridegroom asked the bride: “Quaenam 
vocaris?”, and the bride replied “Ubi tu Gaius, ego Gaia.”, by which they testified expressis 
verbis their intention to marry to their environment too.1 This part of the ritual and the false 
conclusion drawn from it asserting that every fiancée should have been called Gaia in the 
ritual were used by Cicero in his speech in defence of Murena to mock the awkwardness of 
the formalities of archaic law.2 Modern scholars also understood gaius and gaia as 
praenomina, and extraced some symbolic significance from this formula. But there are no 
evidence, that Roman women upon marriage ever changed their nomen, escpecially their 
praenomen. Gary Forsythe interpreted gaius and gaia as adjectives from the Latin etymon 
*ga- (see also gavideo, gavidere and Greek ganymai and gayros), and translated the sentence 
as “where thou art happy, I am happy”. Gaius and gaia must have been an archaic Latin 
adjective meaning “happy”, and used as a praenomen from very early times. The use of gaius 
and gaia (=happy) as adjectives in this legal formula suggests nothing more, than one 
important expectation on marriage was the happiness of the husband and wife, albeit the latter 
expressed the subordination of her happiness to that of her husband.3 
The fiancée greased the doorpost, and tied a piece of wool to it.4 After that the young men 
following them lifted the fiancée over the threshold of the house, because Vesta guarded 
every beginning, so the doorstep too, and to touch it would have been regarded an ill omen.5 
Into the atrium a burning torch and a pitcher of water were brought, and so welcoming the 
bride they admitted her into the family cult;6 even Q. Mucius Scaevola considered this part of 
the ritual as one of the most certain signs of the conclusion of marriage;7 housekeeping was 
assigned by the husband to his wife through handing over the key of the house;8 in the event 
of the termination of the marriage one of the symbolic elements of repudium, ousting was just 
the act of taking the keys away.9 
The bulk of our knowledge of coemptio also comes from Gaius’s Institutiones. In coemptio a 
man obtains manus over the woman with mancipatio, i.e., a kind of sham purchase—in this 
sham purchase the husband is the buyer and the subject of the purchase is the wife—which 
had to be carried out in the presence of five adult Roman citizens as witnesses and of the 
holder of the scales;10 however, the text to be recited in the course of it, which has been 
unfortunately not preserved by Gaius for us, was not identical with the one customarily used 
in slaves’ mancipatio, or when obtaining mancipium over a free person.11 The literary 
sources, the texts of Sevius, Isidorus and Boethius we can quote regarding coemptio are at 
least two centuries older than Gaius’s description, and at several points they misunderstood 
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the essence and process of coemptio: namely, Servius1 and Isidorus Hispalensis following 
him2 believed that the husband and wife mutually bought each other, which would, however, 
result in the wife also obtaining some kind of power over the husband, and the reciprocal 
question and answer mentioned by Boethius3 most probably did not belong to coemptio itself, 
it might have been some kind of preparatory process thereof allowing the parties to make it 
clear that that they wanted to conclude the marriage by their free will.4 The question arises 
that if the fiancée constituted the subject of the purchase and sale, even if in a sham 
transaction, who should be considered the seller? Opinions expressed in the literature are 
highly divided on the matter. Many hold the position that the woman, especially the mulier 
emancipata should be regarded the seller, so she is entitled to the sham purchase price, the 
nummus unus; usually they base their view on two loci from Gaius’s Institutiones5 and one 
locus from Collatio;6 convincingly Benedek expounds why this view based on these sources 
is totally unacceptable. 
The two loci from Gaius does not describe the coemptio aimed at the actual conclusion of 
marriage (coemptio matrimonii causa) but the coemptio designed to terminate guardianship 
(coemptio tutelae evitandae causa), from which it would be hard to draw conclusions on 
coemptio that generates husband’s power if the guard’s duty had actually been only to grant 
auctoritas; the third text of Paulus, as we shall see later on, is about lex Iulia de adulteriis 
coercendis, and in this context auctoritas should be interpreted not as a technical term, but 
only as a term denoting the father’s consent to the conclusion of the marriage.7  Furthermore, 
Benedek quotes an inscription which can be dated from the end of the age of the Roman 
republic that sets forth that the girl to be married off to the husband was handed over to the 
fiancé by the father,8 and remarks that the relevant passage of Laudatio Turiae written 
between 8 and 2 B.C.9 does not support the thesis of the mancipatio carried out by the woman 
herself either; finally, he adds that should the woman receive mummus unus, the symbolic 
purchase price from the fiancé, her later husband in the course of mancipatio, then having 
subjected to the husband’s manus, she would obtain such purchase price also for the benefit of 
the husband, which would seem to be rather inconsistent. Coemptio was no longer part of 
generally adopted practice probably at the same time when confarreatio went out of use 
approximately at the end of the 1st c. B.C.; additional informative data is supplied in this 
respect both by the aforesaid Laudatio Turiae, in which the husband left a widower recalling 
his own marriage without manus mentions his sister-in-law’s marriage concluded with 
coemptio, and by Cicero’s statement that the orators who were not well-versed in the depths 
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of jurisprudence, albeit the place of their operation was identical with that of iuris consultii 
giving advice on the forum, were no longer fully aware of what words were uttered when 
concluding coemptio.1 And the form of expounding his point, i.e., that Gaius speaks about 
coemptio in the present tense, should be most probably interpreted in view of the fact that in 
the enumeration of the forms of the generation of manus he makes a reference to former times 
(olim) at the outset.2 Benedek ranks the following institutions among the types of coemptio 
still used in the age of Gaius. 
Coemptio tutelae evitandae causa3 was to ensure that if the woman having her own rights but 
necessarily being under guardianship4 wanted to get rid of her guardian, then with his 
auctoritas she was allowed to enter into coemptio fiduciaria with somebody who later 
remancipated her for a person selected for a new guardian; this new guardian emancipated her 
with manumissio vindicta, and she became his tutor fiduciariusa.5 Coemptio testamenti 
faciendi causa was meant to make up for the lack of the testamentary capacity of the woman 
having her own rights, the procedure was similar to the previous procedure, after entering into 
the coemptio the husband remancipated his wife for one of his fiduciary persons, who 
subsequently released her from mancipium.6 This institution, however, was made unnecessary 
by a senatus consultum adopted during the reign of Hadrian, which acknowledged the 
testamentary right7 of women having their own rights. Through the coemptio sacrorum 
interimendorum causa the woman was relieved of the burden of the house community’s 
religious celebrations; to attain this goal usually the assistance of elderly, childless men was 
used whose death terminated the house community cult once and for all too. It should be 
added that this type of coemptio had to be clearly distinguished from actual coemptio as far as 
the rituals and external features of the application were concerned, which proves that it was 
still used, albeit not too often, in the age of Cicero.8 
The act of obtaining manus through usus is dealt with by three important sources, the first of 
them comes from Gaius,9 the second one from Servius’s commentaries on Vergil’s 
the third one from Boethius’s explanations of Cicero’s Topica11. These loci reveal that 
cohabitation maintained with the given man for one year without any interruption a woman 
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was subjected to his power without confarreatio and coemptio too, and their community of 
life was regarded marriage simply due to the intention to conclude a marriage (affectio 
maritalis), before the one year has elapsed.1 So the commencement of marriage was clearly 
separated from the date of the generation of manus since the husband prescribed it only after 
one year; and if the wife did not want to become subjected to her husband’s manus, then 
spending three consecutive nights each year away from home (trinoctium), this institution was 
introduced, asserts Gaius, by the Twelve Table Law, she could interrupt the prescription of 
the husband’s power.2 Thus, the act of obtaining manus through usus is nothing else but 
prescribing the husband’s power,3 which was implemented by proper application of the usus–
auctoritas rule4 of the Twelve Table Law.5 The act of obtaining the husband’s power through 
usus, however, disappeared from practice partly through desuetudo, partly through certain 
statutes (most probably Augustus’s laws on marriage). 
 
III. For a long time it was a generally accepted view in the literature that the uxor in manu 
was regarded agnate kin;6 however, Brósz convincingly proved that the uxor in manu did not 
belong to agnatio—what follows is a brief account of his argumentation.7 In view of the 
occurrences of the terms agnatus and agnascor, in the most general and widest sense of word 
they denote increase, growth through birth, more specifically through postumi, the successors 
who are born after the death of the pater familias.8 In addition to that, agnatus occurs, as a 
matter of fact, in the sense of artificial kinship created by law (legitima cognatio),9 that is why 
Paulus remarks that the person adopted with adoptio joins, “is born to” the members of the 
family of the pater familias and by that becomes their cognatus;10 in sources concordant with 
the above we can find the short word quasi supplementing the term agnatio used regarding 
adoption.11 The relevant locus of Sententiarum libri states that the main difference between 
agnati and cognati is that agnati are at the same time cognati, however, cognati are not 
necessarily agnati.12 Consequently, on the grounds of the above it can be ruled out that the 
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uxor is an agnate kin, since the law forbids for a blood relation,1 that is, a cognate kin of the 
husband to become his wife.2   Several definitions of agnatio, differing mostly in their 
formulation while being concordant in their content, can be found in sources, the most well-
known definition comes from Gaius: “sunt autem agnati per virilis sexus personas 
cognatione iuncti, quasi a patre cognati”,3 i.e., “agnate relatives are those who are linked by 
kinship passed on by men, that is, they are relatives (descending)4 from the (same) father”.5 
In each case the basis is decent from the same father, therefore, agnatio can be passed on only 
in this form; and the members of the same family, more specifically as the loci stress those in 
the descending line, belong to the agnatio, that is, agnate relatives are relatives in the father’s 
line of descent (the agnation) who belong to the same family; and none of the texts mentions 
either the wife or the institution of manus.6 
This is supported by Gaius when he states that while men obtain the inheritance falling to 
them from women pursuant to iure agnationis, women can obtain inheritance that falls to 
them from men only as legitima heres, and this applies also to a mother or step-mother 
concluding a marriage with manus, who inherit sororis loco, that is, not agnationis iure.7 In 
what capacity does the uxor in manu inherit? Gaius emphasizes at several points that the uxor 
in manu inherits not as an agnate relative, and manus makes her only filiae loco quasi sua 
heres,8 elsewhere he asserts that being filiae loco she obtains the inheritance as sua heres;9 
The Liber singularis regularum compiled from the works of Ulpian calls the wife under 
manus sua heres,10 the enumeration in Sententiarum libri, however, does not even include her 
among them.11 So when the uxor in manu is referred to as sua heres, the sources do not justify 
it with agnatio but with the husband’s power; presumably it was the adoptivus who was first 
admitted to the row of sui heredes through interpretatio extensiva, and later on the uxor 
standing filiae loco in the place of the female child, initially ranked with the term quasi that 
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allows minute distinction.1 Brósz demonstrates that the Romans did not know the concept of 
agnate family, i.e., familia agnata, since agnatio is not one of the forms of familia proprio 
iure,2 and it follows from this that belonging to familia proprio iure is not subject to agnate 
relation.3 Agnatio usually arises in a natural way, through birth, but in an exceptional case it 
may be generated by adoptio, as it can be read in several loci of the Digest and in one locus of 
Iustinian’s Institutiones;4 and the paragraph of Liber singularis regularum which expounds 
the cases of becoming suus heres enumerates the changes in the range of possible inheritors 
pursuant to ius civile rather than the cases when agnatio arises:5 “Agnascitur suus heres aut 
agnascendo, aut adoptando, aut in manum conveniendo, aut in locum sui heredis succedendo, 
velut nepos mortuo filio vel emancipato vel manumissione, id est si filius ex prima secundave 
mancipatione manumissus reversus sit in patris potestatem.”6 On the grounds of these it can 
be unambiguously pointed out that the uxor in manu does not belong to agnatio.7 
 
IV. Of the husband’s right and obligation to hold iudicium domesticum with the relatives 
because of the wife’s capital offences, adultery and wine drinking, and of the husband’s 
option to punish his wife at his discretion in cases of delinquencies of lower weight Dionysius 
of Halicarnass gives an account. The husband and his relatives passed a judgment on his wife 
in the event of adultery and if a woman was found guilty of drinking wine since a lex regia 
attributed to Romulus allowed to punish both cases with death sentence.8 The locus of 
Dionysus describes the investigation of the relatives to be conducted together with the 
husband, so it is the husband and the relatives (and friends) who take part in the procedure, 
the latter constitute the consilium necessariorum. The term edikadzon can be translated into 
the Latin word cognoscebant,9 which is a technical term of the investigation of Roman 
criminal procedure; apparently the author knowingly uses a term of Roman law, which 
supports what can be read in the text of Cato passed on to us by Seneca (illis ius dicere 
permiserunt) and Gellius: “Verba Marci Catonis adscripsi ex oratione quae inscribitur De 
dote, in qua id quoque scriptum est, in adulterio uxores deprehensas ius fuisse maritis necare: 
’Vir’, inquit, ’cum divortium fecit, mulieri iudex pro censore est, imperium quod videtur 
habet. Si quid pervorse taetreque factum est a muliere, multitatur; si vinum bibit, si cum 
alieno viro probri quid fecit, condemnatur.’ De iure autem occidendi ita scriptum: ’In 
adulterio uxorem tuam si prehensisse, sine iudicio impune necares; illa te, si tu adulterares 
sive tu adulterare, digito non auderet contingere, negque ius est.’”10 This excerpt comes from 
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Marcus Porcius Cato’s oration entitled De dote, of which unfortunately only this fragment has 
been left to us without any other information available to us. The reference to the husband’s 
rights is not enough to give a clue to the purpose and type of the oratio. The use of the second 
person singularis does not necessarily mean that the second person singularis generally and 
impersonally used in Latin is usual and quite frequent regarding any of the participants of the 
lawsuit.1 
Here Cato gives a fairly clear-cut formulation of the husband’s power over his wife, compares 
it to the magistrate’s power, authority over citizens. So in divorce the husband shall have the 
right, provided that his wife has engaged an immoral conduct during the term of the marriage 
(propter mores), to make certain deductions from the endowment that he must return as it 
were in the form of moral adjudication, regimen morum (moral adjudication). So for the 
woman the husband substitutes the censor (vir iudex pro censore est) since he has primary 
power, imperium over the wife (imperium quod videtur habet). This imperium holds, as a 
matter of fact, during the marriage, and does not enter into force on the date of divorce like 
the censor’s regimen morum the husband is entitled to in this case instead of the censor.2 Just 
as the magistrate may exercise his punitive power in two different forms owing to the 
imperium he is entitled to, the husband has the same alternatives: in the case of the wife’s 
wrongs of less significance (si quid pervorse factum est a muliere) he was allowed to punish 
her independently (multitat)—this corresponds with the disciplinary right of the magistrate 
under coercitio; in the case of the wife maintaining a relation with another man, or when the 
woman had drunk wine, in compliance with the exercise of the jurisdiction of law of the 
magistrate the husband also exercised iurisdictio (comdemnat). Consequently, multitare and 
condemnare are technical terms of coercitio and iurisdictio respectively, and as an author 
well-versed in law Cato used these two terms not at all accidentally as the opposites of one 
another. Cato’s text sets forth, that multitare was applied in the divorce procedure, 
consequently, upon and after the termination of manus, here the husband’s imperium. 
Whereas the magistrate was allowed to exercise this disciplinary right during the term of his 
office, i.e., while he possessed imperium; on the other hand, it cannot be ruled out at all that 
by multitare Cato meant the disciplinary punishment imposed by the husband on the wife 
during the term of the marriage. After describing the process of condemning the wife for 
adultery or drinking wine (condemnatio), the author expressly underlines the unequal legal 
status of the spouses since while the husband was allowed to kill his wife caught in the act of 
adultery with impunity without convening consilium necessariorum—in the text of Dionysius 
of Halicarnass syngeneis—and without conducting iudicium domesticum (sine iudicio impune 
necares), the wife was not allowed to touch her husband with a finger. If the husband was 
allowed to kill his wife caught in the act of adultery with impunity, this means that the 
principle in place in the ciriminal law of the state was enforced that set forth that the offender 
caught in the act of the offence (manifestus) might be punished without judicial proceedings 
too; so, e.g., the Twelve Table Law did not punish the killing of a night time thief or a thief 
defending himself with weapon it being lawful self-power.3 
On the grounds of the sources we can state the following as a brief summary of iudicium 
domesticum: in his letter addressed to Lucilius Seneca remarks that the people of ancient 
times allowed the dominus, i.e., the family head to fulfill offices in his house community and 
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exercise iurisdictio; consequently, they believed that the home and the house community was 
a reduced-size copy of the state.1 While exercising his punitive power, the dominus, explains 
Suetonius, proceeded pursuant to mos maiorum.2 The iudicium usually took place in a formal 
procedure in the atrium of the pater familias’s home.3 To hold a iudicium domesticum in 
cases of the wife’s and the family child’s punishment for capital delinquency was both a 
moral and actual legal obligation the pater familias was bound to fulfil, which can be traced 
back to the limitations of manus and patria potestas made right from the outset. It was 
obligatory to involve the relatives in the iudicium necessary for punishing more serious acts 
committed by the wife. The exercise of the ius vitae ac necis in force over the family child 
was not left to the father’s arbitrariness either; according to the locus of Gaius’s Institutiones 
left to us in the fragment from Autun quoting the Twelve Table Law death sentence was not 
allowed to be imposed unless a legal cause (iusta causa) existed,4 and to prove the existence 
of this iusta causa a consilium necessariorum constituting iudicium domesticum was 
indispensable. As a matter of fact, it was possible to dispense with these proceedings if the 
person under power confessed his/her guilt (confessus), or was caught in the act of such guilt 
(manifestus).5 The consilium necessariorum was logically composed of relatives and friends, 
whose circle was, however, determined presumably by the pater familias, albeit he had to 
accept the judgment of the persons invited into and involved in the consilium regarding the 
guilt or innocence of the accused—he was unambiguously bound by this decision; the 
members passing a judgment in the iudicium usually voted orally in the order determined by 
their rank.6 First of all, they had to decide guilt; however, they were allowed to make a 
statement on the form of punishment too. For example, they could expressly protest against 
imposing death sentence even if the accused had been found guilty.7 How did this element of 
the husband’s power change later on and in cases where the husband was not obliged to hold 
iudicium domesticum?  
The lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis contains not exclusively and perhaps not primarily new 
norms created by Augustus8 but rules taken over from former laws.9 Let us make a brief 
survey to what extent and to whom the law gives right to kill adulteresses/adulterers.10 The 
pater familias—in this respect the law does not distinguish blood father from adoptive 
father11—may kill his daughter caught in the act of adultery,12 but only in the event that he 
caught her in the act at his own or at his son-in-law’s house,13 since the legislator regards it 
greater daring, greater recklessness shown by the woman if she has committed adultery at her 
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father’s or husband’s house.1 The father, however, was obliged to kill also his daughter when 
killing the adulterer because if he killed only the adulter, and left her own daughter alive, he 
would incur the charge of homicidium, that is, murder;2 but if the father was not able to kill 
his daughter because she had fled, and not because he wanted to save her life, then he was not 
to be punished for murder.3 Although the law makes no difference as to who the pater 
familias must kill first, but if he kills one of them and only injures the other one, he will be 
held responsible for it pursuant to the lex Corneia de sicariis et veneficiis.4 Nevertheless, 
Marcus Aurelius’s and Commodus’s rescript does not let the father be punished in the case 
when the adulteress—after she has been so seriously injured that she should have died—is left 
alive not by the father’s intention but by as it were fatal accident.5 A prerequisite for 
exercising this right was that the father had to catch the adulteress/adulterer in the act in 
flagranti, that is, in ipsis rebus Veneris indeed;6 and he had to kill both of them as it were at 
one blow (uno ictu et uno impetu), so after killing the adulterer he was not allowed to wait 
several days before killing his daughter. But it did not interrupt the continuity of ictus unus 
(or animus7) if the father killed his daughter, who had fled, several hours later when he caught 
her up or found her.8 
Consequently, the pater familias was supposed to catch the adulteress/adulterer either at his 
own or at his son-in-law’s house, and had to immediately attack them, and if he wanted to 
exercise ius occidendi, he had to kill both the man and his daughter.9 A locus in Ulpian asserts 
that in order for the father to be able to exercise this right, the daughter had to be subjected to 
his potestas,10 but two fragments of Collatio do not strictly tie the right of killing to the 
father’s power; it provides the father with the option of exercising this right also in the case 
when his daughter has already been subordinated to the husband’s power.11 Behind this 
legislative extension most probably stood the highly practical reason that Augustus was aware 
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of the libertine marital conditions of his age, on the one hand; and that is why he put ius 
occidendi in the father’s hand even for the period after the term of the potestas; and through 
that he wanted to ensure to the soldiers stationed permanently within the boundaries of the 
empire that in their absence their wives would continue to be under strict control.1 
A filius familias under power is not entitled expressis verbis to the right to kill his wife caught 
in the act of adultery if she is under her father-in-law’s potestas, yet the legislator provides 
him with this option, since he does not order that his act should be punished.2 The husband 
was not entitled to the right of killing the adulter and his wife jointly, which the law justified 
by the consideration that while the father would deliberate with more pietas if he wanted to 
exercise this right, the husband would make the decision much sooner driven by his temper.3 
Pursuant to the provisions of lex Iulia if the husband kills his wife caught in the act of 
adultery, he will be responsible for murder, homicidium, so he had the right to kill “only” the 
adulter, the “seducer”.4 Notwithstanding, the law definitely narrowed the range of 
adulteresses/adulterers on the basis of their social standing who could be killed by virtue of 
the above,5 since out of them only slaves, infamis persons—in this category the law 
emphasized, among others, those condemned to gladiator’s and animal fights, convicts 
sentenced under iudicio publico, actors/actresses and prostitutes—and certain libertinii could 
be killed by the husband with impunity.6 The father’s right was further narrowed to the extent 
that the husband was allowed to take such action only in the case of adultery that took place at 
his own house.7 After killing the adulter8 he had to immediately dismiss his wife, and had to 
report the case in three days to the competent person exercising iurisdictio.9 And if the 
husband killed his wife caught in the act of adultery, Commodus—referring to a rescriptum of 
Antoninus Pius—stipulated that it was not necessary to impose death sentence on the husband 
pursuant to lex Cornelia de sicariis, because he had committed his act in his righteous pain, 
driven by sudden passion, it was sufficient to sentence him to forced labour if he was ranked 
among the humiliores, or to relegatio if he belonged to the honestiores.10 Likewise, referring 
to iustus dolor11 Alexander Severus ordered less severe adjudication.12 
To sum up the elements of the state of facts of lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis, the pater 
familias is entitled wihout limitation to ius occidendi with respect to uxor in manu and his 
daughter caught in the act of adultery—regarding the female child also in the event that she 
has aleady lived under her husband’s manus. Although filius familias under power shall have 
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no right to kill his wife in this case, he has the option to do that de facto without being 
punished. If he does not exercise power over his wife, the husband has no ius occidendi either 
de iure, or de facto, but if he should kill his wife driven by iustus dolor, his act will be less 
severely adjudged.1 From this Schaub draws the conclusion that the existence and extent of 
ius occidendi holding in the case of adulterium is determined by the fact of being under power 
rather than by the exercise or possession of power: the maritus, whose interest does not 
deserve less protection by law than that of the pater familias, may not kill his wife if she is 
not under power; although not having power over his wife the filius familias as husband yet 
may kill his wife because she is under her father-in-law’s potestas; and the pater familias may 
kill his daughter even if she is no longer under his potestas but under her husband’s manus.2 
So the structure of power existing during the marriage is more closely linked to adultery than 
adultery to the marriage itself, as it comes from the basically and primarily power based 
nature of Roman family relations. In the event that the husband does not divorce his wife 
caught in the act of adultery, the relevant loci do not reveal whether a marriage with manus or 
without manus is concerned,3 pursuant to lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis he shall be 
punished because of lenocinium;4 in this context the uxorem retinere appears as the opposite 
of uxorem dimittere, which occurs several times in loci5 expounding lenocinium.6 The term 
dimittere carries a wider sense than the phrases nuntium remittere, repudiare, or divortium 
facere that can be read in similar contexts, because it expresses not only the fact of divorce 
but implies reference to actual ousting in a much wider sense. If the husband wanted to avoid 
the charge of lenocinium, then he had to break all the ties that linked him through dimittere to 
his wife and the ties that linked his wife to him, so he had to release her from his manus too. 
A terminologically more precise phrase would have been repudiare et remancipare, but due 
to its somewhat complicated structure the legislator chose the verb dimittere that embraces 
these two aspects.7  
 
V. A marriage without manus was terminated without any other assistance by the authorities 
both by divortium, which was carried out with the parties’ common will, and repudium 
implemented with an unilateral statement,8 which was referred to as early as in the Twelve 
Table Law.9 The lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis stipulated that the husband who intended to 
oust his wife should declare his such intention in the presence of seven witnesses; 
Constantinus made the application of repudium subject to the existence of certain ground for 
divorce.10 The husband ousting his wife without legal ground was ordered to be punished by 
Romulus, one half of his properties had to be offered to Ceres, and the other half fell to his 
wife.11 A marriage with manus was terminated by the termination of the manus.12 It was 
out in the form of contrarius actus, that is, the opposite of the legal act generating manus, so 
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the manus generated through confarreatio was terminated by diffarreatio,1 which was 
implemented also with the assistance of the pontifex and in the presence of witnesses, and as 
part of that the panis farreus held out to the parties who intended to divorce was refused by 
them, and they recited some alien, hateful and terrific formula as we know from Plutarch’s 
account,2 the text of which has unfortunately not been left to us. The manus obtained with 
coemptio, or usus was terminated by remancipatio.3 The reference made in leges regiae 
coming also from Plutarch that sets forth that the husband who sells his wife shall be 
sacrificed in serious cases to the gods of the underworld4 mentions sale together with 
unlawful ousting, so most probably it pertains to divorce without legal ground, that is, 
remancipatio, from which the general prohibition of remancipatio cannot be inferred.5  
Remancipatio, however, did not serve divorce as its only purpose since it provided the 
husband with the option to remancipate his wife under the potestas of an earlier exerciser of 
power, usually the pater familias on condition that he was to pass on the wife with mancipatio 
to a third party determined by the husband; later this became the basis of the aforesaid 
coemptio fiduciara that furthered the process of making women have their own rights.6 
Regarding the law of the archaic age there are indeed certain accounts available to us which 
assert that the husband handed over his wife through mancipatio to a third party who was 
bound to return her after the purpose had been achieved; it is an especially interesting case 
when the husband was allowed to deliver his wife to another husband for a period in order for 
her to give birth to a successor, and after it had taken place—as it was stipulated by a pactum 
fiduciae (ut remancipetur) during mancipatio—the wife was returned to him.7 
Accordingly, remancipatio terminated the marriage and the second husband was granted 
manus over the wife, which held until the first husband demanded the wife to be returned to 
him on the grounds of the pactum set forth in the mancipatio; regarding this point Düll 
mentions several sources on the law of Sparta that give accounts of legal practices which can 
be compared to similar Roman customs. 8  Polybios asserts that it was a generally accepted 
custom for three or four, or if they were brothers, even more men to live together with a single 
woman, who gave birth to a child for all of them, and if one of the men believed she had 
given birth to a sufficient number of children, he was allowed to hand over his wife to his 
friend so that she should give birth to children for him.9 Pausanias gives an account of king 
Anaxandridés’s double marriage, namely, the king’s first marriage was childless, and the 
ephorii requested him to divorce his wife but the king was not willing to do that, instead he 
obtained another wife beside the first one.10 Plutarch also describes the Spartian practice that 
although the husband continued to live with his wife to maintain the marriage but was 
allowed to hand her over to another man who asked him to do so in order to beget children; in 
Rome this custom was maintained in the form where a man who had enough children could 
be asked by any childless man to assign his wife to him either once and for all or on condition 
that he would return her to him later.11 Of the existence of this marital institution in the last 
decades of the age the Roman republic we can learn from Plutarch’s biography on Marcus 
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Porcius Cato minor.1 Referring to Lucius Thrasea Paetus, the historian living during the reign 
of Nero, Plutarch narrates that Q. Hortensius, an excellent orator of his age, wanted to confirm 
his friendship with Cato through some kind of kinship; therefore, he asked Cato to marry off 
his daughter, Porcia to him, who was at that time Bibulus’s wife, whom she had presented 
with two children; and if Bibulus insisted on having Porcia, then he would return her to her 
former husband after she had given birth to children for him too. Cato did not consent to his 
daughter becoming Hortensius’s wife; then Hortensius demanded that Marcia herself, Cato’s 
wife should be married off to him, although he knew that they had not got estranged from 
each other since Marcia was just expecting a child from her husband. Seeing that Hortensius’s 
resolution was quite firm, Cato having asked for the consent of Marcia’s father, Philippus 
gave consent to the marriage of his wife, Marcia and Hortensius. He himself was also present 
at the enagegment, which was expressly requested by Hortensius.2 
When Hortensius died, Marcia became a widow, then Cato married her again, for which 
Caesar reproached Cato for considering marriage a source of profiteering since in his last will 
and testament Hortensius bequeathed his properties to Marcia.3 Appianos also touches upon 
this case,4 and Strabón establishes in line with the comparison of Lykurgos with Numa 
Pompilius made by Plutarch 5 that Cato’s procedure complied with ancient Roman customs.6 
In the same spirit, that is, deeming it being in harmony with ancient Roman morals and the 
interest of the state, Augustine recalls this event of Cato’s life,7 and Tertullian demonstrates 
the differences between Roman and Christian values with this case; nevertheless, he connects 
the history of Marcia’s marriage erroneously to Cato Censorius and not to Cato Uticensis.8 It 
proves that this case was part of public knowledge that Quintilian states that the Cato–
Marcia–Hortensius marriage could serve as proper grounds for argumentation and counter-
argumentation in orator’s training.9 Undoubtedly, this marriage must have been a marriage 
with manus since that is why the consent of Marcia’s father, Philippus was required because 
Cato’s manus was terminated by the remancipatio for the pater familias, and in the 
conclusion of the marriage to be concluded with Hortensius, most probably entered into with 
coemptio, the assistance of the exerciser of power could not be dispensed with.10 This is 
supported by the locus of Lucan’s Pharsalia which asserts that Marcia was the subject of 
these transactions as iussa, that is, a person fulfilling an order and not as an active 
participator; the phrase conubii pretium mercesque soluta and another expression tertia iam 
suboles concerning Marcia also refer to coemptio and mancipatio,11 since as prima filia she 
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was Philippus’s daughter, being filiae loco as secunda filia she was a wife in the marriage 
with manus concluded with Cato, and she became filiae loco tertia filia again under 
Hortensius’s manus.1 The former husband’s right to demand his wife to be returned to him 
from under the second husband’s manus was ensured by muncupatio related to mancipatio, 
which was in terms of its content a pactum fiduciae that could be claimed through the courts2 
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Interpretation based on maxims of legal logic occupies an honourable place among the 
possible methods of legal interpretation; this is done most frequently by using basic concepts 
originating from the classical period of Roman law, which faciliate orientation among 
contradictory decrees and help to clarify the meaning of legal rules. Here belong the following 
principles, widely known in Modestinus’s formulation but dating from the period of the leges 
XII tabularum: “lex posterior derogat legi priori”,1 the Papinian “lex specialis derogat legi 
generali”,2 and the “lex primaria derogat legi subsidiariae”. It is a basic interpretive 
principle, that the legal rule should be interpreted in its integrity, not by extracting certain 
parts of it.3 Following the letter of the law often leads to its evasion,4 during interpretation the 
legislator’s intention should be taken into account,5 and if this is doubtful, the more lenient 
solution should be preferred.6 All these can be traced back into a highly philosophical, Celsian 
principle—also widely accepted in contemporary legal thinking—which declares that the 
vocation of the Law is to implement Justice, asserting that “ius est ars boni et aequi”,7 the 
Law is an art of the Good and the Just. Out of these, the procedure called in fraudem legis is 
related to the statement that enforcing the letter of the law often leads to inequity 
contradictory with the spirit of the law; i.e., to injustice. Cicero also quotes this proverbium, 
widely spread as early as in the age of the Republic, which remained in use in his formulation 
until today: “summum ius summa iniuria”;8 i.e., the utmost enforcement of the law leads to 
the greatest injustice. 
The present paper has a modest aim; it does not offer a general survey, much rather an 
introspection into the problem. First, it enumerates the occurrences of this proverb in the 
sources of Roman literature (I.); then, it outlines the development and semantic changes of the 
concept of interpretatio (II.); after that, it investigates the meaning of summum ius in relation 
to the principle ars boni et aequi and the concept of Justice in legal sources and Cicero’s 
works (III.); finally, it will consider the further-reaching consequences of this proverbium in 
Adagia by Erasmus of Rotterdam, one of the most important humanists (IV.). 
 
I. This idea first occurs in Terence’s comedy, Heautontimoroumenos: “Neque tu scilicet / 
illuc confugies: ’Quid mea? Num mihi datumst? Num iussi? Num illa oppignerare filiam 
meam me invito potuit?’ Verum illuc, Cherme, / dicunt: Ius summum saepe summast 
malitia.”9 The situation is the following: Syrus asks Chermes for money, so that he could help 
his young master, but in order to get the sum he claims that he needs it for Chermes’s 
daughter. The law is indubitably on Chermes’s side, but unconditioned clinging to the law 
cannot be reconciliated with the pietas and clementia expected from a Roman pater familias. 
In order to analyse the summa malitia turning point it is useful to peruse some meanings and 
the most typical occurrences of the summus–summa–summum adjective and the different 
                                                 
1
 XII tab. 12, 5; Mod. D. 1, 4, 4. 
2
 Pap. D. 48, 19, 41; 50, 17, 80. 
3
 Cels. D. 1, 3, 24. 
4
 Paul. D. 1, 3, 29. 
5
 Cels. D. 1, 3, 19. 
6
 Marc. D. 28, 4, 3 pr. 
7
 Ulp. D. 1, 1, 1. 
8
 Cic. off. 1, 33. 
9
 Ter. Heaut. 792. ff. 
 88
connotations of the word malitia. In its original meaning summus is the Latin equivalent of 
the Greek hypathos.1 Varro2 and Isidorus Hispalensis3 use it as a grammatical technical term 
for the explanation of the superlativus, Quintilian applies it for the description of rhetorical 
amplification.4 Used figuratively, it can be encountered in many places, both with temporal 
meaning5 and in relation to social status;6 e.g., applied to the optimates and the nobiles7 as the 
contradiction of the humiles, the infima plebs8 and the infimus ordo.9 Isidorus describes the 
word malitia, deriving from the word malus, as the evil thought of mind;10 it is used by many 
authors as the synonym of astutia and calliditas.11 In the prologue of Heautontimorumenos 
Terence mentions expressis verbis the Greek type of his comedy,12 which, with regard to the 
above cited proverbium, can most probably be identified with two lines by Menander,13 
though the two ideas do not correspond word for word. Terence speaks about ius, whereas 
Menander mentions nomoi; i.e., the laws and not dikaion. The synkhophantēs carries a 
slightly wider semantic load than malitia, which could be translated into Latin as damnum, 
calumnia or malum, in any way designating a content in contradiction with the spirit and 
destination of ius;14 lian akribōs can be equally translated by the phrase summo iure or nimis 
exacto quodam studio.15 Hence it becomes obvious that Terence heavily altered the 
Menandrian thought and adapted it to the circumstances of Roman legal life but preserved its 
basic message.16 
Hieronymus takes his version from this Terentian locus: “O vere ius summum summa 
malitia.”17 A statement with similar content (summum ius summa crux) is formulated by 
Columella, when he speaks about the responsibilities of the pater familias and the dominus: 
“comiter agat cum colonis facilemque se prebeat, …sed nec dominus in unaquaque re, cui 
colonum obligaverit, tenax esse sui iuris debet, sicut in diebus pecuniarum vel lignis et ceteris 
paucibus accessionibus exigendis, quarum cura maiorem molestiam quam impensam rusticis 
adfert. Nec sane vindicandum nobis quidquid licet, nam summum ius antiqui summam 
putabant crucem.”18 So it is forbidden to deal too harshly with the colonii, and the master 
should exercise the virtues of meekness and consideration.19 
The proverbium passed into legal common knowledge in Cicero’s formulation in De officiis: 
“Existunt saepe iniuriae calumnia quadam et nimis callida, sed malitiosa iuris 
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interpretatione. Ex quo illud ’summum ius summa iniuria’ factum est iam tritum sermone 
proverbium.”1 Consequently, it is not ius itself that results in iniuria, but the malevolent 
enforcement of a seemingly lawful claim is the case when injustice is committed under the 
mask of law enforcement.2 Examining the bequeathing of the proverbium, one can safely 
assert that the versions of Terentius and Columella are more closely connected with each 
other than with the Ciceronian antithesis, and that they represent an earlier stage in the 
formulation of this thought.3 In these two authors’ works the clash of the legal and moral 
norms becomes foregrounded; i.e., the action permitted and approved by ius becomes 
contestable from the side of mos.4 The Ciceronian formulation goes even further: it is not only 
the legal and ethical norm that conflict here, but the collision takes place within the legal 
system.5 The claim is made not only for a morally correct decision but also for the right and 
just application of the law. The proverb objects to the abuse of the law, to its literal and not 
sensible interpretation.6 (The phrase factum etiam tritum sermone proverbium could refer to 
the fact that Cicero himself took over the idea of summum ius summa iniuria from an earlier 
auctor or the practice on the forum, or it can be assumed that he is referring to his own 
rhetorical practice when he emphasises the great familiarity of the proverb, as he frequently 
used the phrases summo iure agere and summo iure contendere too.7) 
However, he greatly exceeds the requirement of equitable legal interpretation in De legibus, 
where, among other things, he analyses the connection between natural law and positive law.8 
In this work Cicero appears as legislator—as his model Plato9 does in Nomoi10—a thing 
which must have seemed extremely new, almost provoking indignation, because doing this he 
intended to reform and replace the venerated leges XII tabularum,11 thus occupying the place 
of the nation who made these laws.12 The first book contains considerations of legal theory, 
which was practically unknown in Rome in the 1st century BC. It aims at harmonizing ius 
civile with ius naturale because this was the only way Roman law could lay claim to 
universality.13 From the demand of ius naturale neither the comitia, nor the senatus can give 
exemption, this being eternal and unchanging. The fundamental task of the legislator and the 
judge is to proceed in accordance with it,14 and the task of the law is to separate the lawful 
from the unlawful.15 Ius and ratio are inseparably connected; moreover, they are each other’s 
synonyms in a certain respect; so law must originate directly from philosophy and not from 
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the pretorial edict or the leges XII tabularum, therefore, it can never lose its validity.1 He 
formulates in a strictly imperative mood the demand never written down before in Rome: 
“Lex iusta esto!”2 Law must be based on Justice, which might seem trivial in itself, but 
Cicero himself had felt the lack of this condition; so law depends solely on Justice, and social 
cohabitation depends only on the law—this conclusion must have seemed considerably bold 
in ancient Rome.3 Appearing as a great system originator in philosophy, Cicero wanted to 
encompass law in a system as well as in his work—unfortunately lost since then—entiteled 
De iure civili in artem redigendo, which does not seem to have exerted much influence on 
legal scholars in Rome.4 
Returning to summum ius summa iniuria: it was quite common that certain maxims 
formulated in everyday life and transmitted through literary sources were appropriated by 
Law as rules of universal validity. For example, here are a couple of proverbia that became 
regulae iuris.5 Aquila Romanus quotes the sentence “cui quod libet, hoc licet”,6 which can be 
found in the fragment of Ulpianus as “non omne quod licet honestum est”.7 Publius Syrus’s 
thought, “lucrum absque damno alieno fieri non potest”8 resonates with Pomponius’s rule: 
“iure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento fieri locupletiorem”.9 Seneca 
maior’s sentence “tacite loquitur; silentium videtur confessio”10 corresponds with Paulus’s 
“qui tacet, non utique fatetur: sed tamen verum est eum non negare”.11 
 
II. In order to highlight the origin and the meaning of the word interpretatio, let us examine 
the loci to see in what context the concepts interpres and interpretari are used by Plautus, and 
other authors of archaic Roman literature bequeathed to us mainly in fragments. In Poennulus 
the slave says that the speech of his master could only be made intellegible by Oedipus, who 
solved the enigma of the Sphinx too.12 In Pseudolus the content of an undecipherable letter 
could be solved only by the Sybilla.13 Both cases are concerned with deciphering the meaning 
of extremely intricate texts, which can be done exclusively by oracula, the solvers of great 
predictions, of mythical secrets, so the author draws the activity of interpretari into the circle 
of religious mysteries and endows it with the meaning of decoding, of solving an enigma.14 In 
Bacchides, the importunate messenger is made to leave in a comic fashion but quite 
resolutely, with palpable means,15 so the messenger, who interpreted the highly paraphrased 
threat for himself, thought it better to proceed more cautiously.16 In Cistellaria a father 
gathers from the words of the hetaira speaking with him that she seduced her son.17 In this 
case it is not the enigmatic words and composition of the interlocutor where one should draw 
conclusions from, it is much rather the conclusion drawn from the situation, the subjective 
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opinion that is denominated by the word interpretor.1 Refreshing the interlocutor’s memory, 
recalling a certain event can also be signified by the verb interpretari;2 elsewhere the revealer, 
the solver of a doubtful situation, or the implementor of a plan is called the interpres; whereas 
in the last case it is the synonym of internuntius.3 So Plautus uses the expressions interpres 
and interpretari with two connotations: on the one hand, in their original sense, meaning 
mediation, on the other hand, in the sense of understanding, making to understand, a more 
abstract and indirect meaning; this latter meaning implies a kind of irrational activity related 
to the realm of religio.4 This seems to be corroborated by the fragments after Plautus and 
before Cicero. 
A Pacuvian fragment connects the task of the interpres with the interpretive activity of the 
augures and haruspices and it mentions a sinister prodigium,5 placing the interpretive activity 
within the context of Roman religious institutions.6 A fragment from a Latin translation of the 
Ilias contains a line from Agamemnon’s reply to Calchas’s premonition; comparing it to the 
Homeric text it becomes evident that interpres here stands for the Greek mantis.7 It is also a 
fragment by Pacuvius according to which the activity of the interpretari in the course of 
interpreting obscure texts is at times doomed to highly uncertain guesses.8 Based on this, we 
can assume that in the beginning the interpres mediated not only between humans but also 
between the human and the divine sphere, so in the course of fulfilling his task, besides 
everyday logic he had to employ certain means that belonged to the realm of the irrational as 
well.9 
For the religious usage of these expressions one can find ample evidence in the Corpus 
Ciceronianum and other authors from contemporary Roman literature. Augures, haruspices, 
decemviri and Persian magi are mentioned as interpretes;10 premonitions, miraculous and 
sinister signs, thunderbolts, dreams, religious phenomena, and generally the will of the gods, 
all pertaining to the sphere of religio, constitute the object of interpretari.11 In many cases the 
expressions interpres and coniector serve as each other’s explanation, highlighting each 
other.12 According to Cicero, this interpretive activity is needed because of the obscure and 
doubtful nature of certain religious phenomena, so it is not surprising that the concept of 
interpretatio was eagerly associated with obscure and polisemic contents outside the circle of 
religio too; e.g., in philosophical polemic.13 
In addition to its sacred connotations, the most common, practical usage of interpres can also 
be found; it occurs in diplomatic, administrative, military and commercial fields too. In these 
cases interpres is none other than interpreter or translator. In the sources the interpreter 
translates word for word, verbum pro verbo, and in this respect he can be regarded the 
contrary of the orator, who possibly takes over a thought from somebody else, but enriches 
                                                 
1
 Fuhrmann 1970. 84. 
2
 Plaut. Epid. 552. 
3
 Plaut. Mil. 798. 951 f.; 962. 
4
 Fuhrmann 1970. 84. 
5
 Pacuv. v. 80 ff. Cives, antiqui amici maiorum meum, consilium socii, augurium atque extum interpretes, 
postquam prodigium horriferum, portentum pavos. 
6
 About the aurures and haruspices see Latte, K.: Römische Religionsgeschichte. München 1967. 141. 158. 
7
 Mat. frg. 2. Obsceni interpres funestique ominis auctor. Cf. Il. 1, 106 f. 
8
 Pacuv. v. 151 f. Nil coniectura quivi interpretarier, quorsum flexiloqua dictio contenderet. 
9
 Fuhrmann 1970. 85. 
10
 Cic. leg. 2, 20; Phil. 13, 12; nat. 2, 12; 3, 5; div. 1, 3. 4. 46; 2, 110; Liv. 10, 8, 2; Gell. 4, 1, 1. 
11
 Cic. leg. 2, 20. 30; div. 1, 3. 45. 92. 93. 116; Scaur. 30; dom. 107; Quint. 3, 6, 30; Plin. nat. 2, 141; 7, 203; 
Gell. 4, 1, 1; Val. Max. 1, 5. 6. 
12
 Cic. nat. 2, 12; div. 1, 118; 2, 62. 66. 144; Quint. 3, 6, 30. 
13
 Cic. div. 1, 1166; nat. 1, 39; Quint. 3, 4, 3. 
 92
and embellishes it with elements of style when delivering it to the audience.1 Cicero himself 
used these possibilities of individualisation when he translated the speeches of Greek rhetors 
into Latin, an in his philosophical works on the employment of Greek models.2 Giving advice 
to poets in his Ars poetica, Horace is against translation word for word performed in the 
manner of the interpres.3 Quintilian challenges a poet’s originality precisely because of his 
being an interpres.4 Interpretatio as a technical term first occurs in rhetorics, namely in 
Auctor ad Herennium’s discourse concerning rhetoric figures, which claims that a kind of 
geminatio, the conduplicatio differs from interpretatio only to the extent that the verbum pro 
verbo translation is a form-and-content true transfer of a train of thought from a different 
language whereas conduplicatio is the same activity within a single language.5 Quintilian does 
not consider interpretatio to be a rhetoric figure as it was previously by Cornificius, but sees 
in it only an exercise to be used in the course of rhetoric training.6 In certain cases 
interpretatio means the etymological analysis of words and the most precise rendering of 
Greek technical terms in Latin, in course of which, as Cicero warns, one should avoid 
excessive hair splitting.7 
It can be concluded that in the Ciceronian age the expression interpres was used in two 
clearly separable meanings. On the one hand, it was used as interpres deorum, as the 
definition of the person who enlightens phenomena from the sphere of religio, transmits the 
divine will towards the human realm. On the other hand (as the religious semantic content did 
not entirely occupy this concept), it was used for denoting the interpreter and translator who 
mediates in human communication by bridging linguistic impediments.8 
As a scientific technical term, the word interpres became widely used first in the fields of 
philology and legal science. Cicero does not call the philologists interpretes.9 According to 
Suetonius’s account, however, Cornelius Nepos already refers to them as poetarum 
interpretes.10 In the field of legal science Livius remembers Tullus Hostilius as “clemens legis 
interpres”,11 though this wording is slightly anachronistic as the king did not interpret or 
translate the law, concerning provocatio, he only faciliated its implementation.12 In Pliny’s 
Naturalis Historia the Ephesian Hermodoros appears as the interpres of the leges XII 
tabularum but it means only translator,13 just as in Pomponius’s text the reference to 
Hermodoros as auctor means the same.14 However, in connection with lex Valeria, dating 
from 449 BC., Livius already speaks about the interpretes as a genuine legal technical term, as 
they tried to establish the correct interpretation of this law in long legal debates.15 Both the 
explanators of the leges XII tabularum, driven by an archeological interest, usually searching 
for the meaning of a forgotten word, and the iuris prudentes of the near past are mentioned as 
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interpretes in the sources form the 1st century BC.1 Cicero does not simply call the lawyers of 
his time interpretes iuris—as it was later used by Quintilian as the equivalent of iuris 
consultus2—instead, he defines the task of interpretari as a basic component of the iuris 
consultus’s activity, sometimes narrowing its scope by using synonyms.3 In De oratore, in the 
parts concerned with establishing the place and importance of the auxiliary sciences of 
rhetorics from the point of view of the theory of science and dialectics, Cicero does not 
mention interpretatio.4 In his work entitled Brutus, which deals with the history of Roman 
rhetorics, in the loci dedicated to his friend, Servius Suplicius, one of the most outstanding 
lawyers of the age,5 Cicero makes some remarks concerning certain cases of interpretatio 
(primary highlighting its task to clarify and order obscure and doubtful states of affairs), but 
neglects to make its methodology and inner construction an object of scrunity. In the course 
of this he fails to mention the instances of interpretatio iuris when the iuris consultus is 
dealing with the applicability and modes of application of perfectly clearly formulated legal 
texts that contain decrees of general validity.6 
In legal texts, the expression interpres can seldom be encountered, and not as a technical 
term. It usually means translator or interpreter here7 and only in specific cases does it signify 
the person doing the interpretation, the one searching for the meaning of texts.8 The 
derivations interpretari and interpretatio beyond doubt mean the interpretive activity 
performed by lawyers and forums administrating justice. Following Fuhrmann’s 
thematisation, this interpretive activity could refer to different legal transactions (e.g., 
testamenta, stipulationes, contractus), to the laws in general, to criminal laws, to verdicts in 
criminal cases, imperial privileges, and certain concrete decrees resulting from the leges XII 
tabularum, other laws, the pretorial edict, senatus consulta and constitutiones.9 In certain 
cases the meaning of interpretari ranges from interpretation to assumption and establishing.10 
Based on this, the formational and developmental process of the meaning of interpretari 
becomes visible. In the preclassical age, interpretatio often occurs in the spheres of religion 
and mantics; i.e., indicating the mediation between the divine and human spheres. However, 
from Cicero’s time the latest, it became to mean the translator’s and interpreter’s activity; i.e., 
a secularised activity, mediating between humans only; from this time both grammar and 
rhetorics, and on their analogy jurisprudence, began to use it as their own technical term.11 
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III. Celsus’s famous statement “ius est ars boni et aequi”—transmitted by Ulpianus—occurs 
as the opening idea of Iustinian Digesta. It claims that whoever intends to deal with law 
should first know where its name comes from. Ius got its name from iustitia, and—as Celsus 
astutely defines—law is the art of the good and the just/equitable. Following this train of 
thought, Ulpianus states that lawyers should exercise their profession as a priestly vocation, 
because they must respect justice, propagate the knowledge of the good and the equitable, 
separating the legal from the illegal, the permissible from the forbidden.1 Later Ulpianus 
defines justice as an unceasing and eternal effort to give everybody their due right. Therefore, 
the commandments of the law are the following: to live decently, not to hurt anyone, to give 
everybody their due.2 Since this definition is considerably well known, there is no need for 
further explanation. In concordance with this, Ulpianus expressis verbis calls the magistrates’ 
attention to the fact that unlawful procedures are forbidden. As far as judges are concerned—
for whom it is also forbidden to proceed with partiality, prejudice, or in general incorrectly—
they must keep the principle of aequitas in mind, especially in the cases where their personal 
consideration is of greater importance.3 The mere memorization of the legal material is not 
equivalent with the genuine knowledge of law, as Celsus emphasises; and he strongly blames 
the lawyers who do not want to consider the entire law when solving a case, and who only 
present an arbitrarily selected portion even while justifying their responsa.4 The principle 
“suum cuique tribuere” remarkably harmonises with that locus of Cicero’s Topica which 
defines ius civile as aequitas established for the people living in the same state with the scope 
of preserving their goods.5 Regarding the Corpus Ciceronianum, in the speech delivered in 
defence of L. Licinius Murena, this contradiction is thoroughly highlighted: in connection 
with certain legal institutions of marital law (coemptio tutelae evitandae causa, coemptio 
sacrorum interimendorum causa),6 which became empty and troublesome by the time of 
Cicero, the rhetor formulates:7 “In omni denique iure civili aequitatem relinquerunt, verba 
ipsa tenuerunt”.8 So, criticism is not directed against the keystone of the state, the laws,9 but 
only against legal practitioners and their methods of interpretation. 
The loci from the Corpus Ciceronianum referring to aequitas—with special regard to 
Cicero’s theoretical works—can be classified in the following categories.10 In certain cases 
aequitas appears as the opposite of ius,11 in other cases one can find the trinity of aequitas–
ius–lex, which divides the concept of law in a very special way.12 On the one hand, it divides 
                                                 
1
 Ulp. D. 1, 1, 1. Iuri operam daturum prius nosse oportet, unde nomen iuris descendat. Est autem a iustitia 
appellatum: nam, ut eleganter Celsus definit, ius est ars boni et aequi. Cuius merito quis nos sacerdotes 
appellet: iustitiam namque colimus, et boni et aequi notitiam profitemur, aequum ab iniquo separantes, licitum 
ab illicto discernentes, bonos non solum metu poenarum, verum etiam praemiorum quoque exhortatione efficere 
cupientes, veram nisi fallor philosophiam, non simulatam affectantes. 
2
 Ulp. D. 1, 1, 10. Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuendi. Iuris praecepta sunt haec: 
honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere. 
3
 Ulp. D. 47, 10, 32; 5, 1, 15, 1; Gai. D. 50, 13, 6; C. 3, 1, 13, 6; Tryph. D. 16, 3, 31 pr. 
4
 Cels. D. 1, 3, 17. 24; cf. Polaček, A.: Ius est ars aequi et boni. In: Studi in onore di A. Biscardi. Milano 1982. 
II. 27 f. 
5
 Cic. top. 2, 9. Ius civile est aequitas constituta eis, qui eiusdem civitatis sunt ad res suas obtinendas. 
6
 Cf. Benedek, F.: Die conventio in manum und die Förmlichkeiten der Eheschließung im römischen Recht. PTE 
Dolg. Pécs 1978. 19 ff. 
7
 Cic. Mur. 27. 
8
 Cic. Mur. 27. 
9
 Cic. leg. 1, 14. 
10
 Ciulei, G.: Les rapports de l’équité avec le droit et la justice dans l’oeuvre de Cicéron. Revue historique de 
droit français et étranger 1968. 640 ff. 
11
 Cic. inv. 32; part. 28; Caec. 36; De orat. 1, 56. 
12
 Cic. top. 5. 7. 
 95
justice into a ius based on lex, on the other hand, into a ius based on aequitas.1 Elsewhere—
e.g., in Pro Caecina—aequitas is none other than the means of interpretatio iuris.2 A third 
different group is constituted by the loci where aequitas is referred to as a synonym of ius.3 In 
his philosophical works aequitas appears in many thoughts as a projection, a form of iustitia, 
being the foundation of human relationships.4 It brings us closer to our present topic of 
discussion if we try to trace the occurrences of aequitas in Cicero’s speeches and his 
correspondence. In certain characterisations it appears as a personal characteristic feature.5 
This is the way he characterises Scipio6 and Servius Sulpicius,7 and as he expects every 
Roman in office to possess this quality, he finds it particulary desirable in the case of judges.8 
At the same time iustitia appears only as an exception as somebody’s personal feature in 
Ciceronian characterisations.9 Aequitas, often mentioned together with ius not only as its 
complementary, is considered an ethical norm that plays an important role in the 
administration of law,10 so it does not appear as the kind of equity that would give the judge 
the possibility to reach a decision in contradiction with written law because this way the 
verdict could easily become unjust, coming to a result contradictory with its aim.11 
Let us take a quick view—following Pringsheim’s statements—to the changes that the 
concept of aequitas underwent after Cicero, as the complementary and opposite of ius, and 
see how the concepts of ius aequum and ius strictum are formed.12 The ius aequum adjectival 
construction does not imply an equity based legal interpretation used in an abstract sense, but, 
in accordance with the original meaning of the adjective aequus, it denotes equal right 
identical for everybody both in literary and legal sources.13 Basically, it is not ius that is 
divided into ius aequum and ius strictum, but it is aequitas that appears as a principle which 
regulates, at times aids, corrects ius, at times harmonises with it, at times constitutes a 
contradictory principle, which, however, was never defined at the level of an abstract 
definition, probably due to a lack of effort.14 During the period of the dominate aequitas kept 
gaining terrain from ius. A turning point in this was Constantinus’s legislation who, on the 
one hand, declared that it is the emperor alone who is entitled to interpret the difference 
between ius and aequitas, on the other hand, he made aequitas the synonym of iustitia and ius 
iustitiaque, ranking these above ius (strictum).15 This idea was later taken over by Iustinian 
legal science, so the sources reflect the clear dominance of aequitas, with which the concepts 
of humanitas, iustitia, benignitas, utilitas and bona fides are associated,16 leaving to ius the 
meaning of strict, limited and—sit venia verbo—narrow-minded law, clinging to a rigid, word 
for word interpretation.17 The expression ius strictum cannot be found in the literary sources 
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of the classical period; iudicium strictum is used as a technical term of rhetorical works.1 In 
Statius’s Silvae strictae leges are opposed to aequum;2 ius strictum becomes an 
unquestionable technical term only in Iustinian’s legal work.3 
Returning to Cicero, the expressions “summo iure agere” and “summo iure contendere” 
indicate the use of the whole range of possibilities offered by law,4 which itself does not mean 
legal practice contradictory with aequitas; whether it is proper or improper becomes clear 
only in the concrete situation. At times Cicero has the possibility to be lenient, but the hostile 
behaviour of the opponent can make him legitimately act against it with the strictest means of 
the law, keeping in mind not only his personal interests but the interests of the state as well.5 
(Concerning the point that summum ius depends on the specific situation, both Stroux6 and 
Bürge7 quote as a literary example, the scene from Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice in 
which, Portia as judge uses, instead of the rational, the literal interpretation of the law against 
Shylock, who is reluctant to accept the doge’s more equitable proposal. She turns the situation 
inside out and finally makes him withdraw.8) Aequitas as the principle of interpretatio is not 
formulated expressis verbis in connection with the causa Curiana, treated by Cicero. 
However, since basically it expounds the contradiction between interpretatio restrictiva and 
interpretatio extensiva, in its content aequitas seems to belong to its essence. The basic 
question concerning the facts of the case is whether substitutio pupillaris9 can also be 
regarded as substitutio vulgaris,10 and, in relation to this point, the question whether the 
alternate heir so ordered is also the heir of the bequeather should also be answered.11 Q. 
Mucius Scaevola argued for the restrictive, L. Licinius Crassus for the extending 
interpretation. Consequently, both of them referred to auctores substantiating their opinion. 
Moreover, Crassus, employing the weapon of humor, made fun of the obsolete formulation of 
the legal text, thus ridiculing its restrictive interpretation.12 (The decision made in the causa 
Curiana did not prove to be long-lasting in legal science, as we know about several later 
sententiae contradictory with this.13) 
As we have seen, neither Cicero, nor other Roman legal scientists, basically reluctant to 
formulate abstract definitions,14 determined the uncontradictory concept of aequitas. 
Therefore, the decisiveness of the attempt to solve the scriptum–voluntas contradiction, 
emphasised by Stroux in connection with the causa Curiana,15 loses its validity because 
aequitas worked as a rhetorical ornament rather than a basic principle of judgement.16 
Crassus, who acted as patrocinium aequitatis in the causa Curiana, proved to be the advocate 
of ius strictum in another case. M. Marius Gratidianus sold a plot to C. Sergius Orta, from 
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whom he had bought the same plot a few years earlier. The plot was loaded with servitutes,1 
about which Sergius Orta, as the former owner must have had knowledge. However, when 
signing of the contract, Gratidianus did not mention the servitutes, though this would have 
been his duty.2 In the case of actio empti the seller is responsible for the dolus, the judge had 
to decide whether Gratidianus proceeded dolose or not. The advocati of the parts had a great 
opportunity to influence the iudex, using rhetoric devices based on legal science.3 As Cicero 
remarks too, in this case Antonius based his reasoning on aequitas; opposed to him, Crassus 
clung to the more restrictive interpretation. The appearance of these poles in the same case 
unequivocally harmonises with the training practice of rhetoricians, where the magister 
divided the case to be discussed among the students in a way that half of them had to defend 
their point of view based on aequitas, the other half based on ius strictum, then they changed 
roles.4 
In as much as we do not consider aequitas to be an abstract idea in these cases, but as a freely 
applicable rhetoric device, Cicero’s rather liberal handling of the concept of aequitas 
harmonises with other statements that deal with the essence of eloquence.5 Within the 
boundaries designated by legal science—which in a given case can mean the facts of the case, 
determined by the iuris consultus—the orator can freely move while concentrating his 
attention on the task of defence; all the more so, as he is not striving to prove the truth, but to 
convince the audience of the veri simile.6 (To illustrate this, Cicero tells the following 
example. A simple man from the country wanted to ask iuris consultus P. Crassus for advice, 
but the jurist sent him away as he thought that he could do nothing for him. However, Servius 
Galba, the rhetor, presented him so many examples, parallels, arguments interlarded with 
humor, based on aequitas, and not on ius, in support of the rusticus, that the jurist—still not 
sharing the rhetor’s point of view—had to admit that his arguments were so probable that they 
almost sounded like truth.7) The freedom of movement of the rhetor is considerably greater 
than that of the jurist; as Gellius puts it, he is not closely tied to the truth content of the facts.8 
The rhetor had to be able to argue for or against the same case, as this technique constituted a 
substantial part of rhetoric studies.9 The difference between legal and rhetorical methods was 
long preserved in Rome, as Quintilian admits in his Institutio oratoria, in the chapter in which 
he emphasises the importance of the rhetor’s acquiring legal knowledge.10 In the course of 
time, this difference became even wider, when, at the beginning of the Principate, political 
eloquence faltered, whereas eloquence lost its connections with jurisprudence by dealing with 
fictitious examples and solving more and more artificial rhetorical situations.11 
 
IV. Investigating the use and explanation of the proverbium “summum ius summa iniuria” in 
the works of Erasmus of Rotterdam seems to be substantiated not so much by the historical 
and dogmatic depth of the Erasmian interpretation—as this idea was made the object of much 
more intensive and exhaustive legal theory scrutiny by numerous humanists; e.g., Claudius 
Cantiuncula, Bonifacius Amerbach or Symon Grynaeus (if only due to Erasmus’s slighter 
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interest in historical studies)—but because of the immense influence produced by this 
excellent humanist over the centuries enhanced by his enormous authority, which is hard to 
underestimate.1 Without any need to enter a more meticulous study of the genesis and 
influence of Erasmus’s Adagia, it can be stated that from its first edition in the 16th century 
until the end of the 18th century, it was used as a widely appreciated scholary text book, so it 
can be safely assumed that the “summum ius summa iniuria” paroemia gained considerable 
popularity among humanists, theologians, philosophers, as it is proved by it being frequently 
quoted in the most various contexts.2 
As Erasmus had been making an effort to perfect the Adagia until the end of his life, several 
versions and explanations of this idea can be encountered in the Erasmian corpus. The first 
edition dating from 1500 refers to the proverb in two places;3 first in connection with the 
Terentian quotation “summum ius summa malitia”;4 later with regard to Plato and Cicero 
under the title of “ad vivum summo iure”.5 The text appearing in Basel in 15406 but dating 
from 1536 synthetises all the known occurrences of this idea in Latin authors.7 Before 
enumerating and analysing the loci, trying to avoid the charge that he includes sententiae 
instead of adagia; i.e., proverbs, Erasmus gives a long explanation, and eventually finds his 
acquittal in quoting the Terentian nominatim.8 
Not being a jurist, Erasmus dedicated less attention to the legal paroemia, except for a few 
explanations referring to Iustitia. Only four years before his death, in 1532 did Erasmus 
become interested in juridic regulations, and asked his friend, Bonifacius Amerbach in a letter 
to send him some material, suitable for the completion of the Adagia. Then, after receiving 
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the two-page-long collection, he urged his friend to send him some more. It is highly probable 
that this was how the quotations from the Roman sources found their way into the 1540 
edition of the Adagia.1 
In Erasmus’s interpretation aequitas often mentioned to highlight the paroemia ”summum ius 
summa iniuria” probably did not actually mean equity as a legal interpretive principle, much 
rather justice that should be enforced even against the letter of the law.2 For the explanations 
Erasmus usually refers to antique authors generally with the exact documentation of the 
sources but at times without summarizing their content. Most often the concept aequitas is 
simply used in the sense of aequum et bonum, as the opposite of iniquitas, placing the spirit of 
the law above its letter. One can find the type of the Ciceronian pair of concepts in the 
Aristotelian Ethica Nicomachea, which asserts that a man can be regarded equitable, if he is 
satisfied with less, even if the law is on his side, and does not stick to his own justice in the 
detriment of others, so equity is none other than a kind of justice.3 It is interesting though, that 
that Erasmus does not make any reference to Aristotle in the early editions of the Adagia, and 
only the 1536 and 1540 editions allow us to assume that probably he had the specific locus 
from Ethica Nicomachea in mind. In these latter editions reference is made to Cicero’s Pro 
Murena, instead of Pro Caecina; naturally, together with the classic formulation of the 
proverbium, which can be read in De officiis. We can suspect Aristotelian influence—on an 
ideological level rather than in the concrete wording—in the reference to the intention of the 
legislator opposed to the letter of the law.4 The image “voces …quasi legum cutis est”; i.e., 
the words constitute the skin, the outward layer, is presumably Erasmus’s own. Erasmus’s 
attention to the two legal fragments by Celsus and Paulus respectively from the Digesta by 
Iustinian was probably called by Bonifacius Amerbach, but he used them merely as a kind of 
illustration without examining either their historical or dogmatic background.5 
Reaching the end of our introspection, we can draw the following conclusions. From the 
maxims of legal logic as means of legal interpretation, in the present work we made the 
proverb “summum ius summa iniuria” the object of our scrutiny, enumerating its occurrences 
in antique literary sources, namely in Terence, Columella and then in Cicero. In this last 
formulation the meaning of the proverb became the most clearly crystallized. It signifies the 
excessive, malevolent legal practice in the course of interpretatio iuris, which plays off the 
letter of the law against its spirit. Following this we tried to trace the different meanings, 
formation and the stages of development of the expression interpretatio itself, in the course of 
which interpretatio combined mutatis mutandis the nuances of the religious sphere, on the 
one hand, and those of the grammatical field, on the other, until it reached the semantic 
content of interpretive activity, and became a determining factor by the classical age. The 
Celsian sententia “ius est ars boni et aequi” formulates one of the most general, all-
encompassing basic principles of interpretatio meant to offer protection against the too 
strictly interpreted and applied summum ius. Although jurists never clearly defined the 
concept of aequitas, it became a very important means of legal development as a thought 
emerging from the interaction of jurisprudence and eloquence. By presenting the relevant loci 
from Erasmus of Rotterdam’s Adagia as a typical example of the persistence of the paroemia 
“summum ius summa iniuria”, we wanted to show the way a proverb turning into regula 
iuris—apart from its direct legal application—became an integral part of today’s legal 
common knowledge. 
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Roman Elections and Quintus Tullius Cicero’s Commentariolum petitionis 
 
 
The Commentariolum petitionis written in 64 B.C. is the oldest campaign strategy document 
that has been preserved for us. In this handbook Quintus Tullius Cicero, younger brother of 
the most excellent orator of the Antiquity, Marcus Tullius Cicero, gives advice to his elder 
brother on how Marcus can win consul’s elections, that is, how he can rise to the highest 
position of the Roman Republic. In the present paper Commentariolum will be analysed in 
detail examining the following aspects: the Antique genre commentary (I.); the issue of 
authorship of Commentariolum (II.); the characterisation of the competitors, Antonius and 
Catilina, provided in Commentariolum (III.); the system of elections in Anciet Rome and the 
crime of election fraud/bribery, i.e. the crimen ambitus (IV.) and the role of associations and 
clients in Roman elections (IV.).  
 
I. The Latin genre commentary (commentarius) comes from the Greek hypomnema. 
Hypomnemata were meant to support memory (mimneskesthai), either in form of lists and 
invoices on business transactions, or private notes not intended for publication.1 Given a wide 
scope of meaning, the genre of hypomnema was suitable for being extended in several 
directions; so for denoting descriptions of noteworthy events as autobiographical notes or 
practical guidelines.2 From the age of Hellenism, hypomnema served more and more to denote 
exegetic comments on literary texts; the locus quoted was followed by explanation and 
various interpretations. Later, especially in the last century of the Roman Republic, plain 
presentations confined to sheer description of facts were called commentarius, which could be 
elaborated into annals (libri annales) or historical works (historia) by historians. At the same 
time, the notion of commentarius used in the sense of notes meant for private use, or at least 
not for being made public in the given form, did not vanish completely.3 
The question arises which literary genre Commentariolum petitionis is the closest to. The 
form with diminutive suffix in the title (commentariolum) gives the impression that the author 
intended to sum up his views on applying for office merely in minor notes rather than in an 
exhaustive writing. At the beginning of the work one can read the greetings addressed to 
Marcus Tullius Cicero,4 on the other hand, it implies that he wanted to send this writing as a 
letter.5 Both in the opening lines and in the last paragraph of the work Quintus Tullius Cicero 
speaks to his brother Marcus in a fairly direct, fraternal tone, and at the end of the letter he 
asks him to share his comments on, supplementing, correcting the writing with him so that it 
could be published as a genuine commentarius.6 By that the author made it clear that his 
writing in the form sent by him was not to be considered real commentary, but the improved 
text he wanted to publish as such. Furthermore, most of the manuscripts of Commentariolum 
petitionis bequeath this work as Quintus Tullius Cicero’s work included in books 9–16 of 
Marcus Tullius Cicero’s correspondence with his kin and friends (ad familiares). On the other 
hand, the text cannot be considered a letter in the strict sense for the structure, introduction 
and closure of the writing as well as its attention to detail imply that the author considered the 
work to be made public later completed in most of its parts. Except for its private aspects and 
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greetings, the text, or a significant part thereof that can be published as commentarius, is fully 
presented to us.1 
It is rather dubious if Quintus published—could have published—this work after it had been 
revised by Marcus, in which he outlines the organisation and management of the election 
campaign since he explored the details of the fight for votes with relentless honesty. Günter 
Laser sums up the core of Quintus’s writing as follows: in order to obtain the consul’s office 
the applicant should not shrink back from any tricks, false promises, lies, pretence and 
approaching/flattering any group that fits the purpose.2 
Even more important than discrediting opponents is to win as many friends as possible.3 It is 
important to appear in the company of popular people, even if they do not support the 
candidate since those who can see them together will not necessarily know that.4 Quintus lists 
three kinds of ways of how to arouse sympathy: when one does good to somebody; when 
people hope that we will do good to them, or when people likes us.5 One should send the 
message to the friends of our friends that one will not be ungrateful if they support us. One 
should promise them offices since the worst that could happen is that we might possibly not 
keep our promise once having won the consul’s office.6 The most important thing, however, 
is that when one appears in a village, everybody who counts must be called by their name.7 
Quintus asserts that a candidate should keep the map of entire Italy in his mind so that there 
should be no village where he has no sufficient support.8 Each electoral district should be 
covered by a web of friendly relations.9 The most important thing, however, is that when one 
appears in a village, everybody who counts must be called by their name. However, so many 
names to keep in mind is an impossible task for anybody. To this end, nomeclatores (name 
reminders) were used, who whispered who was who into one’s ears.10 In Quintus Cicero’s 
view, to contact those who are hesitating between political sides three things are needed: 
generosity, attention and, occasionally, some pretension and flattery.11 One should let 
everybody to have access to him day and night; everybody should be helped; or at least one’s 
help should be promised but all this in such manner that one does not hurt self-esteem of 
those whom one helps.12 
 
II. The issue of authorship of the Commentariolum petitionis has many times divided 
researchers. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, G. L. Henderson questioned the 
originality of Commentariolum but his assertion drew no significant responses, either for or 
against, in the literature;13 and in his entry on Quintus Cicero Fr. Münzer took the position 
the work was original.14 In the middle of the 20th century, W. S. Watt, the publisher of 
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Commentariolum expressed his amazement that this work could have ever been considered by 
anybody Quintus Cicero’s letter written to his brother, Marcus;1 and refusing the standpoint of 
hypercriticism. The recent publisher, G. Laser alleged the text was Q. Cicero’s work.2 Against 
Quintus’s authorship the following arguments have been put forward. They deem it 
exaggerated naivety that the younger brother, Quintus would have made notes for his elder 
brother, Marcus on what strategy he should follow while applying for the consul’s office, and 
in these notes—as he himself confessed—he would not have made known anything to his 
brother that he had not already known, or could have known. Also, it might definitely give 
rise to suspicion that the arguments against the competitors, Antonius and Catilina put forth in 
the Commentariolum return almost word for word in Marcus’s oration registered under the 
tile In toga candida handed down to us by Asconius in fragments. On the grounds of the 
above, they qualify the Commentariolum forgery compiled from In toga candida and Pro 
Murena and Marcus’s letter written on the public administration of the provinces addressed to 
Quintus.3 
These arguments have been denied by several experts, including R. Till, with the following 
reasons. The inherited manuscripts of Cicero’s works can hardly give an answer to the 
question of originality. Quintus’s four letters preserved for us, three of them addressed to Tiro 
and one to Marcus, cannot support any linguistic or stylistic conclusions drawn with regard to 
his author profile. On the other hand, it is highly improbable that his style would have been 
greatly different from the language of his brother’s letters who was almost the same age as 
him and had the same education. The assumption claiming that Commentariolum can be dated 
as well to the late period of the Age of Augustus can be refused by putting the question 
whether who could have been the person in the last years of the reign of Augustus that 
deemed it was in his interest to give a detailed description on the election and campaign 
secrets of the year 64 B.C. And even if somebody had decided to do that why would he have 
chosen Quintus Cicero, a rather grey figure both in literary and political terms, as the 
authority of what he wanted to expound. What benefit could he have gained from using 
Quintus’s name after Marcus’s death for revealing his brother’s policy of opportunism? Who 
could have been the author who had such exact knowledge of the conditions and events of the 
given year that no errors whatsoever were made in his writing? Why would he have chosen 
just the period as the subject of his description when Catilina had not been swept off the scene 
of public life? Finally, what forger would have been so modest to emphasise right at the 
beginning of his writing that the fictitious addressee could not learn anything new from his 
summary?4 
The author hardly wanted to win rhetor’s laurel since his style is dry, his sentences have an 
unpleasant ring.5 The Commentariolum provides formidable knowledge of the events of the 
years discussed in it, so its author must have by all means been a contemporary who 
experienced these events from quite close. References made to Marcus’s situation and 
background6 give account of such knowledge that it can be bravely assumed that from words 
let drop or sentences left unfinished the addressee exactly understood what the author meant. 
As a matter of fact, Marcus was not lacking knowledge of the process of applying for offices 
either, however, it can justify Quintus’s effort to sum up relevant experience that he had also 
applied for minor offices (magistratus minores), and so he could add his personal 
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observations to his brother’s strategy.1 The plural used in sentences with more personal tone2 
also indicates that the writer of the letter might have had a direct relation with the addressee. 
The fact that certain sentences from Commentariolum return almost word for word in In toga 
candida cannot be an argument against originality. Quintus sent his notes to his brother with a 
view to have them supplemented and corrected,3 from which one can draw the conclusion that 
later on he wanted to make his writing public—at a later point of time, in May 59, he 
forwarded his work entitled Annales to Marcus also for correction with the intention to 
publish it.4 As a matter of fact, the Commentariolum was not published by Marcus either in 64 
or later since by doing that he would have allowed to have an insight into his own political 
intentions and opportunism, but the charges against Antonius and Catilina gathered in these 
notes he could use with clear conscience and comfortably in his later oration, In toga 
candida.5 The publication of the work later was just as against Marcus’s purposes as the 
publication of several of his letters addressed to Atticus. Taking all the above into 
consideration, albeit for lack of direct evidence we are forced to dismiss the standpoint of 
hypercriticism and until the contrary is proved unambiguously we need to allege that Quintus 
Tullius Cicero is the author of Commentariolum petitionis.6 
Quite openly, Quintus explores his brother’s far from favourable situation in applying for the 
consul’s office. In the eye of the nobility he is considered ’a new man’ (homo novus),7 who is 
not backed either by a proper group of clientes, or sufficient financial support; while his 
competitors, Antonius and Catilina are abounding in all these.8 Although the term homo novus 
was never defined exactly, it was used in a dual sense: as a narrower denotation it meant all of 
those who did not have any consul among their ancestors; in a wider sense it denoted those 
whose forefathers, even if not having obtained the highest rank, did obtain some office or 
were allowed to be the members of the senatus. The optimates used this term properly since 
for them it meant only the parvenu; however, Cicero declared about himself quite proudly that 
he had obtained all possible offices at the youngest age permitted by law (in suo anno), 
although he did not come from the aristocracy of the senatus. A similar thought can be read in 
Pro Murena too.9 
For Marcus his own character and view of life must have meant a disadvantage too since 
being a Platonist it was alien to him to apply pretence (simulatio) indispensably necessary for 
application10 and the ability to make friends with people in order to adjust to voters.11 His key 
weapon was his oratory skills that helped him to make himself popular among the people 
(popularis).12 On the other hand, he had to beware of appearing a populist politician since it 
was not the urban masses (urbana multitudo) that would decide the outcome of the election.13 
Interestingly, Quintus did not attribute any special significance to the help Marcus had 
recently given to populists (C. Fundanius, Q. Gallus, C. Cornelius and C. Orchivius), 
regarding the election he considered it simply a useful step to win the relevant associations 
(sodalitates).14 From first to last, Marcus attempted to avoid appearing a populist but in his 
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efforts he got several times in unpleasant situations; so, for example, when he undertook C. 
Manilius’s case.1 What happened was that the urban masses forced Marcus to live up his word 
to undertake the defense of C. Manilius;2 the proceedings were not held in early 65 due to the 
political situation, and so Cicero escaped from being forced to make an unambiguously clear 
political statement in public.3 Although Quintus does not consider the aforesaid statements of 
defense a standpoint of especially great weight, he deems the action taken for the benefit of 
Pompeius in 67 even after such a long time an act that could cast shadow on his brother’s 
career.4 The reason for that can be most probably looked for in the fact that while statements 
of defense made in court of justice were considered events soon forgotten in the turmoil of 
everyday life, Marcus himself protested against being confronted with his standpoints 
formulated in statements of defense later on as his own opinion.5 This oration made in the 
popular assembly for the first time as praetor entering office represented an unambiguous 
confrontation with the senatus since it was the popular assembly and not the senatus that was 
competent to decide the superior commander’s authority (imperium) to be granted to 
Pompeius. To promote his popularity, Cicero gave free rein to diminuting the authority of the 
senatus, and subsequently many were very much offended by his act—so he had to 
manoeuvre quite skilfully during the process of application not to alienate Pompeius and his 
adherents, on the one hand, and not to worsen his chances in the circles of senatores by 
asserting his commitment to Pompeius, on the other.6  
How does Quintus in early 64 evaluate his brother’s chances in the election, and what 
opinions does he formulate on the competitors? He considers it a fortunate circumstance that 
his brother does not have any respectful competitors who come from the nobility (nobilitas), 
and he points out that C. Coelius Caldus, the consul of the year 94—the last homo novus who 
fulfilled the consul’s office before Cicero—must have had quite a difficult job since he had to 
overcome outstanding figures of the nobility.7 The nobility of the age considered the 
consulatus their own monopoly;8 they believed that electing Cicero consul would defile and 
desecrate this office.9 After that, Quintus enumerates the four possible opponents, of whom 
Galba and Cassius albeit coming from high-born families had no chances because they do not 
have enough persistence and drive.10 The criminal procedure against Catilina turned out 
favourably in spite of anticipations,11 although somewhat earlier, in July 65 Marcus did not 
think it was possible, and was pondering over possibly undertaking Catilina’s defense as by 
that he wanted to win Crassus and Caesar standing behind Catilina for his later election 
campaign.12 Eventually, Marcus did not undertake to defend Catilina, and after the verdict of 
acquittal Catilina entered into an election alliance with Antonius, which was approved by the 
aforesaid influential political factors too. All this unambiguously shows that political alliances 
of the period were formed accidentally based on current interests, and that in order to increase 
his chances Cicero would have been willing to enter into alliance even with Catilina, and after 
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their election most probably he would have applied the same tactic against him as against 
Antonius—these assumptions, however, are on the verge of unhistorical speculations.1 
 
III. The characterisation of the competitors, Antonius and Catilina2 is perhaps the most 
remarkable part of the Commentariolum both in terms of language and the palpable 
description. Quintus considers both persons unpleasant for his brother; at the same time, he is 
compelled to see them as factors that must be reckoned with—regarding both of them he 
states that their past is obscure and sinful, both of them live to fulfil his desires, and none of 
them has the necessary financial means to be able to conduct the election campaign 
successfully3 (with this last remark he opposes them to the wealthy upper and middle classes 
who want to protect their wealth).4 At the end of the presentation he underlines as their 
common feature that it is not so much their origin from high-born families but their sins that 
make them well-known, and those casting their votes on them would stab two daggers at the 
same time into the state.5 The use of the term dagger (sica) is not by chance, by that Quintus 
lets Marcus associate it with Antonius’s and Catilina’s aforesaid characterisation, in 
particular, that both of them are assassins (sicarii). 
C. Antonius, son of M. Antonius, the orator, who taught Cicero too,6 bore the sobriquet 
Hybrida (bastard), and is kept in evidence among others as the uncle and father-in-law of the 
later triumvir M. Antonius. Quintus adduced against him that in 70 the censores excluded him 
from the senatus7 because he sold his plots and property in auction due to his debts.8 As the 
next charge he mentions the lawsuit successfully brought against him by the inhabitants of 
Achaia in 76 before M. Licinius Lucullus praetor peregrinus as a competent forum having 
jurisdiction in the disputes of Roman citizens and aliens:9 they charged him with looting them 
as the commander of the cavalry during Sulla’s rule of terror.10 The counsel for the 
prosecution was the then twenty-four year old Caesar,11 and although Antonius withdrew 
himself from the praetor’s jurisdiction, six years later it was this act due to which the 
censores excluded him from the senatus. Nevertheless, he was admitted to the senatus again 
in 66 as praetor, and later in 42 he fulfilled the censor’s office too.12 When elected praetor he 
was not able to name friends in sufficient rank for counting and checking the ballots, only the 
ill-famed Sabidius and Panthera.13 His father’s name was probably of great help to him in 
successfully applying both for the praetor’s and later the consul’s office; however, Quintus 
does not mention that in his election to be praetor Antonius got from the third place to the 
first with Cicero’s help14 —this fact also shows that election alliances were short-term 
partnerships based on interests of the moment.15 Concubinage with a slave woman 
(concubinatus) itself was not considered a rare thing or an exceptionally scandalous act.16 
What caused dissatisfaction in the case of Antonius was that he bought the slave girl whom he 
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kept beside him in an open auction (de machinis) as a praetor in office, and by doing so he 
injured the dignity of the office he fulfilled.1 
When the application procedure commenced Antonius did not stay in Rome but we do not 
know where his journey took him.2 On official missions (legatio libera) the traveller was 
entitled to reimbursement of travel expenses and accommodation and board; also he had the 
opportunity, in addition to compulsory benefits, to make the innkeepers hosting him pay 
tributes—the fleeced innkeeper (copo compilatus) as a proverbial phrase was used by 
Petronius too.3 On official missions one could get enormously rich as it is proved by a locus 
from one of Cato maior’s orations on his own costs and expenses (De sumptu suo).4 In 59 
Caesar made an attempt to eliminate the abuse of public funds by statutory instrument (lex 
Iulia de repetundis); and in Cilicia Cicero waived even the reimbursement of expenses he was 
entitled to.5 On his official journey mentioned by Quintus, Antonius substantially replenished 
his financial resources to accumulate proper funds for generous distribution of gifts during the 
election campaign (largitio); on the other hand, he injured the people of Rome too—points 
out the author—since he failed to fulfil his obligation to ask for the support of the people of 
Rome personally during the process of application (populo Romano supplicare).6 Later, 
Cicero was yet compelled to exercise his consul’s office in concordance with (concordia) 
him7 since the popular assembly (comitia centuriata) elected Antonius consul on the second 
place after Cicero—it praises Marcus’s sense of tactic that by doing favours to him he was 
able to make the competitor attacked earlier stand by him as an associate in the office during 
the times when he had to cope with the dangers of the Catilina plot.8 
Expressing his indignation over Catilina’s past and way of life Quintus took to more powerful 
means as in the characterisation of Antonius, which can be clearly identified in the series of 
pathetic poetic questions.9 At the same time, these questions and exclamations do not lack 
irony as he sharply questions the nobleness of Catilina’s origin, on the one hand—although in 
theory Catilina was more high-born than Antonius, his ancestors obtained only the praetor’s 
office while Antonius’s father was one of the leading personalities of the State—and the lack 
of nobleness of his character, on the other.10 Contrary to Antonius who was frightened even 
by his own shadow, Quintus characterises Catilina in general as an uninhibited scoundrel who 
despises and defames the law;11 then, he turns to the list of his outrageous deeds.12 He 
underlines his poor family conditions, also referred to by Sallustius,13 as it was only through 
Sulla’s proscriptions that Catilina took possession of considerable wealth,14 and the fact that 
his rakish and violent sexual nature was reinforced by what he experienced at home, seeing 
his elder sister’s conduct.15 The greatest part of the crimes in the presentation comprises the 
murders committed during Sulla’s rule of terror against Roman citizens.16 Quintus enumerates 
the names of the murdered Roman knights, who supported Cinna and by doing so evoked 
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Sulla’s revenge, in a generalising plural even if Catilina’s bloodlust demanded only one 
victim from the given clan.1 As one of the most outrages examples of these murders he recalls 
the murder of Q. Caecilius, Catilina’s own brother-in-law, who played no political role at all, 
and considering his age the only thing he wanted was quiet old age;2 it is highly weird that to 
the best of our knowledge Marcus never mentions the murder of relatives committed by 
Catilina.3 
Quintus gives a longer pathetic description not shrinking back from depicting naturalistic 
details of the brutal murder of Catilina’s wife, Gratidia’s sister, by M. Marius Gratidianus 
Catilina.4 This murder must have affected the brothers closely since through their 
grandmother they were relatives of Gratidianus.5 This man highly dear to the people of Rome 
(homo carissimus populo Romano) was very popular among others because during the two 
consecutive years, in 85 and 84 when he fulfilled the praetor’s office he took several 
measures to prevent the people from being injured; so at several points of the city they erected 
statues of him, which were respected with cultic ceremonies.6 On the other hand, both Quintus 
and Marcus conceals that in 87 Gratidianus as a popular tribune and as Cinna’s adherent 
threatened Q. Lutatius Catulus with crucifixion, who escaped into suicide—the 
Commentariolum renders the merciless revenge of Catulus’s son and especially Catilina 
perceptible.7 Quintus demonstrates Catilina’s corruptness and dangerous nature when he does 
not fail to mention that Catilina lived together with actors and gladiators—both occupations 
were inflicted by loss of honour (infamia) in Roman law8—and while actors satisfied only his 
lust, gladiators meant grave threat to all the citizens.9 Since the Spartacus uprising, contacts 
with gladiators represented threat to the peace of the State—Catilina obtained a troop of 
gladiators from Q. Gallus.10 The danger implied by it is indicated also by the resolution of the 
senatus (senatus consultum) dated 12 October 63, twelve days before Cicero’s first oration 
against Catilina, claiming that Catilina’s gladiators must be dispersed to Capua and other 
provincial towns.11 
Catilina committed sacrilege (sacrilegium) both when he washed his hands besmeared with 
blood in the holy water basin of the Apollo temple after murdering Gratidianus,12 and later by 
other acts. However, Quintus puts it quite obliquely and speaks about defiling only one sacred 
place and some other persons who became the innocent victims of Catilina’s crime.13 
Quintus’s vague description is understandable since the case is from 73 when Clodius charged 
Catilina with incest, incestum, committed with Fabia (Fabia was a Vesta priestess and half-
sister of Cicero’s wife, Terentia). Owing to Catulus’s help, Catilina was acquitted but the case 
left the reputation of Fabia, and by that of Terentia’s and Cicero’s family in tatters. There are 
a few loci available on the case; e.g., Sallustius14 and Plutarch15 asserts Catilina’s outrageous 
deed as a fact, but Cicero, should he refer to the fact, never associated his sister-in-law’s name 
with him. After that Quintus enumerates some persons by name who belonged to the circle of 
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Catilina’s close friends (amicissimi);1 this, however, cannot be interpreted to imply that 
Marcus or Quintus suspected as early as that anything about the plot prepared by Catilina2—
nevertheless, certain names (Q. Curius, L. Vettius) related later to the plot already appeared 
here.3 
To make the list of crimes complete, Quintus points out that Catilina seduced free-born boys 
almost in their parents’ lap—Sulla’s legislation and the lex Sca(n)tinia imposed a fine of ten 
thousand sestertius on this state of facts—4 which was public knowledge all over the city,5 
and was absolutely contrary to Cicero’s relation to youth several times underlined by Quintus 
too.6 To cover Catilina’s recent scandal, Quintus adduces to the case well-known to his 
brother: the acquittal from the charge brought against him for robbing goods from the 
province Africa (crimen repetundarum).7 This lawsuit could have prevented Catilina from 
applying for the consul’s office8 but in late 65 at Catilina’s demand the purportedly biased 
jurors were recalled with the prosecutor’s, P. Clodius Pulcher’s consent, and the newly set up 
jury acquitted Catilina.9 Quintus, and later Marcus spoke about the corrupt jurors with 
contempt.10 On the other hand, Quintus does not talk about Crassus and Caesar who supported 
Catilina from the background.11 
Most probably Quintus summed up the negative features of the two competitors well-known 
to his brother to help Marcus to make the citizens aware of them in a concise form,12 or to 
make him able to properly threaten Catilina and Antonius with charging them with their 
outrageous deeds.13 Against Antonius he enumerates the following acts, in brief summary: his 
debts; selling his estates; his contempt of the court; his exclusion from the senatus; his 
suspicious acquaintance with Sabidius and Panthera; defiling the dignity of the office by 
buying the girl friend on the slave market; and, from the recent period, looting the innkeepers; 
and despising the people of Rome by not attending the application in person. Legally, it was 
only the abuse of the rights of official mission—or his participation in Sulla’s proscriptions—
that could give proper grounds for calling him to account for his deeds.14 
In the description of Catilina’s past, when Quintus enumerated the names of the knights killed 
by him, and pathetically described the murder of Gratidianus, he must have had kept current 
political issues in view and not just the requirements of historical authenticity as that was the 
time when those who committed murders during Sulla’s reign of terror were called to account 
for their deeds15 —in spite of the fact that pursuant to the dictator’s regulations the killers of 
proscribed persons should have enjoyed impunity.16 As part of this process, a short time 
the election of the consules, L. Liscius, Sulla’s well-known captain and Bellienus, Catilina’s 
uncle were sentenced due to murdering proscribed persons during Sulla’s rule, although both 
of them were quite ignorant persons and they could have said that they had committed all that 
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on the orders of Sulla.1 At the end of 64, Catilina was also brought to the court of justice 
competent to pass judgment on homicide (quaestio inter sicarios), the investigator’s office 
(quaesitor) was fulfilled by Caesar, the chairman’s office by L. Lucceius, known as a 
historian, who was good friends with Cicero.2 In spite of the fact that Catilina could not give 
an excuse for his deeds by saying that he acted on the orders of the dictator, he was acquitted 
because Caesar and Cassius backed him.3 Furthermore, he could have been charged with 
seducing boys and unlawfully keeping gladiators; and many people demanded retrial of the 
case of looting the province. Although the first lawsuit ended with acquittal, the public 
opinion of the period evaluated it as a scandalous outcome. So owing to Quintus’s 
instructions, Marcus had sufficient material for being able to threaten both of his competitors, 
primarily Catilina with possibly charging them.4 
Marcus amply used the material compiled by his brother in his oration entitled In toga 
candida handed down to us by Asconius in fragments: what happened was he claimed to 
make the law motioned by C. Calpurnius Piso to sanction election fraud in 67 (lex Calpurnia 
de ambitu) stricter when the amount of the bribery monies distributed by Antonius and 
Catilina went far beyond any usual extent.5 Q. Maucius Orestinus exercised his right of veto 
(intercessio), and Marcus heavily attacked his competitors before the senatus enumerating the 
following deeds. Regarding Antonius: looting Achaia and despising the court; his own favour 
he did to Antonius in the election of the praetor; assigning his goods; and holding back the 
shepherds who worked on his estate in order to organise an army from them; Antonius’s 
participation in Sulla’s proscriptions and the role taken by him when driving a cart 
(quadrigarius) in Sulla’s triumphal procession. 
In the rest of the speech, he attacked Catilina: he charged him with murdering Roman 
citizens; financial abuses and crimes; immorality and debauchery; despising the law; killing 
Marius Gratidianus; gathering gladiators and seducing the Vesta priestess—and called both of 
them a dagger pointed against the State.6 The two competitors made efforts to defend 
themselves; however, not being able to come up with anything against Cicero’s personality 
and conduct of life, the only thing they cast on his eyes was that he was ’a new man’ (homo 
novus).7 The oration produced its impact: it seemed more prudent to elect an applicant who 
did not have noble descent from the old times but was eligible for each layer of society and 
the masses than Catilina.8 Antonius achieved the second place after Cicero, and his father’s 
former authority was of great help to him.9 
 
IV. The Republic of Rome recognised four kinds of popular assemblies; three of them played 
a part in the elections. The comitia centuriata based on property census elected the prime 
leaders of the Empire, the consules and the praetores who carried out administration of justice 
as well as the censores who implemented property estimation. The point of the system was 
that based on their property status, income the population was ranked among military/political 
centuriae. The centuriae of the wealthier as a matter of fact did not amount to one hundred 
persons while the number of persons in a single centuria of the pauper was at least as large as 
the whole first class; that is, the total of the eighty centuriae of the aristocracy. Equites 
constituted eighteen centuriae. The wealthier the people recruited were, the higher the number 
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of centuriae was; i.e., the number of citizens classified in each centuria was steadily 
increasing when the given centuria consisted of less and less wealthy people. Through that it 
was possible to attain that people without any property were represented only by five 
centuriae. Elections were held in a process per centuriae—and ”from up to down”. This 
means that first wealthier people cast their vote and after that the poorer, finally the pauper, 
who constituted the major part of the population. Although the ballots cast by each citizen 
were equal but their ballots were aggregated per centuria and their centuria eventually 
represented only a single ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote, depending on which response the majority of the 
ballots was cast in the centuria. If a case had to be decided or an official had to be voted for, 
voting was carried out only up to the stage where the centuriae that had already cast their vote 
had reached fifty percent plus one ballot. As the eighty votes of the eighteen votes of the 
equites and the eighty votes of the first class of the patricians/the aristocracy themselves were 
more than half of the one hundred and ninety-three centuriae in total, it can be clearly realised 
that even the twenty centuriae of the second property class had to cast their ballots only in the 
very rare case that the centuriae of the knights and the first class had not reached accord for 
some reason. As, however, the first ninety-eight centuriae actually represented merely a 
fraction of the whole of the citizens, the election was far from reflecting the will of the 
majority of the citizens.1 
The day of the election of the consuls always fell on the second half of July. The electors went 
out to the Mars field early morning and gathered by centuriae. The persons controlling the 
elections announced the names of the candidates; and, after that voting began. The identity of 
the voters appearing per centuriae was verified by the guards at the gateway to the voting 
bridge. Voters wrote the initials of the name of the candidate they supported on a wax covered 
piece of wooden board. At the other end of the voting bridge a ballot-box was set up where 
they cast their boards. Once one centuria has cast their votes, ballots were aggregated in the 
ballot counting chamber, and the names of the candidates were written in a predetermined 
order, with the decisions of the centuriae added beside the names. When a candidate had 
reached fifty percent plus one vote of the ballots of the centuriae, voting was discontinued, 
and the result was proclaimed. The institution of campaign silence was unknown to the 
Romans since agents tried to convince voters to vote for specific candidates even at the gate 
of the bridge. If it was foreseen that the result would be unfavourable for patricians, then the 
voting bridge collapsed ”accidentally”, and the voting had to be interrupted—and be 
postponed for several days. Then, in some cases, augures showed up, who stated that they 
were seeing ill omina, and this allowed declaring the whole procedure null and void.2 
Just as the election of magistrates was a necessary part of the order of the state of the 
Republic of Rome, in these elections election fraud/bribery (ambitus) played a part too. Very 
soon after the making of the Twelve Table Law, in 432, the first statutory provision was 
published, which prohibited for applicants to call their fellow citizens’ attention to themselves 
with specially whitened clothes made shining.3 Initially, ambitus (walking around) indicated 
not more than the activity when the applicant for the office walked around among electors to 
secure their votes for him.4 It is linked with the name of C. Poetelius tribunus plebis that in 
358 a plebiscitum prohibited for the applicants to walk around on markets and in villages 
among electors,5 which provision was obviously intended to prevent unethical practices to 
obtain votes outside Rome. In accordance with Roman terminology, it was always only 
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ambitus that violated legal order, ambitio did not;1 the latter was often used in the sense of 
petitio, its meaning was sometimes undoubtedly pejorative but it never became a legal term.2 
It should be noted, however, that the aforesaid two plebiscita cannot be considered punitive 
statutes.3 
From the second half of the second century we know of the existence of two acts that 
sanctioned ambitus – they are lex Cornelia Baebia from 1814 and an act from 159,5 but their 
content is not known. In the age between C. Gracchus and Sulla, the system of quaestiones 
perpetuae was already quite extended. The first news provided on a lawsuit specifically on the 
charge of ambitus is dated to this period: in 116 one of the consul’s offices for the year of 115 
was won by a homo novus Marcus Aemilius Scaurus, who was charged by his rival having 
lost the election, P. Rutilius Rufus with ambitus. In turn Scaurus did the same against Rufus; 
otherwise both of the accused—who were prosecutors at the same time—were acquitted.6 The 
existence of lex Cornelia de ambitu made by Sulla is somewhat disputed;7 our understanding 
of leges Corneliae is not complete since there are two sources on these acts available. First, 
Cicero’s speeches; secondly, the writings of the lawyers of late principate, which are known 
only in the form bequeathed in the Digest. Cicero refers to these acts only to the extent his 
interests manifested in the given speech, that is, the rhetoric situation makes it necessary; so in 
no way does he make an effort to be exhaustive as it is not his duty. The lawyers of the 
principatus dealt with only those acts of Sulla that remained in force after Augustus’s reforms. 
The following reference, however, gives ground for considering the existence of lex Cornelia 
de ambitu possible. It asserts that in earlier ages the convicted were condemned to refrain 
from applying for magistrates for ten years. The aforesaid lex Cornelia can be hardly the lex 
Cornelia Baebia from 181 since between his speech delivered in defense of Publius Cornelius 
Sulla and lex Cornelia more than ten years had passed, and as in this period other laws 
sanctioning ambitus were also made, it cannot be supposed that the extent of punishment 
would have remained the same.8 
In the periods after Sulla, quaestio de ambitu was usually headed by a praetor, so for example 
in 66 C. Aquilius Gallus fulfilled the office of praetor ambitus.9 On the laws following this 
stage, information is supplied by Cicero in Pro Murena. At the request of C. Cornelius 
tribunus plebis, in 67, lex Calpurnia was born;10 what can be known about its sanctions is as 
follows. It contained expulsion from the senatus, banning from applying for offices for life 
(contrary to the ten years’ term defined under lex Cornelia) and certain pecuniary 
punishments.11 A senatus consultum from 63 emphatically sanctioned a part of the acts 
regulated under lex Calpurnia; so for example, the act of recruiting party adherents for money 
upon the reception of the applicant in Rome; the act of distributing a great number of free 
tickets and seats for gladiators’ games; and the act of hospitality to an excessive extent;12 this 
senatus consultum probably interpreted and specified the aforesaid law.13 The events of the 
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year 64, however—primarily the increasing losses of Antonius and Catilina—made it 
necessary to make a new law. This law became lex Tullia enacted in 63, supported by all the 
candidates applying for the consulatus of the year 62,1 which threatened with ten years’ exile 
as a new punishment, and took firmer action against distributing money, and punished 
absence from legislation due to alleged illness. Furthermore, it banned the arrangement of 
gladiators’ games during two years before applying, with the only exemption from such ban 
being an obligation to do so as set forth in a last will and testament. That is how the law 
wanted to prevent paying money directly to voters, and intended to limit the number of the 
entourage of the applicants (as an increasingly great entourage almost appearing to be a 
triumphal procession might have suggested sure victory to voters). It is a fact however—as 
Joachim Adamietz’s witty and quite to the point remark reveals—that the actual limits of 
ambitus were determined by nothing else than the confines of the financial possibilities of the 
candidates.2 
 
V. The associations founded by private persons, usually called collegium, held together the 
communities providing protection and assistance for persons living at the same settlement and 
belonging to the same religious cult but were primarily not meant to serve everyday political 
fights.3 To cover their expenses certain associations claimed admission fees (capitulare) or 
regular monthly membership fees (stips menstrua),4 which of course limited the number of 
members; that is, most often the members of the collegia were from the wealthier layers of 
urban common people (plebs urbana), traders, craftsmen, ship owners and not from simple 
labourers.5 If an association, which did not claim any membership fees, was not able to 
finance its expenses from its own resources, it could rely on the generosity of its leaders, or a 
patronus but if it engaged a conduct which was contrary to the maintainer’s intentions, then it 
could lose the support.6 The political significance of collegia increased during periods of 
applications for magistrates; however, even then it was enough for the applicant to win over 
the leading personalities of the collegium to his goals, the rest of the members obediently 
followed the opinion leaders.7 Clodius’s activity added a peculiar element to the political 
operation of certain associations. Clodius definitely raised the number of collegia that did not 
claim any membership fees and brought together the scum of the city, which highly shocked 
Cicero.8 The maintenance and “representation” expenses of these associations were most 
probably covered by Clodius himself, and in return the members could express their gratitude 
to their patronus in several ways and forms; consequently, in theory Clodius could easily 
mobilise masses.9 These collegia lead by Clodius were actually gangs operated by keeping the 
appearance of legality but used as tools to raise riots; and it was not in the interest of decent 
citizens to risk their reputation, proceeds and life—by closing their shops and leaving their 
daily jobs—for the sake of Clodius.10 Later, Clodius made efforts to use the collegia 
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maintained by him as a kind of private army,1 which were, looking at their “results”, 
sufficient for Clodius achieving his short-term plans and disturbing the privacy of the public 
for a short while, but for seizing power for a longer period (which was perhaps not included in 
Clodius’s intentions) both financial resources and proper motivation were missing. After 
Clodius’s death, the collegia lost their impact produced on political events; nevertheless, later 
on the leaders of the State were very careful in their ways with associations.2 
The question arises what proportion of the population the institution of the clientela 
covered—Gelzer believes it was the common people of the city (plebs urbana) who belonged 
to the clientela3 —and as part of that what services the clientes were obliged to provide for 
their patronus; and to what extent the wider masses could be manipulated and mobilised 
through the clientela. Since the early period of the Republic the relation between the patronus 
and the cliens had been based on mutual trust (fides), under which patricians having 
outstanding authority (auctoritas), dignity (dignitas) and wealth (vires), and later plebeians 
undertook to protect citizens in need of and asking for protection4 as well as travelling aliens 
(hospites) in the form of various benefits and favours (beneficia, merita) both financially and 
before the law.5 In spite of their dependant relation to their patronus the clientes preserved 
their personal freedom, and were not compelled to waive their right to political activity or 
participation in public life; what is more, their patrons promoted them to do so.6 In addition to 
expressing esteem (reverentia) and gratitude (gratia) the clientes were obliged to provide 
several services for their patronus.7 So, for example, they arranged for accommodation for 
their patron or his friends,8 shared the payment of penalties,9 supported their patronus in court 
proceedings,10 during the period of applying for or fulfilling offices they provided spiritual 
and financial support for their patron,11 in danger they undertook to protect him personally,12 
as a foreign cliens they supplied goods to the patronus,13 and preferably they informed as 
many people as possible about the generosity of their patron.14 On the grounds of all the 
above, the clientes were in many cases meant to articulate the patronus’s interests and views 
to the wider masses clearly and efficiently.15 Although the clientela provided an essential 
basis of support for the patronus, the citizens fulfilling patronatus were far from relying only 
on clientes in search of tools that could be used for their political purposes since the 
attachment of the clientela was of ethical rather than legal nature, on the one hand—
consequently, the patron was not able to enforce support given to him through legal means, or 
he could get this support only by holding out the prospect of appropriate consideration—and 
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the clientes, pursuing their own occupation, could not always be available to the patronus, on 
the other. 
The social significance of the clientela depended to a great extent on the social position of the 
cliens, and, therefore, the patronus–ingenuus (free-born citizen) relation and the patronus–
libertus (freedman, liberated slave) relation must be clearly separated from each other. A part 
of free-born clientes belonged to a social and economic layer identical with or similar to that 
of the patronus, and needed the patronus’s support only for the sake of strengthening their 
own position, or for obtaining an office1—in this case the clientela meant friendship between 
persons of equal rank (amicitia).2 These clientes belonged to the higher census class, and so at 
the comitia centuriata and in a provincial tribus they could articulate their opinion and 
advance their patronus’s interests as competent persons.3 As a matter of fact, not all free-born 
citizens belonged to the wealthier layers, and they turned to the patronus primarily for urgent 
legal or financial help, but they could hardly return the favours did to them as due to the 
peculiar features of the Roman election system they did not have the opportunity to cast their 
votes and these votes were not evaluated unless the elections were expected to produce a 
dubious outcome.4 Compared to the latter, the applicant for the office appreciated the support 
of men with greater prestige much more; so, for example, the support of the leaders of 
collegia (principes), who in the given case did not constitute a part of the clientela but 
produced major influence in their association, district and their entire place of living, and had 
considerable impact on changes in the morale of voters.5 
The representation of the institution of salutation (salutatio) casts interesting light on the 
applicant’s social relations: saluters from lower layers of society (salutatores) visited several 
applicants on the same day (plures competitores), so the conduct engaged by them during the 
election could not be considered secure and stable (communes/fucosi suffragatores). 
Therefore, the patronus applying for the office ought to have appeared grateful to them, and 
had to praise their activity both to their face and in front of their friends as by doing so he 
could expect them to leave their other patroni and become firm and committed voters 
(proprii/firmi suffragatores)—the applicant was not supposed to bring up his suspicion arising 
or proved regarding their loyalty, and against his better conviction he had to assert his trust in 
them.6 The patronus could never be absolutely sure of the support and gratitude of salutatores 
for they could compare the goods and benefits received from him to the allowances granted 
by other applicants they had also visited—i.e., economically independent citizens seemed 
more secure voter’s base. The endeavour to recruit and hold inconstant salutatores and 
clientes becomes understandable when one considers that the patronus applying for an office 
could produce the appearance of popularity and influence by having a lot of people crowding 
around him during salutation.7 
More important and more respectful salutatores were allowed to have a word directly with the 
patronus; their presence made the masses aware that the applicant was worthy of more 
extensive support.8 The salutatio provided opportunities for the applicant for gathering 
information on the morale and desires of common people, which their close circle of friends 
(amici) did not provide insight into; consequently, the patronus–cliens relation served mostly 
exchange of information. The relation between the patronus and the freedmen (liberti) 
developed somewhat differently: their relation remained closer even after liberation 
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(manumissio) but this relation was based as much on the requirements of moral standards than 
on the requirements of legal norms: In 118 Rutilius Rufus’s praetor edictum limited the range 
of services that could be demanded by the patronus,1 but a freedman was not allowed to take 
legal action against the patronus,2 and it was only Augustus’s lex Aelia Sentia that formulated 
statutory sanctions against ungrateful freedmen.3 
Accordingly, the clientela made up of free-born citizens and freedmen cannot be considered 
uniform in terms of the strength of their attachment to the patronus since it was exactly due to 
the moral nature of the attachment that the patronus did not have any legal means to collect 
outstanding claims and unfulfilled obligations. Although a patronus deceitfully acting against 
his clientes became the object of the contempt of society, this did not mean that he was 
deprived of his rights. Servius’s commentary quoting the text of the Twelve Table Law 
attached to the relevant locus of Vergil’s Aeneis4 —which asserted that the patronus 
deceiving his cliens should be damned (sacer)—implied ethical offence and not criminal law 
facts. In this case the term sacer presumably meant the person who engaged culpable, that is, 
despiseable conduct5 rather than a person who could be sacrificed to the gods or freely killed. 
6
 Most probably Servius followed the tendency of the late period of the Age of the Republic 
that idealised the Roman past.7 Even if we presume close patronus–cliens relations regarding 
the archaic age, the significance of clientelae dramatically diminished by the 3rd c. B.C., and 
owing to the growth of the number of citizens we can no longer reckon with stable clientelae 
during Sulla’s rule of terror, much rather ad hoc patronus–cliens relations organised for 
specific purposes should be presumed under which fulfilment of moral obligations was no 
longer of great account.8 If there had been no mobility of such a great extent within and 
between clientelae, then the patroni and applicants for offices would not have been 
compelled—even at the expense of ambitus (election fraud)—to recruit clients.9 Clientes from 
lower layers of society became important to the patronus not so much for getting their 
votes—which sometimes they were not even allowed to cast in the elections—much rather for 
their capacity to mediate the opinion of the masses to him, which helped him to prepare for 
what opinion they would like to hear from him in public appearances.10 
With the loosening of the patronus–cliens relation, or owing to the fact that the cliens would 
seek a patronus that represented his interests better, and the patronus would seek clientes in 
his environment who had more considerable influence and so had greater capital of relations, 
this process reached the stage where the lower layers of society, which constituted a 
considerable part of clientes, were able to produce direct influence on political leaders. A 
grand entourage represented the acknowledgement of the politician and his legitimisation by 
the citizens,11 whereas a decreasing number of people forced him to revise his views 
entertained so far.12 On the other hand, it was just due to the unstable and unreliable nature of 
the clientela that in the last century of the Republic applicants for offices relied, in addition to 
their clientes, on their relatives, friends, neighbours in the district, their freedmen and slaves 
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when compiling the urban accompaniment—this diversity enriched not only the spectacular 
entourage but opened roads to each layer of society and created relations for the applicant.1 So 
the clientela was only one of the means of political fight, and far from being the only or the 
most important one;2 all the more as Livius’s description asserts that the purpose of the 
clientes taking action before the court of justice was not to raise sympathy with the defendant 
much rather to prevent a larger mass from getting together.3 
 
The exploration of uninhibited opportunism and manoeuvring described in Commentariolum 
petitionis by Quintus Tullius Cicero was in no way in the interest of the ruling class of the late 
Republic, and it would have put especially Marcus Tullius Cicero in an unpleasant situation 
since he could not have shielded himself from the shadow of the suspicion that—especially as 
homo novus—he was able to win consulatus because he used all these tools in practice. In the 
mirror of all the above, it can be ascertained that the Commentariolum petitionis was 
produced primarily as a personal writing addressed to Marcus, in which his brother, Quintus 
wanted to give him help by summing up the key aspects and tools of the election campaign to 
win the consul’s office. 
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Crimen ambitus and ambitio in the Late Republic 
 
 
Cicero delivered his speech in November 63 in defence of Lucius Licinius Murena, an 
applicant for the office of the next year’s consul, who was charged by his competitors with 
election fraud, ambitus. The condemnation of Murena would have broken not only the 
commander’s political carreer, it would have driven the Republic into serious danger. So, it 
was not only the honesty of a member of the Roman political elite but the stability of the 
Roman State that Cicero was destined to defend, as he clearly states it in his speech. In his 
statement of defence, it is not primarily the personal merits of the competitors, Licinius 
Murena and Sulpicius Rufus that the orator compares, it is their career, the commander’s, the 
jurist’s activity that he puts on the scales of public good, and provides a fairly humorous, 
witty assessment of these. The outcome of the lawsuit is known, the court acquitted Murena, 
who thus was able to start his service as a consul, and take over the office from the previous 
year’s consul and his own counsel for defence, Cicero. 
The speech in defence of Cnaeus Plancius was delivered in early autumn 54, immediately 
before or after the speech in defence of M. Aemilius Scaurus. Cn. Plancius won the office of 
aedil of the year 54 by winning the election, and, as it was not rare in Rome, his competitor, 
who lost in the election, M. Iuventius Laterensis charged him of election bribery/fraud. As co-
prosecutor L. Cassius Longinus took sides with him, defence was provided by Cicero (and as 
quite often Hortensius), who—as was his custom—rose to speak as the last one. The court of 
justice was chaired by C. Alfius Flavus, of whom—in spite of his people’s party affiliation—
Cicero made positive statements elsewhere. The close relation between Cicero and his 
defendant was highly influenced by the fact that Plancius, who acted in Macedonia as 
quaestor, gave shelter to the exiled politician, which was equal to saving his life in the 
orator’s interpretation. Cicero responds to the allegations of general significance made by the 
prosecution, in not too exhaustive details; however, he turns the attention from the accused 
and his acts to his own person, and the style of the speech here is elevated to hymn of 
gratitude addressed to his friend and saviour, Plancius, who stood by the orator-statesman 
from first to last even during his exile. As on several occasions earlier and later, he 
convincingly hammered the conviction into his audience that his voluntary and self-
sacrificing exile saved the people of Rome from terrible civil war and bloodshed, and he tried 
to clarify his relation with the triumvirs far from being free from contradictions, yet stylised 
into a harmonic relation in the given situation. By describing his exile and escape in vivid 
colours and presenting a stylised figure of Plancius as a heroic saviour, he aroused the 
audience’s compassion with the accused in a pathetic peroratio—and not without impact 
since, as it is known, in the proceedings Plancius was acquitted. 
First, we shall analyse the historical background of Pro Murena, describing the political 
events surrounding the delivery of the speech in details as the oratio was made just at the time 
of revealing Catilina’s plot, and so it cannot be taken out of the context of the stormy political 
conditions of the those months. (I.) After that, we shall discuss the rhetorical tactics used in 
Pro Murena, contentio dignitatis, that is, the strategy typically used in ambitus lawsuits by 
which Cicero compared development of the career and personality of the competing 
candidates to enable him to demonstrate—not so much his defendant’s innocence in the 
charge of election bribery—much rather eligibility of Murena, who won the election, and 
ineligibility of his opponent, Sulpicius Rufus, to the consul’s dignity. (II.) After brief 
description of the historical background of the lawsuit of Plancius (III.), we analyse Pro 
Plancio more profoundly to investigate the rhetorical handling of the facts of the case, which 
will be compared to Pro Murena examined earlier at several points to ensure better 
understanding. (IV.) Although the case was not one of the events that stirred huge political 
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storms in the last century of the Republic, and so it was soon forgotten, it can be considered 
important among charges brought due to election bribery and lawsuits conducted on this 
subject to the extent that, after Pro Murena, Pro Plancio is the second—and the last—speech 
delivered by Cicero in ambitus lawsuits that have been left to us, which provides us with the 
opportunity for profound and comparative analysis of the Ciceronian handing of the facts of 
the case that he usually applied in crimen ambitus. 
 
I. In 63 Lucius Licinius Murena and Decimus Iunius Silanus were elected consuls for the year 
of 62. Apart from them, however, Lucius Sergius Catilina and Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the 
most excellent jurist of his age also applied for this office. Before the election, M. Porcius 
Cato made an oath that he would charge anybody who had won the election with ambitus, 
except for his brother-in-law,1 Silanus.2 In Rome it was far from being a rare thing to charge 
the magistrates elected with ambitus. In 66 both consules designati, P. Cornelius Sulla and P. 
Antonius Paetus were actually condemned, and in 54 none of the four applicants managed to 
avoid the proceedings taken due to ambitus.3 The act of condemning a consul designatus, as a 
matter of fact, was likely to shake the stability of the Republic to a considerable extent.4 The 
fact that the charge made by Sulpicius and Cato went far beyond the usual extent of the 
possible danger to the res publica was justified by the events taking place in the year of 63. 
The delivery of Pro Murena can be dated to November 63; that is, one of the periods 
burdened with the greatest crisis of the Roman Republic. The year of 63—when Marcus 
Tullius Cicero and Caius Antonius Hybrida became consuls—saw the second Catilina’s plot.5 
What follows is a brief summary of the key events of the conspiracy.6 
The lawsuit involved four prosecutors (Ser. Sulpicius Rufus, M. Porcius Cato, Ser. Sulpicius 
Rufus minor and a certain C. Postumius not specifically known) and three counsels for 
defence (Q. Hortensius Hortalus, M. Licinius Crassus and Cicero). The proceedings were 
terminated with the acquittal of Murena.7 
 
II. The structure of the speech can be outlined as follows.8 Cicero replies to the reproaches 
addressed to him for having undertaken defence.9 In antique rhetoric it is not rare for the 
counsel of defence to apply the strategy to clear himself first. His style is solemn right in the 
first sentence both in terms of vocabulary and rhythm, the use of creticus.10 In the main part11 
he follows the disposition of the charge divided into three parts. In the first very short part, he 
refuses the charges brought against Murena’s conduct of life (deprehensio vitae). In the 
second part, he deals with the chances of the election of the two competitors.12 This was 
required because the charge subsequently stressing the point that Murena had no chance 
intended to prove that he had won owing to nothing else but dishonest means: that was what 
Cicero wanted to reply to. He emphasises that social background and the office obtained 
through it are equal in the case of both parties,13 by virtue of this none of them could 
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overcome the other. Murena obtained esteem with his career till then and achieved victory for 
himself by using this esteem.1 He compares the glory of the orator’s and the soldier’s career to 
to the lawyer’s career,2 in which competition (studiorum atque artium contentio)—as the 
rhetorical situation required—as a matter of fact the eloquence and the res militaris become 
the winner. After that, however, Cicero puts forth more compelling reasons to support 
Murena:3 for example, the ludi that he arranged as praetor.4 The fact that, contrary to 
Sulpicius Rufus,5 he undertook to administer a province,6 and finally that his election was 
supported also by commander Lucullus and his troops, who returned from the third war with 
Mithritades to Rome. Then he launches an attack against Servius:7 he criticises the tactics 
followed by him, in particular that instead of advancing his own victory Sulpicius prepared 
the evidence of the charge of ambitus against his enemies right from the outset, and by that 
involuntarily drove those who were afraid of Catilina’s victory to Murena’s camp.8 It is in the 
the third part9 where he comes to the actual charges. First, he replies to the charges brought by 
by Cato, and the consideration thereof,10 since it was Cato’s excessively exercised firmness 
that made him support the charge.11 As earlier pettiness and certain out-of-date institutions of 
the jurisprudence,12 now he makes the sometimes exaggerating strictness of Stoic ethics the 
subject of scorn.13 This charge is followed by his factual but rather narrow and not too 
convincing disproof.14 Emphasis is laid not so much on production of evidence but on the 
assertion that the lawsuit itself is a highly false step and that anyone who wanted to attain 
through it that next January only one consul should enter office would deliver the res publica 
in the hands Catilina and his accomplices.15 Thus, his aim is to protect the State and his 
citizens.16 In the peroratio17 he calls the judges’ attention to the point that in their decisions 
they should keep public interest in view.18 
In Pro Murena Cicero—in addition to emphasising the political weight of the lawsuit—
achieved success, that is, Murena’s acquittal by comparing the career of the two applicants 
(studiorum atque artium contentio and contentio dignitatis), in which he was helped by 
moderately used humour and irony as the most important tools. In the Orator Cicero provides 
theoretical foundations for all the three kinds of style, however, he points out that, in addition 
to its other attributes (avoiding prose rhythm and complex sentence, dropping hiatus, use of 
munditia and elegantia, moderation in applying both ornament and tropes, figures)19 the most 
characteristic trait of simple style is witticism and irony. When using them the orator is to 
make sure that he should not cause irreparable harms; should thrust stings only into his 
enemies; should do that with moderation and not ceaselessly; and should not hurt all of them 
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and not in any way. Regarding temperance to be followed by the orator—and actually 
complied with by Cicero in Pro Murena—Quintilian notes that the orator should not ever 
want to hurt anybody, and especially should not have the slightest intention of being 
compelled to give up a friend rather than a witty remark.1 It is worth observing that Cicero 
behaved in a very similar spirit towards Sulpicius too: he states of Sulpicius expressis verbis 
that owing to his other merits, i.e., self-control, dignity, justness, loyalty and all his other 
merits he has always considered him especially worthy of consul’s and any other dignity,2 and 
and he deems it highly praiseworthy that he has acquired erudition in civil law, kept awake, 
worked a lot, helped many people.3 Ironic remarks are in each case aimed only at 
iurisprudentia.4 In the light of that, we should survey the career of the two competitors, 
Murena defended by Cicero for political reasons and Sulpicius Rufus, the opponent in the 
lawsuit, who otherwise maintained a friendly relation with the orator, and the orator’s relation 
to the field represented by them, res militaris and iurisprudentia.  
Lucius Licinius Murena was born in 105, and fulfilled war service under his father’s 
commandership between 83 and 81 in Asia Minor, and took part in his triumphs too.5 In 75, 
he fulfilled quaestorship together with Sulpicius.6 In 74, with consul L. Lucullus he returned 
to the war against Mithridates ignited again in the meantime.7 In 65, he was again Sulpicius’s 
collega, and as praetor urbanus he had plenty of occasions to become quite popular through 
organising the pompous ludi Apollinares.8 As a propraetor in 64 he was given Gallia 
Narbonensis as his class. The prosecutors reproached him with the newness of his clan,9 but 
Murena was not homo novus in the traditional sense of the word since he was the fourth in the 
row of generations who attained the office of praetor, and this term was used for those whose 
family members had not obtained any of the magistratus curules providing ius imaginum.10 
One of the pillars of his success was his strong financial background proved among others by 
the games organised by him as praetor, and improved by his activity as propraetor in Gallia. 
Also, the current political situation was grist that came to his mill: against the danger Catilina 
was threatening with a well organised combat ready army was required, and among the 
applicants only Murena had such an army.11 No significant acts taken by him are known from 
the period after his consulate. The life work of Servius Sulpicius consisting of one hundred 
and eighty volumes, irrespective of the given political situation and the results of the election, 
properly shows the jurist’s intellectual superiority over Lucius Licinius Murena, who was a 
rather colourless character.12  
The Romans considered war a natural part of life, and were fully aware that they can thank 
their imperium to their military virtue, virtus militartis. So in their mind the craft/art of war, 
res militaris preceded any other activity, and the conditions under which they could be 
exercised were created by the peace won/forced by res militaris. Corpus Ciceronianum, 
however, does not include plenty of loci that express this view: although Cicero 
acknowledges that the glory bequeathed by the ancestors to the people of Rome is present in 
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many things, almost in everything, especially military affairs.1 When praising the statesman’s 
vision and perfect orator’s skills of Cn. Pompey he points out that it is exactly these traits that 
constitute the essence of a commander’s dignity.2 In De officiis he further elaborates the 
traditional Roman view proclaiming the priority of res militaris: it is true, he says, that for a 
young man the best recommendation for glory is given by his war merits,3 but it is necessary 
to review and deny the opinion supported by many which asserts that deeds of war are greater 
and more glorious than deeds of peace—he warns.4 Then, drawing the conclusion he takes the 
the position that if we want to judge properly, we must acknowledge that several deeds of 
peaceful civil life have appeared greater and more excellent than deeds of war.5 Convinced 
and convincingly, he quotes the sentences, which some evil and envious people dare to 
attack,6 proving that brave deeds of peaceful civil life are of not less importance than deeds of 
of war, what is more we must make greater efforts to carry out the former than the later.7  
Servius Sulpicius Rufus came from a patrician clan but his family did not play an important 
part in public life of Rome.8 His grandfather did not attain any significant position in cursus 
honorum, and his father belonged to the order of knights.9 As a young man he pursued studies 
studies just like Cicero; he studied rhetoric in Rhodes. Then, having returned from there he 
turned from elocution to jurisprudence.10 He fulfilled quaestor’s office in Ostia, presumably in 
75,11 in 65, he became praetor and chaired the quaestio peculatus.12 He fulfilled both of the 
offices in the same year as Murena.13 After he acted as praetor he did not accept any province 
but stayed in Rome and continued to act as iuris consultus.14  
As it is known, in 63 he lost the elections. What were the reasons for that? Servius Sulpicius 
did not have proper social background and relations. Cicero notes regarding the orator’s 
activity that with these abilities men without noble origin also won consul’s dignity since they 
had obtained considerable influence, highly strong friendly relations and great support.15 With 
the phrase homines non nobiles Cicero refers to his own career too, which was not 
unprecedented but highly rare as the six hundred consuls of the last three centuries of the 
Republic included only fifteen homines novi.16 
Gratia was sine qua non of Roman public life, which a politician had to have by all means 
among its adherents and the people,17 and was indispensable when obtaining an office.18 
Although today the means of obtaining gratia would be assigned to the scope of corruption,19 
Cicero also clearly distinguished gratia from fraud/bribery.20 Without this strong social 
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intertwining several institutions of Roman law—for example mandatum, negotiorum gestio, 
commodatum—would have become inoperable,1 and if gratia and amicitia had not tied 
leading Roman circles together, then a much greater public administration apparatus would 
have been needed to govern the empire.2 Cicero points out that in jurisprudence none of these 
(gratia, amicitia, studium) can be found.3 It is, of course, questionable to what extent this 
statement can be considered Cicero’s own opinion and to what extent a necessity generated by 
this particular political situation. Beneficentia and liberalitas (just as gratia, amicitia and 
studium referred to in Pro Murena)4 are not purely ethical categories but also tools of success 
in public life.5 Once cultivating jurisprudence had become proper means to achieve that, the 
first men of the State held it in their possession, but in the troublesome present age it has lost 
its shining. The great jurist of the age means Servius Sulpicius Rufus; it is with him that the 
order of knights starts to enter the field of jurisprudence. So the statement that claims that 
jurisprudence does not provide proper background for acting in public was dictated only by 
the given political situation and not by Cicero’s own conviction. Similarly, the statement that 
by no means does a safe path lead from jurisprudence to consulate is only partly true.6 In 63 
the res publica no longer lived in times when jurists often got to the top of cursus honorum. 
On the other hand, until 95 we know of eighteen lawyers who occupied consul’s office 
(Appius Claudius Caecus and Cornelius Scipio Nasica even twice); the twenty consulates so 
produced took place between 201—95.7 The next year after 95 in which the consul’s office 
was fulfilled by a jurist was 51, and the jurist was Servius Sulpicius Rufus.8 
Sulpicius’s failure in 63 was due to personal reasons too. Not being a quite determinant 
character he saw his competitors’ initial success, gave up fighting too early, and instead of 
working hard to achieve his own victory, he made efforts to come up with charges against the 
would-be winners.9 This tactics—in view of Murena’s popularity based on his activity as 
praetor, and the general fear from Catilina—as it were predestined Sulpicius to lose. 
When in 51—winning over Cato, who fought on his side in 6310—he finally attained 
consulate, he was not able to take firm and determinant actions in that highly stormy period.11 
He died in 43 as an intermediary of peace in the civil war flaring up. Cicero highly 
acknowledged the merits of Servius Sulpicius both in his life,12 and after his death13—he did 
not doubt his personal excellence in the Pro Murena either.14 He demanded public funeral 
ceremony and the erection of his statue before the rostra; both acts of paying last honours 
took place as Cicero requested.15 
Servius Sulpicius’s jurist activity deserved to be praised by Cicero since his life work was 
quite extensive and composite. He bequeathed a responsum collection consisting of one 
hundred and eighty books,16 which was made public by his disciples, Aufidius Namusa17 and 
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Alfenus Varus,1 and he is noted for the creation of three new genres. He was the one among 
the lawyers of the age of the Republic on whom the influence produced by Greek philosophy 
was the most manifest.2 His achievement in establishing a school is characterised by the fact 
that ten of his disciples are known.3 Cicero himself praised this method applied by Servius 
when walking on new roads in jurisprudence surpassing his predecessors,4 and pointed out 
that through his philosophical education he was able to create a coherent system often missed 
by Cicero from earlier jurisprudence.  
In the analysis of Cicero’s relation to jurisprudence we should dispense with the description 
of the literature of the subject area of Cicero iuris consultus, now accumulated to an immense 
extent. Following the system of Gábor Hamza’s5 analysis it seems to be more appropriate to 
look for an answer in the mirror of the sources to the question what role Cicero meant to 
assign to legal knowledge, jurisprudence in his own activity, rhetorical training and steering 
the ship of State. 
In his letter written to iuris consulti, citing examples of the technical elements of 
jurisprudence he uses the terms vos soletis6 and in vestris libris,7 i.e., clearly separates himself 
himself from those who pursue this craft in practice. It is with reason to attribute similar 
meaning to the phrases used in Topica—offered to and created at the urging of Trebatius8—in 
in vestris actionibus,9 and vestris mysteriis in Pro Murena,10 vestris formulis atque 
actionibus11 and vestrae exercitationi.12 Likewise, he proudly cites Gallus’s statement that the 
given topic is subject not to law but to the field of Cicero.13 In Digest several references are 
made to Cicero. In the fragments of Pomponius’s Enchiridion Cicero is quoted primarily as 
exemplum,14 and his sentences are of rhetorical-political weight rather than having legal 
auctoritas.15 In Digest one can find quotations from non-legal authors at several points;16 e.g., 
in Marcianus17 and Pomponius.18 Apart from Enchiridion, Cicero is quoted in Digest at four 
points,19 regarding each legal case in the aforesaid spirit. So these references do not prove that 
classic iuris consulti considered Cicero a collega.20 
All this, however, does not justify to handle Cicero as an alien body in jurisprudence, or to 
consider jurisprudence a field basically far from Cicero since the opinion. “Nihil hoc ad ius; 
ad Ciceronem” was indeed shared only by iuris consulti, and emphasises no more than 
pursuing law in practice, in the technical sense was alien to Cicero. Legal practice is, 
however, only one branch of iurisprudentia, its usefulness in everyday life does not provide 
evidence of its primate in an absolute sense. It is a fact, on the other hand, that during his 
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whole life Cicero maintained a quite close relation with those who pursued jurisprudence in 
practice. He considered the two Scaevolae, the augur and the pontifex as two of his masters. 
In Laelius de amicitia he gives an account that after he had put on toga virilis, his father took 
him to Mucius Scaevola, the augur, and from then on he never leaved his side; then, after his 
death he went to pontifex Scaevola, whom he calls one of the most talented and most diligent 
men of the Roman State.1  
Furthermore, it is worth surveying what role or significance Cicero attributed to legal 
knowledge in orators’ training. In Cicero’s values eloquence definitely preceded 
jurisprudence, which is quite obvious from the statement he made regarding Servius Sulpicius 
Rufus that he wanted to be the first in the second science rather than the second in the first;2 
that is why he elected to pursue eloquence instead of jurisprudence. The field of jurisprudence 
is narrower than that of elocution, and due to its nature elocution is subtler than jurisprudence 
since a iuris consultus can act successfully without any knowledge of ars oratoria, but an 
orator cannot do without certain legal knowledge. Thus, orators’ training must include legal 
studies,3 as an orator—and specifically a perfectus orator defined in De oratore—may not 
despise any science since they are all associates and servants of an orator’s speech.4 
This formulation of this conclusion Cicero puts in the mouth of Crassus, his master, one of the 
protagonists of the dialogue in De oratore.5 He emphatically underlines the use of legal 
knowledge in the later stages of the dialogue too. In particular, by asserting that people would 
need to undertake the burden of studying, even if understanding law were a great and hard 
task, because of the great benefit that they can win by acquiring it, but in his view there is no 
science that could be more easily acquired than jurisprudence.6 In Brutus, when praising his 
only worthy, at that time already dead, opponent, colleague, Hortensius, Cicero underlines his 
legal knowledge;7 and in Pro L. Valerio Flacco he makes his opponent, who is not well 
versed in law, the target of scathing irony.8 Furthermore, he points out that for him—contrary 
to most of the orators—the knowledge of ius civile had always been very important.9 
As a summary of studiorum atque artium contentio it is possible to quote Quintilian’s opinion 
on the entire Pro Murena when he praises Cicero’s procedure stating that, albeit, he 
acknowledged all the merits of Sulpicius and praised him, yet advised him not to apply for the 
consulate.10 Cicero takes the edge of Sulpicius’s and Cato’s charges by the weapons of 
humour and irony. While doing so, to increase the comic effect aimed against lawyers he 
often uses Grecisms, proverbs, terms taken from legal jargon, quotations from (legis actio) 
procedure, and adds comments in standard language, in a chattering tone to them. On the 
contrary, when he turns to res militaris and eloquence, his style becomes ceremonially high-
flown. It is, however, quite apparent that a considerable part of his statements are rhetorical 
topoi, repetition of widespread critical comments regarding a specific occupational group (in 
this case lawyers)—of which several comments are made as righteous criticism. Praise is 
always addressed to the given person, Sulpicius, whereas carping affects only his occupation. 
In Pro Murena Cicero does not deny the general importance of jurisprudence and the law as a 
system of norms, the importance of the role they play in the life of the public and the State, 
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but makes a (successful) attempt in a given—and as we have seen highly critical—political 
situation to avoid the Scylla of the condemnation of Murena and by that the flaring up of 
Catilina’s plot and the Charybdis of insulting alienation from his dear friend, Sulpicius. 
Throughout the speech he refrains from shaking the bases of law and order; his criticism 
remains on the surface; and this criticism—just as the praising of res militaris—is not 
inevitably Cicero’s own conviction but merely a necessity dictated by the oratorical situation. 
 
III. Cnaeus Plancius came from a family in the order of knights; he was born presumably in 
96 as the son of an honourable and wealthy publican (tax farmer). After he acted as military 
tribune and quaestor, he applied for aedil’s office in 55, running together with Iuventius 
Laterensis, somewhat younger than him, as his opponent. At that time, he won the majority of 
the votes cast; however, the election was postponed, and was repeated in the following year.1 
Plancius and A. Plotius won, Laterensis and Q. Pedius—the latter obtained very few votes—
lost the election.2 Laterensis did what many people did in such a case in Rome: he brought a 
charge of ambitus, i.e., election fraud/bribery against Plancius. Beside Laterensis, L. Cassius 
Longinus, brother of one of Caesar’s later assassins, acted as co- or secondary accuser; the 
defence was provided by Hortensius and Cicero. As the basis of the charge he did not choose 
lex Tullia de ambitu created in 63 during the period of Cicero’s consulship but lex Licinia de 
sodaliciis created in 55 on Crassus’s initiative to sanction use of associations set up for 
distributing bribes during election campaigns. This law seemed to be more favourable to the 
prosecutor not because of its sanction—since earlier laws held out the prospect of properly 
strict punishment: ten year exile, expulsion from the senate, being barred from applying for 
offices for life and a certain fine—but because of its procedural law aspect. For, in accordance 
with this law, the prosecutor could determine the four tribus from whom the judges had to be 
selected and the accused could refuse only one tribus, that is, his right of reiectio—right to 
refer to bias and to expel certain judges without any special reason—was considerably 
impaired compared to usual quaestio proceedings. In the procedure, actually used in practice, 
first the accused had to name the judges whom he was related to by marriage and kinship or 
confidential relation as a member of the same sodalicium or collegium, in twenty days. Then, 
the prosecutor selected one hundred from among the four hundred and fifty judges (editio), 
who were not allowed to maintain the above-mentioned relations with the prosecutor; after 
that, as part of his right of reiectio, the accused was allowed to reject fifty from among the 
designated one hundred judges, within forty days.3 
Since it evolved in relation to winning the office of aedil and not consul, the lawsuit did not 
have great political significance; however, Cicero had to cope with a rather critical situation 
due to his personal relations with the accused and the accuser4 because both Plancius and 
Laterensis and his family did significant services and favours to him during his exile.5 As he 
was more indebted to Plancius, whom he had supported during his election campaign already, 
due to the outstanding officium to him he had to undertake his defence.6 Laterensis obviously 
took it in bad part,7 and tried to lessen Plancius’s services done to and merits obtained 
regarding Cicero.8 It was not by chance that Cicero noted at the beginning of his speech that 
he hoped that in passing judgment the judges would appreciate the merits that Plancius 
obtained with regard to the one-time consul, all the more because the court of justice 
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consisted of mostly Cicero’s friends and good acquaintances, which gave hopes for the 
acquittal of the accused from the first;1 it was just their emotions that the orator wanted to 
move in his2 peroratio formulated with huge pathos as usual. 
 
IV. To the best of our knowledge, Cicero acted as counsel for the defence at least on eight 
occasions in criminal actions due to ambitus, however, not all the speeches were published 
and only two of them have been left to us: the oratio delivered in 63 in defence of Lucius 
Licinius Murena elected consul and Cnaeus Plancius elected aedil in 54. It is striking in both 
lawsuits that Cicero deals with the state of facts of ambitus and tries to refute the allegations 
made by the prosecution in merely one-fourth3 and one-fifth4—or, in the latter case, stricto 
sensu, one-twentieth5—of the oratio. This similarity allows to infer that what we have here is 
a rhetorical tactics independent of the specific case, which the judges and the audience 
actually expected the advocate to come up with in ambitus lawsuits.6 It might also arouse the 
attention that in both speeches Cicero speaks about himself at length, which is not justified by 
the legal facts of the case at all. The explanation for this is found in the practice of Roman 
orators/advocates as in Rome it was not only his rhetorical competence but his entire authority 
that an advocate or a patron made available to the accused or client brought before court and 
thereby guaranteed the authenticity of the case undertaken and the person defended, by full 
weight of his personality to the judges—what is more, he identified himself with his acts and 
fate.7 Accordingly, the opponent, as a matter of fact, worked towards attacking and shaking 
the authenticity of both the accused and his defending counsel; therefore, in the two particular 
cases the prosecution considered it necessary to speak exhaustively about Cicero too. This 
custom can be seen again, for example, in Pro Cluentio8 and is explained in De oratore.9 
In Pro Murena, the orator feels it necessary in the prooemium already to respond to 
reproaches against him for having undertaken the case at all.10 As one of the four accusers, 
beside Servius Sulpicius Rufus, who lost the elections, and S. Sulpicius Rufus junior and C. 
Postumius, not known specifically, M. Porcius Cato—who took an oath in public before the 
elections that if the election would be won by any other person than his brother-in-law, 
Silanus, he would bring a charge of ambitus against him11—criticised Cicero (although as a 
consul he created lex Tullia de ambitu12 which held out the prospect of ten year exile as a new 
punishment and took firmer action against those who distributed money) for having 
undertaken the defence of Murena charged of election bribery. Cicero was highly criticised 
also by Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the most significant jurist of the age, who considered 
Murena’s defence a betrayal of their friendship. All this was meant to undermine the 
authenticity of Cicero as a defending counsel, which would have weakened his defendant’s 
position too.13 
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In Pro Plancio, Cicero notes that in their statement for the prosecution M. Iuventius 
Laterensis and L. Cassius Longinus spoke more about him than about Plancius;1 accordingly, 
in the third third of his speech Cicero discusses solely his own person and the services and 
favours done to him by Plancius.2 Several allegations of the prosecutors were involved in the 
statement of the defence in the form of remarks; for example, the allegation that in the 
description of his own exile Cicero went too far in praising Plancius’s merits.3 The merits 
obtained by the accused with regard to the defending counsel are described in details not only 
in Pro Plancio:4 Pro Sestio also contains longer arguments with such content.5 Obviously, the 
the prosecutors’ intention must have been to separate Plancius completely from the judges’ 
sympathy towards Cicero owing to his exile, that is why Laterensis insisted on his allegation 
that the merits Plancius had obtained regarding Cicero’s exile—if they were true at all—
should not have any weight in the Judges’ eyes.6 In harmony with that, the prosecutors 
recalled scornfully that Cicero had begged in tears to the judges in vain in defence of Cispius, 
who also did several services to him.7 
The rather trivial commonplaces brought up as argument by Laterensis included the point that 
Cicero had earlier as a consul caused to involve exile in the sanctions ordered by lex Tullia de 
ambitu for no other reason than to be able to make the peroratio of his defence speeches more 
efficient.8 Also, he reproaches the orator for his years of study on Rhodes in order to point out 
out that the moral looseness of eastern provinces must have been dear to Cicero.9 It is rather 
double-edged criticism by the prosecutor that Cicero failed to exploit the point inherent in 
Laterensis’s stay on Crete: the play on the words island and chalk (creta).10 For applicants for 
offices made their clothes more shining and white by chalk, which was prohibited by law very 
early, in 432.11 Furthermore, he condemns Cicero for addressing a letter on his consulate to 
Pompey, the commander, probably with unpleasant content, highly stressing his own merits, 
which circulated in Rome—we have no further information on its content as it has not been 
left to us.12 Similarly, he criticises Cicero’s decision that he had gone into exile instead of 
undertaking fight—attributing all this to Cicero’s cowardice.13 He does not omit to emphasise 
that Cicero is not acting by free will at the time when the speech is delivered either—
suggesting dependence on Pompey.14 All this, although has nothing to do with the facts of the 
case, served to undermine the authority of the defending counsel and thereby the authority of 
his defendant.15 
The personal motivation of the prosecution is clear since in Rome a prosecutor did not have to 
be objective and unbiased at all.16 In the charge of ambitus the accusers who had lost the 
elections might have been driven by the motive that if the accused elected for the given office 
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were convicted, they could take their place1 as it did happen in 65 in the case of L. Aurelius 
Cotta and T. Manilius Torquatus after P. Cornelius Sulla and P. Autronius Paetus elected 
consul had been convicted. There were good chances for Servius Suplicius Rufus and Marcus 
Iuventius Laterensis hoping for the same in the event that Murena and Plancius were 
convicted. Anyone who decided to bring a charge, as a matter of fact, exposed himself to 
personal attack by the defending counsel.2 It was not by chance that Torquatus referred to 
Cicero’s tyranny and autocracy (regnum) in court of justice in the lawsuit against Sulla3 as 
Cicero was not sparing with attacks against the prosecutor, tribune L. Labienus in Pro Rabirio 
perduellionis.4 
The attacks against Cicero were of great weight in the Plancius lawsuit and in several cases 
hit Cicero in sensitive points: Cassius brought up Cicero’s attempt at entering into alliance 
with Pompey, which, however, failed,5 Iuventius reproached Cicero for undertaking Cispius’s 
Cispius’s defence, and in connection with that he parodied the famous “quo usquem tandem” 
passage6 of the first Catilinarian oration;7 similarly, they ridiculed his pathetic perorations.8 
perorations.8 All this, however, was dwarfed by their suspecting him of leaving Rome in 58 
and going into exile out of cowardice and sacrificing his freedom to flatter the triumvirs—the 
orator responded to it in natural and deep indignation.9 Briefly but resolutely, he attacked his 
enemies at the time, Clodius, Gabinius and Piso.10 
Furthermore, in both lawsuits against Murena and Plancius, Cicero had to cope with the 
difficulty that the adverse parties in the lawsuit, that is, the prosecutors, were his good friends. 
He supported Sulpicius in his election struggles, and maintained relations with Labienus’s 
family since his exile, however, Murena’s acquittal was definitely in the interest of the State 
because that was the only way to ensure that at the beginning of the year two dynamic consuls 
could take over control over the state organisation undermined by the conspiracy, and it is an 
undeniable fact that Plancius did much greater service to Cicero by providing him with shelter 
in Thessaloniki than Labienus’s family. Therefore, the orator could not use the well-tried 
strategy of stressing his defendant’s merits by dealing the opponent a devastating blow; 
instead, he had to find some middle-of-the-road solution by which he could both clear the 
accused and was not compelled to start a serious attack against the prosecutor.11 It was not by 
chance that Quintilian noted that in Pro Murena Cicero acknowledged Sulpicius’s all virtues 
and although he praised him, he advised him not to apply for consulate.12  
The fundamentum ac robur totius accusationis,13 that is, the attack against Cato was justified 
just by the unquestionableness of his motifs and singular authority. It was just this authority 
that made the senators at the session of the senate held a few days after Pro Murena was 
delivered, on 5 December 63, in the Concordia temple14 join what Cicero summed up in the 
fourth Catilinarian oration, in opposition to Caesar, who proposed life imprisonment of the 
conspirators,15 after Cato had also demanded death penalty for the traitors,1 which was 
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executed that evening in Tullianum. It was just this that Cicero tries to defend against in his 
ironic attack against Cato’s cold stoicism so that the statesman’s unbelievable authority, that 
is, purely his name should not be detrimental to the accused.2 Acknowledging Cato’s moral 
greatness, he endeavours to present his standpoint taken in the particular matter as a trait alien 
to life, alien to the spirit of Roman people in order to take the edge of the charge and ruin the 
image in the judges that anyone Cato has resolved to bring a charge against must be by all 
means guilty.3 It is not by chance that the edited version of Pro Murena left to us does not 
contain detailed refutation of the charges made by Servius Sulpicius junior and Postumus—as 
the arguments brought up by them were not backed by moral authority similar to that of Cato, 
Cicero was not compelled to take the sting out of their argument by delicate shading.4 
In legal terms, it does not belong to the charge and its refutation either to compare the life and 
activity of the competitors, having lost in the election struggle, acting as accusers in the 
ambitus lawsuit, to that of the winners of the election, the accused parties of the lawsuit. 
Cicero, however, in response to the allegations of the prosecution, touches on the conduct of 
life of the accused parties (reprehensio vitae),5 the comparison of the eligibility, authority and 
worthiness of the office of the accused parties having won and the accusers having lost in the 
elections (contentio dignitatis).6 Only after that does he deal with the crime of election 
bribery/fraud rather briefly and try to refute the relevant charges (crimina ambitus)—in the 
case of Pro Murena, also by inserting, before the fact-based, yet rather taciturn and not really 
convincing refutation,7 the response to the motifs of the charges brought up by Cato.8 
The examination of the conduct of life of the accused parties (vita anteacta) is of a highly 
critical tone in the statement of the prosecution in both cases. Cato reproached Murena for his 
stay in Asia and the presumption that he took pleasure in eastern luxury,9 his sympathy for 
dancing, which was not worthy of a free Roman citizen in the eyes of the Romans10—
however, none of these criticisms was connected with the crime of ambitus. The prosecutors 
reproached Plancius for the charge of bigamy, ravishing an actress, Atinia,11 releasing a 
prisoner from prison unlawfully12 and the too resolute action taken by his father, Plancius 
senior for the sake of publicans (publicani).13 These allegations were not connected either 
directly or indirectly with the actual charge, ambitus. However, accumulation of charges not 
supported by facts—more exactly, as Cicero often stressed it: abusive language and 
defamation—was general practice in any lawsuit, not just ambitus lawsuits, as a tool of 
influencing the climate of opinion against the accused.14 
In ambitus lawsuits it was traditional to compare the competitors’ dignity, eligibility for office 
(contentio dignitatis) both by the prosecution and the defence. In Pro Murena this constitutes 
a rather lengthy, independent part;15 in Pro Plancio—referring to the sensitivity of just the 
accuser, Laterensis16—Cicero rejects the use of this tool;1 later on, however, albeit, 
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emphatically in response to Crassus’s counts of the indictment, he uses them anyway.2 By all 
that, the defending counsel tries to achieve a double result: on the one hand, he wants to prove 
his defendant’s high eligibility for the office to be filled; on the other hand, he explains the 
causes of his election victory. Simultaneously, he gives explanation for the accuser’s election 
defeat, arguing that it was due to the defeated party’s fault and not to his defendant’s acts, 
even less to possible bribe.3 Accordingly, in the part of Pro Murena that can be called 
contentio dignitatis, discussion of Sulpicius’s defeat was given an important place too,4 and in 
Pro Plancio it is after the seeming rejection of the opportunity of contentio5 that the orator 
comes to Laterensis’s election defeat on two occasions.6 The structure of contentio is identical 
in both speeches: Cicero discusses the career of the competitors in chronological order.7 
In Pro Murena, in response to Sulpicius’s argument that he outdoes Murena in social 
background, the orator underlines the significance of individual achievements,8 and to the fact 
that he was announced first in the election of the quaestor he opposes the point that what must 
and can be investigated on the merits is nothing else than the achievements attained in office 
filled in the same year—and in this respect none of them excelled.9 In response to Suplicius’s 
argument that he would have been more worthy of consul’s office because he stayed in Rome 
from first to last, while Murena stayed in the east as commander, Cicero points out that it is 
not presence but merits that count.10 At this point, in studiorum atque artium contentio, the 
orator opposes soldier’s activity to lawyer’s activity and involves the art of rhetoric as a third 
element in the comparison, and this way jurisprudence as a profession dealing with 
unnecessarily overcomplicated, insignificant matters is given the third place only.11 Praise of 
res militaris is a response to Cato’s criticism that Murena’s merits as commander are 
insignificant, if for no other reason, because the war in Asia was fought against women and 
not men.12 Cicero beats off the argument of victory obtained in the first place in the election 
of praetors by the topos of the unpredictableness of public opinion,13 and underlines the 
magnificence of the games arranged by Murena, and opposes it to the fact that Sulpicius had 
not arranged any.14 
Furthermore, Cicero emphasises that the electors appreciated Murena’s role fulfilled in 
administration of justice, contrary to the severity engaged by Sulpicius in this respect, which 
arose from the nature of the field he controlled, and that the commander’s activity in the 
provinces also provided him with great support, whereas the jurist was not willing to assume 
any task outside Rome.15 After discussing the causes of Murena’s victory, he comes to the 
direct causes of Sulpicius’s defeat. Electors clearly noticed that Sulpicius did not strive for 
winning the elections in the first place, instead, he dealt with the opportunity of bringing a 
charge in case he would lose and collecting evidence against his rivals, which suggested that 
he did not see many chances for victory.16 Furthermore, he fought for making lex Calpurnia, 
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which sanctioned ambitus, stricter, and in this effort he was supported by Cicero as consul 
and friend by creating lex Tullia de ambitu—yet, this had not made him sympathetic to 
electors either.1 Finally, the critical political situation, i.e., general fear of Catilina’s possible 
victory, favoured Murena, whom citizens considered a firm support against threatening 
danger, while they did not presume that the anxious and hesitating Sulpicius would take such 
a firm action.2 To sum it up: Cicero took the position that Murena’s victory arose from his 
own excellence and the faults made by his rival, Sulpicius but by no means from unlawful 
practices and bribery.3 
In the Plancius lawsuit Cassius criticised and condemned Cicero’s defendant,4 while he 
appreciated Laterensis’s merits and competencies.5 Whereas the opponent underlined 
Laterensis’s nobilitas and deemed him worthy of the aedil’s office owing to his social 
background, Cicero (just as Plancius in Murena’s lawsuit) emphasised individual virtus, 
merits, aptitude in the case of homo novus.6 A homo novus, in other words, a person whose 
ancestors did not get higher offices (cursus honorum), was in certain respects in a 
disadvantageous position in the struggle for winning given offices compared to the members 
of the nobility because the latter could proudly refer to their ancestors’ deeds carried out for 
the benefit and greatness of the people of Rome. The homines novi who achieved the highest 
degree of public dignity, in several cases—as it can be observed in the example of Cato the 
Elder or Cicero—followed ancient ideals more consistently and, one should say, with 
neophyte enthusiasm. Prior to Cicero, it was in 94 when a homo novus, more specifically, C. 
Coelius Caldus, was elected consul. At the same time, Cicero—in order to win the people’s 
support and make advantage out of disadvantage—voiced the rather populist view that 
members of the nobility handled the consul’s office as their own privilege, and proudly 
emphasised his own merits, by which he was able to get the highest dignity of the State even 
against the nobility.7 
Anyway, regarding Laterensis he used the tools of humanitas and urbanitas as the accuser did 
not belong to his personal enemies.8 In the case of Plancius, Cassius challenged lack of 
triumphuses, military achievements, rhetorical and jurist competencies—that is, there are 
good chances that he used the arguments that Cicero formulated in Pro Murena with regard to 
various professions. In response, Cicero as defending counsel expounded that the opportunity 
of triumphs would become available, for that matter, through holding given offices, and that 
by his activity on Crete and in Macedonia he did prove his military aptitude, and that he had 
never claimed to have knowledge obtained in rhetoric and jurisprudence, instead, he could 
show prominence in character, which was much more appreciated by the people of Rome than 
professional knowledge.9 At the same time, Cicero lessens the weight of Laterensis’s merits 
obtained in Cyrene also to his detriment by an ironical dialogue narrated in relation to his 
activity as proquaestor in Sicily, with the morals that Laterensis would believe in vain that he 
had carried out significant deeds in remote provinces, the public might have not even heard of 
his being away from Rome.10 
To take care of the sensitivity of the opponent who otherwise maintained good relations with 
him, Cicero discusses the reasons for Laterensis’s election defeat separately from contentio 
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dignitatis,1 and gets down with it primarily by the topos of the unpredictableness of public 
opinion and unreliability of public judgment.2 The tricks of winning mercy of the people were 
were discussed in details by his brother, Quintus in Commentariolum petitionis where he 
expounded that applicants should formulate what they have got to say in accordance with 
electors’ desires and needs rather than their own conviction, and pointed out that promises 
made kindly are more important than keeping such promises.3 Apparently, it was just this that 
that Plancius forgot about, and before the court of justice consisting of senators and knights 
Cicero could safely refer to the shaky and unreliable value judgment of the people,4 and, to 
completely reduce the edge of the attack against Laterensis, he declared that if the people had 
had firm conviction, had orientated themselves in terms of merits and values in forming their 
opinion, then they would have elected Laterensis aedil.5 
The people blamed Laterensis for not making efforts to win their favour and for relying on the 
advantages provided by his social background only in winning the election.6 Similarly, giving 
giving up the fight for tribune’s office already commenced in 59 was to his detriment because 
the public considered it indifference,7 and asserting his high-born origin might have evoked 
antipathy instead of sympathy in the plebs.8 Later on, Cicero returns again to the thought that 
Laterensis’s defeat was caused by lack of humbleness to be engaged to the mercy of the 
people (supplicare, se submittere).9 The consequences of Laterensis’s faults were increased 
by the circumstances that supported Plancius: the support of his home town,10 the 
commitment of publicans ranged on his side by his father, the leader of the publicans,11 and 
Cicero’s help, who thereby thanked Plancius for the favours he had done to him during his 
exile.12 Furthermore, his activity in Africa, on Crete and in Macedonia,13 and his successful 
tribune’s activity was in favour of Plancius.14 
It should be noted with regard to publicans that they made it possible that state administration 
with a low headcount had to be maintained in Rome because well-to-do publicani, most often 
from the order of knights, constituted a company for the economic implementation of 
important goals in the life of the State (for example, construction of water pipes, providing the 
army with arms). The late age of the Republic used the terms knights and publicans often as 
synonyms; however, overlapping between the two categories by no means meant identity: 
some publicans had assets between forty thousand and one hundred thousand sestertii, while 
the extent of knights’ census was set as four hundred thousand sestertii. In the company of 
publicans the members assumed burdens and shared benefits in proportion to their share; the 
most propertied were accountable to the State for implementing the enterprise usually by their 
landed estate; on behalf of the State the magistrate entered into a contract with them. The key 
task of publicans was their role assumed in taxation in the provinces: they paid the amount of 
tax determined for the given province to the state treasury in advance, and on the leased 
territory during the lease period they could freely collect the amount they had paid in advance. 
The governors, as a matter of fact, often abused their position and imposed unlawful burdens 
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on provinces; so, inhabitants were compelled to take out loans from publicans, who usually 
disbursed the amount demanded at usurious interest rates. Accordingly, judgement of 
publicans was disputed; in his letter to his brother—as a matter of fact, in a statement not 
addressed to the general public—Cicero himself called them the greatest burden of provincial 
administration.1 In several cases publicans supported the election of persons favourable to 
them by covering a major part of their campaign costs—it was not by chance that Cicero’s 
brother, Quintus tried to convince him that he should win publicans’ benevolence to support 
his own consul campaign.2 Cicero called publicans the flower of the order of knights of 
Rome,3 the knights themselves strong support of the rest of the orders.4 C. Gracchus already 
relied on knights actually as an order, and entrusted Asia province to them as publicans. 
In Pro Plancio a peculiar element of contentio dignitatis is the projection of the personality of 
the two candidates to their hometown, Tusculum in the case of Laterensis and Atina in the 
case of Plancius. Tusculum was a distinguished settlement south-east of Rome, where several 
consuls’ families came from. Therefore, it is understandable that the inhabitants of 
Tusculum—as numerous men who had held consulship lived in the town—did not attribute 
special significance to Laterensis’s aedil’s office; consequently, they did not make many 
efforts to help him to win the desired office. Atina, lying not far from Cicero’s hometown, 
Arpinum, was far from being so respectful and notable; so, its inhabitants made more efforts 
to help one of the citizens born at their settlement to win the aedil’s office since thus glory fell 
on them too, which the inhabitants of Tusculum had plenty of.5 
Therefore, by contentio dignitatis Cicero tried to shed light primarily on the fact in both 
speeches—by analysing both the virtues and strengths of the winner/accused and the faults 
and failures of the loser/accuser—that his defendants had not been in need at all of trying to 
influence the outcome of the election by bribery as there were sufficient arguments that made 
them sure of their victory. Thereby he indirectly proved that the charge of ambitus was 
unfounded. Secondly, however, contentio dignitatis served to enable him to prove to the 
judges, as public opinion representing electors, that the winner of the election was by all 
means more suitable for the given office than his opponent—the enumeration of faults and 
failures committed during the election campaign was also meant to support the above as 
reasons for the train of thoughts that a person who controls his election campaign with more 
aptitude will hold the office more efficiently. Based on all that it can be inferred that the 
orator wanted to convince the judges also of the point that not only should the winner be 
acquitted for lack of crime but the results of the elections should not be invalidated due to the 
person’s eligibility and the accuser’s ineligibility either.6 
Refutation of the charge of ambitus on the merits is very short, almost insufficiently concise 
in both speeches.7 The reason for that can be looked for, on the one hand, in the fact that from 
from both lawsuits only Cicero’s speeches have been left to us, so neither the statements of 
the prosecution, nor the rest of defence speeches are known to us, and as in both lawsuits 
Cicero rose to speak as the last one as was his custom, we could presume that the defending 
counsels taking the floor before him had already refuted the legally relevant counts of the 
indictment on the merits of the case, point by point. At the same time, it can be presumed that 
Cicero would have somehow referred or alluded to these refutations—however, no traces of 
that can be found. It is highly probable that both the prosecution and the defence set out from 
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arguments related to person, and counts of the indictment that could be specifically supported 
and refuted did not play any considerable part—if for nothing else, due to the low number of 
proofs arising from the character of the cases. Defending counsels much rather tried to 
prove—all the more because the dividing line between ambitus sanctioned by law and morally 
contestable and legally acceptable ambitio could not be sharply drawn—that in the course of 
winning the electors’ favours no scandalous, exaggerating steps contrary to traditions and 
customs were taken.1 Due to the indistinct dividing line between ambitus and ambitio we can 
possibly accept Wilhelm Kroll’s statement that these Ciceronian speeches can be considered, 
for that matter, praise of properly and moderately exercised ambitus too.2 
In Pro Murena Cicero argued that whereas Cato disapproved any kind of search for electors’ 
favours, that is, entourage, hospitality and distribution of free tickets to circus and theatre 
performances, Murena, in the course of all these steps, took care of complying with and 
respecting generally accepted customs to sufficient extent: he recruited entourage not for 
money and theatre seats and feasts were made possible by his friends’ generosity, which was 
not prohibited by law or unwritten law either.3 In Pro Plancio he could simply respond to the 
charge that Plancius entered into coitio, that is, alliance allowed by law with the other winning 
candidate, Plotius: originally it was Laterensis who wanted to enter into alliance with 
Plancius, however, it failed. At this point, it is possible to presume the cause behind the 
argument of the prosecution: it was not Laterensis that the agreement set out in the coitio 
favoured.4 The circumstances of distributing money in Circus Flaminius, the origin and 
function of the money could not be determined exactly and could not be proved, so this 
charge seemed to be weightless too5—at least in Cicero’s narrative. And for lack of proper 
evidence, Cicero could easily consider all the other statements gossip and defamation.6 
Thus, based on all that, Plancius did not amount to the state of facts of lex Licinia, and 
demanding the application of this law was nothing else than a bad faith manoeuvre from the 
first by the prosecution to make the situation of the accused more difficult.7 The provision of 
lex Licinia that set forth that the prosecution could designate four tribus, of which the judges 
were selected, was used by Laterensis contrary to the spirit of the law,8 since he left out just 
the Voltinia district where bribes had purportedly taken place, and whose judges for this 
reason could have judged the case with greater overview—Cicero’s above opinion was 
obviously shared by Hortensius too, who expounded it in his own defence speech on the day 
before Cicero’s oration was delivered.9 It was undoubtedly impossible to prove Plancius 
guilty of communis ambitus because this would have required to certify that distribution of 
money was carried out in an organised form, directly launched by the candidate—in other 
words, gratia and observantia of allowed extent only helped Plancius on the side of his 
friends and supporters.10 
Basically, Pro Murena and Pro Plancio are made of identical elements, although the elements 
are arranged somewhat differently. Both the prosecution criticises the defending counsel, 
Cicero and Cicero resolutely criticises and attacks the accusers, Cato, Suplicius and 
Laterensis, not sparing sarcasm. On the one hand, the prosecution endeavours to make the 
person of the accused, having won the elections, inauthentic during reprehensio vitae, and 
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thereby support the necessity of ambitus. On the other hand, the defence tries to prove 
ineligibility of the defeated accuser through contentio dignitatis to convince the judges 
thereby that the losing party can reproach nobody else than himself for his defeat, and for this 
reason the winner had not only not committed any fraud or bribery during the election 
campaign, but he was not in need of it either. It clearly explains this tactics when we consider 
that in case the winner was convicted, then the loser placed behind obtained the office that 
constituted the subject of the dispute; that is, if the counts of the indictment proved true, it 
guaranteed, in addition to conviction and punishment of the accused, that the accuser, having 
lost the elections, could win the office not obtained by votes. The fact-based refutation of 
crimina ambitus crowned this argument only but had no exclusive value for the outcome of 
the lawsuit, all the less as the judgment in the action-at-law unambiguously contained a 
political decision too. The jurors voted not only on guilt and innocence but on the fate of the 
office to be fulfilled; therefore, their vote was influenced, in addition to the case of ambitus, 
by their conviction developed of the eligibility of the accuser and the accused, that is, the 
parties opposed as competitors in the election struggle.1 
In both cases the orator builds his statement by combining these elements in accordance with 
the circumstances. In the prooemium of Pro Murena he immediately responds to the 
objections of the prosecution that are aimed at Cicero undertaking the defending counsel’s 
tasks as a consul in office and thereby betraying his friendship maintained with Sulpicius,2 
and in the peroratio he uses the dignity of his office as a weapon that can be used for the sake 
of his defendant.3 Before addressing specific charges, he believes it is useful to convince the 
judges that Murena’s conduct of life is irreproachable and he is eligible for the office,4 which 
he emphasises in a lengthy contentio dignitatis in an enlarged form by stressing Murena’s 
merits and questioning Sulpicius’s aptitude, and by underlining the faults and failures made 
by him during the election campaign.5 The attack against Cato, cast in humorous form, takes 
the edge of the charges, by which he presents the objections brought up against Murena as the 
outcome of the philosopher-statesman’s too anxious conscience and approach alien to life.6 
Emphasis of the imminence by Catilina—which Suplicius, otherwise having excellent traits 
and values deserving acknowledgement by all means from a human viewpoint, would not be 
able to efficiently oppose—reinforces Murena’s position. So, Cicero as a consul defends his 
elected successor in office—as the verdict of acquittal shows—successfully, and the defence 
rests on three pillars: Murena’s aptitude, Sulpicius’s ineligibility and failures, and realistic 
recognition of the dangers of the situation in current politics. 
In Plancius’s lawsuit the prosecution also started a co-ordinated attack against the counsel for 
the defence and former consul, Cicero because the accusers believed that they could achieve 
their goal against Plancius only by weakening Cicero. Accordingly, Cicero highlights 
Plancius’s merits and services by which he supported him during his exile, in the prooemium 
already, and builds the entire third part of the speech: the refutation of the charges made by 
Cassius7 and Laterensis8 and the peroratio9 on them. Thus, the significance of the identity of 
of the defending counsel far surpasses that of his defendant in this case too, and it can be 
stated that Plancius’s acquittal was owing almost exclusively to Cicero’s moral weight, 
independently of the acts and failures of the accused. From among contentio dignitatis and 
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exploration of the causes of Laterensis’s election defeat, first, the second element appears,1 on 
on the one hand, to take care of Laterensis’s sensitivity, and, on the other hand, to reduce his 
accuser’s drive by enumerating the faults committed. Only after that comes Cicero to clearing 
his defendant’s conduct of life,2 as it were forcing the accuser into defence position, because 
he—according to Cicero’s argument—attacked Plancius by distorting the provisions of lex 
Licinia de sodaliciis, that is, in unfair manner.3 This tactics highly reminds one of the 
criticism against Cato—Cicero strives to convince the judges that the prosecutors’ action, 
although it might seem to be lawful, is by all means seriously unfair. Laterensis’s accuser’s 
position could have been by no means strengthened by the somewhat condescending, 
patronising encouragement by which Cicero urged him not to give up hope: successes in 
public life will certainly not keep him waiting in the future if he learns a lesson from his faults 
and takes the advice he has just received.4 After having properly prepared the field, the orator 
refutes the actual charge of ambitus by lapidary conciseness, all the more because—as Cicero 
argues henceforth in the contentio dignitatis—Plancius’s favourable opportunities and 
aptitude, and the support provided by him, among others, to him as exiled former consul,5 
made it unjustified from the first for his defendant to use unlawful tools.6 
From the Ciceronian practice of ambitus lawsuits it can be unambiguously ascertained that the 
judgment and, as its antecedents, the role of the prosecution and the defence orientated itself 
primarily in terms of political aspects. The party who brought the charge was often a 
competitor beaten in the elections, who could not only expect the proceedings to impose 
sanctions on unlawful practices through the conviction of his one-time competitor, the 
accused in the lawsuit, but, based on Roman practice, could certainly count also on obtaining 
the office that he had not been able to obtain by winning the electors over, as a benefit of the 
lawsuit. Consequently, when deciding the issue of guilt or innocence, the judges deliberated 
the past, conduct of life of the accuser and the accused, i.e., the winner and loser of the 
elections, the necessities demanded by the situation of current politics, the eligibility of the 
parties concerned and—as Pro Murena and Pro Plancio convincingly proves it—the political 
weight of the patron who took action for the sake of the accused.7 
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